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## CHAPTER X. COALITION WAR

The local nature of the wars of the middle and the end of the twentieth century and the reasons for this. Imperialism and coalition war. — Topicality of the issue of waging a coalition war. - The possibility of local wars at the present time. - Clausewitz's doctrine of coalition war. - The Coalition War of the Napoleonic Times. - The Coalition and Imperialism. — Study of the coalition war on the threshold of the world war. — Basic principles of the coalition: political, military and economic unity. - Political unity among the states of the triple alliance and triple agreement. — Their lack of agreement on common policy goals. - State egoism. — The structure of public administration and

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its influence on the conduct of the coalition war. — A special line of the General Staff. - Federation of Workers' States. — Political leadership of the war. - Unity of the coalition in matters. peace conclusions. — Military unity of the goat. - The use of forces and means of the coalition. — General plan of action and conditions for its creation. - Unified military administration in the era of Napoleon. — The question of a unified military administration before the World War. - Its solution among the states of the tripartite alliance. - Conrad's explanations on this issue and his post-war proposals. — Dibman on managing a coalition war. — The question of a unified management of the war among the states of the Entente and its resolution in the course of the world war. - Only political unity creates a unified management of the coalition war. — Economic unity and its conditions. — Form of agreements: a) political acts; 6) military conventions; c) exchange of letters. — Political letters and their strength. — Exchange of political letters. — Non-aggression pacts. — Activities of diplomacy and the general staff

for political alliances. - Military conventions and their strength. - Exchange of letters from the general staffs. — Contents of military conventions. - Special acts on the management of war and the conclusion of peace. — Economic agreement. — The range of activities of the General Staff in concluding military conventions. — Participation in this diplomacy and ratification of military conventions .... eeee eeee eeee no

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INTRODUCTION

The vastness of the work "The Brain of the Army". - Fundamentals of research. — Austro-Hungarian General Staff. What is the end of the second book of our work. — Lack in the work of exhaustive completeness on the diplomatic history of Europe in the twentieth century and the reasons for this. — This book brings the events to the first days of the war of 1914.

In the previous two books, we have repeatedly pointed out that, having introduced the reader into the circle of the functional activities of the General Staff, we are forced to follow a long path, because, examining the war on a specific example, we do not think it possible to confine ourselves to general outlines. True, in our day there are works on the service of the General Staff, embracing no more than a hundred pages, but they are only general provisions, without concretizing them and enlivening them with the recent past. It is also true that the merit of labor is sometimes its small volume, for it is both convenient for the reader and economical in the use of labor and costly paper.

Unfortunately, we have not radio-analyzed our pen so much and are forced to speak at length about things that may seem simple. However, if the reader, who is familiar with the first books of our work, agrees with us that the topic covered in them is extensive in its very essence, then, I think, he will come to the conclusion that it is impossible to crumple the work that has begun.

We will not here again prove the full usefulness of studying the activities of the General Staff as an organ of military command, because in previous books this has been said with sufficient clarity. And today it is not necessary to talk about the brain of the army as a topic of the past.

As a basis for the study of the work of this body of military administration, we took mainly the Austro-Wenser Zeneral Stadt, whose head, Konrad, left us a solid work on his activities.

We have already acquainted readers with some of the hunktional functions of the brain of the army, and in the second book we broke off our pen on the study of foreign policy and the participation of the General Staff in it at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In chronological order, the events of the political life of Europe since 1906 have been brought by us to the end of 1914 - to the time when a kind of lull came in the political relations of the states of Europe. It is well known that such a calm state of the political barometer always heralds a storm. She was approaching...

In the second book of our work, we sketched a picture of the political life of Europe. Already in the introduction to this book, we indicated that in our

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It is by no means the task of presenting to the reader the political history of Europe at the beginning of the 20th century. This is not necessary for our work, and even life was beyond our strength. Our goal is to study the role and activities of the General Staff in the diplomatic field, and therefore only a diplomatic outline is needed, and by no means an exhaustive history of the foreign relations of the states of Europe.

We have been investigating the activities of the General Staff in the diplomatic arena since 1906 precisely because it did not start with a Sarajevo shot and led to a world war. Long before the moment when the enthusiast's revolver was unloaded on the offspring of the Habsburgs, the specter of inevitable war was already hovering on the fields of Europe.

In the second book we tried to show how, by way of crises in Europe, the atmosphere thickened more and more every year and how greedy imperialism led matters to a bloody denouement. We have sketched out in general terms the directing lines of the foreign policy of the states of Europe, and, with the completeness accessible to us, have studied the activities of the general staffs of the most important of these countries.

In the course of the historical presentation, we tried to show the falsity of the statements of the representatives of the general staffs about their apolitical nature, to reveal their participation in the formation of military alliances, to make public the documents that they created on the question of external relations with other states.

Whether they succeeded in this or not is, of course, not for us to judge. In any case, we were seized by this desire. ..

Our pen stopped at the beginning of 1944, when, after the crisis of 1913, all states seemed to have stopped thinking about war, and the general staffs! went about their normal peacetime work. In the afterword to the second book, we indicated that this is not where we intend to end our narrative about the diplomatic field and that we decided to bring the struggle on it to the moment when in the external relations of the states of Europe the pen was replaced by the sword.

With these aspirations, we continue our research, starting this book.

## CHAPTER 1 ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE WORLD WAR

Austrian Foreign Policy Tasks for 1914 According to Konrad. — The nature of the work of the chief of the general staff. - Albania and Konrad's project on the Formation of the Albanian army. Konrad dissociates himself from Franz Ferdinand. — Weed's fate. - Konrad is busy with strengthening the Romanian gravel. — Comparison of military forces in Europe. — Konrad advises Franz Josich to talk to Wilhelm about the impending war. On March 12, Konrad advises Berchtold to conclude an agreement with Germany, signed by the ministers of both countries. — Konrad on the readiness for war of the armies of the monarchy. — Specific proposals by Konrad on June 4 on preparations for a war with Rumania. — Letter from Konrad to Berchtold, June 22, 1914, on the general political situation. — Necessity of war with Serbia and Montenegro. "Austria is completely surrounded by enemies. — Konrad's departure

July 24 for maneuvers in Bosnia. — Conrad's last meeting with Franço-Ferdinand. - Austria and Romania. — Report to Konrad by a military agent from Bucharest. — Konrad and the Romanian military agent. — Conrad's policy. — Letter from Conrad on March 18 to Berchtold about the need to prepare for war with Romania. — March 95 Konrad invites Franco-Josich to find out the position of Romania. — Chernin's instructions, his despair. - Help Chernin; military agent. - Austria and Germany. — German policy in 1914 as seen by Tirpitz. - Brave cowards. — "Politics without war." — Moltke for the war. — Konrad about Italy. — Konrad on the future war and his regrets about the absence of Bismarck. Conrad's conversation with the German ambassador in Vienna. - "Two personalities interfere with the war: Franz Ferdinand and the Kaiser." — Moltke's concern for complications in the spring. — Italian military mission in Berlin. — Letter from Conrad to Moltke dated 14 February. - "Y small stone is the cause of the crash." — Letter to Moltke, 13 March. Russia and France don't want war. "England is cautiously reserved." — Moltke's concern for Rumania. "Türkiye militarily is zero." — There is a tense situation in Europe. — Moltke's faith in the strength of the tripartite alliance. - Reports by Waldersee and Moltke on strengthening the military training of the population. - Moltke's meeting with Konrad on May 19 in Karasbad. — Moltke believes that delaying the war worsens the "chances" of the middle states. "Pollio is only a man..."—The General Staff Treaty and its power. - Meeting of Wilhelm with Franz Ferdinand in Konopiste on June 12. - Memorandum on Russian policy. — Document of preventive war. — The mysterious behavior of Italy. — The Balkan states gravitating toward a tripartite alliance. - Pasic in St. Petersburg. - Participation of the Serbian General Staff in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. - Awareness 06b by the mouth of Austria. — Politics of Russia. - Trouble of the Naval Ministry to increase the fleet. — Danilov on German policy. - Special meeting on February 8, 1914. — The Russian General Staff on the Constantinople operation. — Proposals of Nemits. — Preparations for the capture of the straits. - Danilov is against the Constantinople operation. - Sukhomlinov's excuses. Rapprochement between Russia and England. - Efforts in this France. — Anglo-Russian Naval Agreement. - Landing in Pomerania. - Sukhomlinov © naval agreement with England. - Visits of the British and French to St. Petersburg. - Calmness in the military spheres of St. Petersburg. - Sukhomlinov's speech in the press. "Russia is ready." — Konrad's conversation with a military agent from St. Petersburg. — Izvolsky's confidence in the support of France. - A different assessment of France by Sukhomlinov. — France and England. — Bethmann's House of Cards.

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The local wars that broke out at the beginning of the 20th century in various places in Europe, Asia and Ahrika were only the forerunners of the global clash of states. The crises they caused in the foreign relations of the states of Europe were somehow settled at the diplomatic table, but every year a general agreement between the diplomats was achieved with great difficulty. The glow of military fires, reminiscent of the impending European war, lifted the spirits of the representatives of the general staffs, who, intensifying preparations for war, put more and more pressure on the diplomats in the board for the speedy resolution of foreign policy issues by force of arms.

More than once in 1913, peace in Europe was ready to pass into its opposite, i.e., into a state of war, and it must be said that in states that were on the verge of internal crises, like Austria-Hungary and Russia, the inevitability and necessity wars became

the main program requirements for foreign policy.

However, the year 1913, despite a new casus belli — the mission of Lehman Fon-Sanders in Constantinople — ended without an armed clash, and life seemed to go on as normal.

If we recall, in the memoir for 1914, which was reported to Frappu-Joseph on January 16, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff definitely indicated the coming armed struggle of the triple alliance with triple agreement, moreover, setting foreign policy the task: 1) to strengthen the triple alliance 2) find out the position of Rumania and 3) tie up the forces of the Triple Entente and Rumania in other directions, if she were in the opposite camp.

Conrad himself continued to work in these directions.

Meanwhile, life seemed to go on as normal. Vienna, merry Vienna, continued to pass day after day carelessly: the diplomats reveled in their recent success, and only the soul of the chief of the general staff was restless. Making it his first duty to prepare for a future war, Conrad persistently studied the issues of strengthening the army and its combat training.

The end of the Balkan crises and the transition to peaceful work made both his reports to Franz Josef and his personal conversations with Foreign Minister Berchtold rare. Conrad's meetings with Franz Ferdinand were even rarer and concerned mainly military work. The young Habsburg openly prepared a successor to Konrad, and three generals, chosen by the heir himself, were to take part in great maneuvers in the summer of 1914 as candidates for the post of chief of the general staff.

In Albania, the offspring of the German princes was seated on the throne, with the hope that this country under his rule would fall into the orbit of influence of the Danubian monarchy. However, this prince, according to Konrad, did not "grind on a bed strewn with roses", as the internal struggle continued in the country. We know what great importance Konrad attached to Albania in the event of a conflict in the Balkans, and therefore even now he sought to make this country a military factor in the hands of the tripartite alliance.

In January, the Chief of the General Staff sent a letter to Berchtold, in which he outlined his views on the formation of an Albanian standing army.

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"The current situation in Europe," Konrad wrote his letter, "is currently characterized by the fact that in the coming years it is necessary to reckon with the possibility of new Balkan wars and, to varying degrees, with a big European war."

Pointing out that Albania was of particular importance in these cases, the Commander of the General Staff developed in detail before the Minister of Foreign Affairs the need to organize a permanent, and not a militia army in Albania and send Austro-Hungarian instructors there to the military mission, as this made by Germavia in Turkey. Considering, however, that Itazil was also interested in these matters, Koprad Shekh wa Usuzki, offering

some of the instructors, for example, in the Gorpua artillery, call in Italy. The expenses for the formation of the Albanian army could be borne by Austria and Italy, providing, in general, monetary support to this country.

At the end of his report, Konrad asked Berchtold to report the question of the Albanian army to Rappz-Mosifhu and receive principal instructions from him.

On January 16, Konrad appeared in Franz Josef's office with a memoir in his hands, allowing himself to once again draw attention to the perfect secrecy of his third part about "co-specific military training." "Are you sure that these matters are not discussed in the belvedere (dvorel of the heir - B. 1.)? !" - ask the old man. Koprade replied that there was a big difference between the military office of the emperor and that of the heir: if the first one serves to transmit directive instructions, then at Frapla-Ferdanail all reports are previously discussed with the chief of the office. "It turns out to be abnormal," Konrad continues, "that reports are subject to consideration by secondary bodies, and they, and not the higher military institutions, report cases orally. This greatly interferes with proper service relations. L is convinced that Bardolph (the heir's warden's warden - BB. Psh.) is filled with the best of feelings, but the situation itself harbors unhealthy 'hepdenias'. In support of what was said, the chief of the general staff recalled the maneuvers of 1913.

"So it is in the Grazhlap region," remarked old Gabeburg.

In a conversation with Berchtold on January 26, the chief of the General Staff spoke out against the armed intervention of Austria in the Azbanian grandfathers, even if Prince Vid had lost the throne or been killed. "And in this case, we should explore something to do. There will be another candidate. For us, it is important to form an independent state out of Albapiya and do not allow it, there is no other foreign influence besides ours," said Konrad.

A month later, on February 24, in a report at Fravpa Mosif, the pachalgic of the general staff made a proposal to build roads in Semigradpi and fortifications on the Romanian grappa, because Romania should be considered as a future enemy. The old man did not agree with this, considering Konrad's arguments that every band has the right to build fortifications in itself, as does its co-creator, Italy. Frapp-Joseph gave his permission to carry out reconnaissance for the construction, if necessary, of field fortifications.

According to Konrad, Russia is actively preparing for the war, and therefore, in view of it, she agreed to provide Italy with Asetrin help in the form of sending three

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corps, it would be imperative to send Frand-Ferdivand to Rome.

"I thought," writes Kolrad in his memoirs, "that perhaps the fate of the monarchy depended on the trip of the heir."

Frani-Nosakh promised to join his ilyamen to this.

For a visual characterization of the political situation, the chief of staff



reported a comparative table of the armed forces, excerpts from which we present, setting out a memoir of 1914.

At the same time, Konrad pointed out the need to speak with Wilhelm, opening his eyes to the ongoing armament of Russia.

To the words of Frapts-Josef: "Wilhelm will not stay long and avoids such conversations," Konrad objected ardently: "Germany, it seems, does not want to notice the obviousness. She threatens her life as well as the pasha. The conversation was about Wilhelm's pending arrival to hunt in Konopist - Frapp-Ferlinand's castle.

On March 12, Konrad met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Russian armaments did not bother Berchtold, and he believed that military preparations were being made by Russia not for war in the West, but for possible clashes in Asia (in Armenia), where the Turks were embarking on new adventures.

"This supposition does not contradict my assessment of the settlement," Konrad answered, "but the Russians are definitely preparing for a war in the west, so this war is highly probable." It is necessary, according to the chief of staff, to separate the preparations for war in Asia from the preparations for the invasion in the west, where Russia and France are only waiting for a favorable situation. It is necessary to agree with Germapien what she will do, and for this, use Wilhelm's stay in VKoponiszuch. "One should not confine oneself to one conversation," Koprad taught, "but also a written den, a state act, signed by the mlnistramp of both countries."

Berchtold agreed with such a proposal and made it clear to pick it up.

At the end of the conversation, the minister unexpectedly conveyed the impression of the Eriserloger Leopold that the monarch was not military 6 and would hardly blow the zoo in the course of three years.

"Erugernog is a general, a pispector of artillery," Konrad said. - Cho, our artillery is not ready, the op is right about this. His assessment can only concern artillery, which we will continue to improve, but, in general, the real balance of forces is unprofitable for us at the present time and even worse, if we delay the decision. -

But in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, Italy is on the sidelines of moparchip, England is wavering, Serbia has not yet recovered from the war and is now less restless than three years ago, Bulgaria has been defeated. Rummytia is now a mystery, and it would be nice to have her on the side of Austria-Hepgria.

"Romania will wait," thought Berchtoll, "will speak out only when the situation is clarified."

The consequence of this conversation were two documents: a letter dated March 18 to Berchtold and a report to Franz Josich on March 25, in which Konrad elucidated the position of Romania and which we will discuss below.

Romania greatly worried the chief of staff, and on June 4, in a report to Franz Josich, he makes specific proposals: 1) about

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the division of the minimum forces against Romania in the event of a war with Russia, 2) about

the appointment of the commander of this group and 3) on the approval of the estimate developed by him for the construction of fortifications on the Romanian border for 80 million crowns.

Franz Josich was aware that Romania must be reckoned with as a future enemy, but he had doubts that Romania would not be more hostile when he learned about the strengthening of the border.

"No, on the contrary," Konrad reassured the old man, "we have the same situation with Italy."

This was Konrad's last report to old Franz before the "Sarajevo action", and this report, according to the conclusion of the chief of staff, passed under the sign of peace.

Summer time came, and the chief of the staff entered the usual circle of his work in directing field trips and preparing maneuvers.

However, three days before traveling to Sarajevo for the maneuvers, on July 22 Konrad wrote a letter to Berchtold assessing the general political situation.

"Every time I touch on the assessment of the current political situation of the monarchy," Konrad begins his letter, "I am forced to turn to the history of those facts that underlie the current situation, because only in this way can a correct assessment be made".

Having outlined all his attempts, since his appointment as Chief of the General Staff in 1906, to bring things to a war with Serbia and Chernoyuria, which he considers to be the most important, Konrad says that it is only from this point of view that the value for the Albanian monarchy should be considered, as a state that weakens Serbia and Montenegro.

If Austria attacks Serbia, Rumania will also come forward, now finding support in Russia.

"The historical background briefly outlined above leads to the conclusion that the monarchy is surrounded on its northeastern, eastern and southeastern Fronts by active opponents pursuing positive goals (Russia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro), that in the southwest it borders on a dubious ally (Italy) and only on the northwestern border has a permanent ally, which, however, is threatened by two strong neighbors (Russia and France), if you do not take into account what is being done by me, England.

Such a situation, according to Conrad, calls the monarchy to the exertion of all forces to prepare the army for the war for "being."

Returning to the Albanian question, the chief of staff speaks in favor of helping Albania with instructors, money, weapons, etc., but not with troops.

At the end of the letter, Konrad draws Berchtold's attention to the most important military measures that must be carried out in order to prepare for the "death milk", which will take place, in an evil way, on land, and not on moth.

On June 24, Konrad left for maneuvers in Sarajevo, where Francp-Ferdinand also arrived.

We will not dwell on the events in Sarajevo, as they are well known to everyone. During the maneuvers, the young Habsburg was

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very kind to Konrad and on the evening of June 27, before the departure of the chief of staff for a field trip, he very affably said goodbye to him. "So, goodbye to the maneuvers," were the last words of the former friend, and now a hidden enemy, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, Franz Ferdinand. Meanwhile, the pistol of the Serbian student was already being loaded...

We have characterized Conrad's activities in the field of foreign policy in general, but we know that the chief of the general staff was not only a leader who summarized the data of the political situation: he himself sought to create it, receiving reports from his military agents, in isolation scattered across different countries.

In these views, we will allow ourselves to dwell in more detail on the consideration of the relationship of the monarchy with various countries, as they were drawn by Conrad and his confidants - military attachés in various states of Europe.

"The most important and topical issue of foreign policy during this time," Konrad tells us, "was the clarification of the relationship between Austria-Hungary and Romania, primarily for military reasons."

From the foregoing, we know what position Conrad took on the Romanian question and why, for military reasons, he sought to keep Romania in the bosom of the tripartite alliance.

On January 3, the military agent of the monarchy, Garnilovich, who was in Vienna, had a report from Conrad. Both exchanged views on a possible rapprochement between the Romanians and Serbia and Italy. In any case, the rapprochement between the Romanians and the Serbs seemed to be a fact, and therefore the chief of staff considered it necessary to frighten Romania with the rapprochement between Austria and Bulgaria.

Garnilovich believed that the most important obstacle to rapprochement < Romanian is the position of the Hungarians in the Romanian question. Tisza and his friend Chernin, appointed ambassador to Bucharest, could do a lot in this regard, but they, above all, run into the resistance of Franz Ferdinand.

On January 22, Conrad was visited by a Romanian military agent, and on February 12, the chief of the general staff paid a visit, and asked the owner to bring his entire conversation with him to the attention of the Romanian government.

The Romanian was frightened by the rapprochement between Austria and Bulgaria and convinced Conrad of friendship, for for 40 years Romania had been in such relations with Austria-Hungary.

Conrad did not object at all to such feelings of the Romanian and wished that relations would continue to be the same. Meanwhile, Rumania is in alliance with Serbia and is striving to wrest Semigradie from Austria.

The military agent, of course, protested against such "plans" and pointed out that if anyone thought of this, it was only the press. Here's another thing

— Bessarabia. In Romania, on the contrary, there is a party that is in favor of becoming part of Austria-Hungary, but with the fact that the Romanian regions will go to Romania.

"A great idea," replied the chief of staff, "but such requirements must be agreed © by the Hungarian statehood, which is 1000 years old. Think, if the monarchy falls, then it will be iho for Romyshia and Germany. If the Slavs, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro,

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form a strong Slavic state, they will certainly destroy the monarchy. What would you like? An Austro-Hungarian monarchy with Serbia and Montenegro included in it, or a strong South Slavic state?!"

"Naturally, Austria-Hungary," answered the military agent.

"Then there is no need to flirt with Russia; Russia's path to Constantinople leads through Rumania," Konrad said to make his arguments more convincing. -

As is known, Romania now prefers a strong Yugoslavia rather than a restored Austria-Hungary, insuring itself against this by creating the Little Entente.

Konrad painted enticing prospects for the military agent. "Now Romania has all the advantages to do good deeds," advised the Chief of the General Staff. - Circumstances are now against the pass, but this is temporary. If Rumania is far-sighted, then she must appreciate the benefits of her current position. Bulgaria wants to get Dobruja, Russia wants the road to Constantinople, but we don't want anything from Romania."

Romania was frightened most of all by "great" Bulgaria.

"You must not forget," replied the chief of staff, "that just as "great" Bulgaria is unpleasant for you, so we cannot endure "great" Serbia."

How the Romanian government, to which they were addressed by the chief of the general staff, took all these arguments, we do not know. But on the other hand, it is well known that Romania continued to draw closer to Serbia and Greece, sought a loan in France, and gradually gravitated more and more towards Russia.

Conrad, meanwhile, was no less active in the preliminary development of military considerations in the event of a clash with Romania, although on March 16 the German ambassador in Vienna convinced him that the Romanian sympathies were on the side of the tripartite alliance, and therefore military training should not be conducted, for this will only give the Romanians a reason to say: "the treacherous Austria-Hungary is arming itself against Romania."

On March 18, the clerk of the headquarters considered himself obliged to send a letter to Berchtold, in which, having outlined the hostile monarchist structure in Romania even in government circles, he reported that, according to a report from a military agent, a war plan was being developed with Austria-Hungary, that the Romanians were trying to receive now maps of Semigradia already unofficial

through, but through intermediaries, and in large numbers. Yokonrad found it beyond doubt that Romania would take a hostile position in the future collision.

According to Koprada, it is now necessary to prepare for war with Rumania, because this preparation requires a lot of time, money and labor. Relations with Romania develop similarly to relations with Italy: both countries are both friends and enemies at the same time.

On March 25, Konrad presents a report to Franze-Joseph on the same topic. Noting that in his memoir for 1914 he indicated the importance of Romania in the event of a major European war and said that "the most important task of diplomacy is to prevent Romania from being in the camp of our

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Prinnaniaaaaaninnin < ID of the opponents," the chief of the general staff, after describing in detail the situation in Bucharest and wrapping the Viennese diplomacy in passivity, comes to the conclusion that in the event of a war of a tripartite alliance with tripartite consent, Romania must immediately be considered as an enemy.

The Chief of the General Staff proposes to require the Romanian to openly and document their relationship to the tripartite alliance both in diplomatic and military relations. We must first reach an agreement with Germany on this issue.

Konrad is radical in his conclusions and sees a way out: either the entry of Romania into a monarchy like Bavaria with the transfer of Transylvania to it, then a strong Central European bloc (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Romania) would be formed, which would not be afraid of Russia or Italy and could pursue an active policy against the Serbians, or else to consider Rumania a rival and prepare for war with her.

Konrad is not afraid that the Romanians, just as they did with the Bulgarians, can strike from the rear and occupy Semigradia, because it is necessary first of all to win success against the Russians.

Considering this issue very important for the destiny of the monarchy, Konrad asks for instructions on which way to stop, i.e., whether to consider Romania in an alliance or an enemy.

The document took effect and the newly appointed envoy to Romania, the notorious Chernin, was entrusted with the mission to regulate relations with Romania and renew the treaty with her.

On April 2, Chernin sent a rather sad letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which clearly outlined the futility of the ambassador's efforts to fulfill the task assigned to him. "I have been appointed to this position (ambassador in Bucharest—B.Sh.) without my consent and desire," wrote the desperate person. I don't lose."

The military agent Garpilovich was also brought in to help Chernin in this case. Before leaving for Bucharest, Garpilovich delivered a report to Franz Joseph and Berchtold. Francis-Josif, agreeing that Austria and Germany should conclude a joint treaty with Romania, ordered Garpilovich not to leave Vienna until he received the appropriate instructions from Berchtold to the ambassador.

Berchtold called Garpilovich to him twice and, in the presence of his closest aides and the Roman ambassador, talked to him about the situation in Rumania and the need to strengthen the border with her. Garnilovich advised to abandon the policy of sideepia between the chairs and sort out relations with Rumania right now, finding it necessary at the same time to prepare the frontier against Rumania, since otherwise the Romanians would march freely to Bucharest.

Garnilovich writes to Konrad from Bucharest about his adventures in Vienna. With "great difficulty" he managed to get Berchtold's personal letter to Chernin, which began, as was customary for a number of years, with a proposal to persuade Rumania, to prove to her the benefits of the union, etc.; The ambassador was advised in recognition of the conquests of Rumyschia under the Bucharest peace, to persuade her to openly sign the union treaty.

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Chernin actively set about his mission, but unsuccessfully. In Rumania, the army and society were against the monarchy, the king was "not the master", the Austro-Hungarian-Romanian alliance would be nothing but "a piece of paper," Chernin reported. The diplomat found that it was possible to attract Romania, Bulgaria and Greece to the tripartite alliance, but only at the expense of Serbia, and therefore he proposed, since the war with Serbia was not far off and could not be avoided, to sacrifice Serbia. These are Chernin's documents. In his memoirs, he writes: "A great disagreement has always reigned in the dress of the Romanian question in Vienna. Wha struggle between the Rumanian and Romanian-Phobe tendencies... The first group strove for a closer rapprochement between Romania and Austria-Hungary; the situation with the alliance, and whether we have a friend or an enemy on the other side of the Carpathians ... The positive task set before me was to investigate on the spot whether this alliance has any practical solution, and if I come to negative conclusion, then suggest the means and ways necessary to make it viable.

"The first part of my task," continues Chernin, "consisting in ascertaining the state of the union, was not difficult to carry out, because the very first long conversations with King Charles left no doubt in me that the old monarch himself considers this alliance very fragile... During my third or fourth audience, I proposed to King Charles to legitimize the alliance treaty, that is, to ratify it in the parliaments of Vevey, Budapest and Bucharest. The fear that seized the king from one of my proposals, the mere thought that the strict secret in which this alliance is kept could be violated, this fear proved to me that under the given conditions it is impossible to infuse life into these dead letters.

"My reports kept in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs leave no doubt that I answered categorically to the first question put to me, that under present conditions the union with Rumania is just a piece of paper."

"The solution of the second question, whether there are ways and means to breathe life into the union treaty and what are the options, was as easy in theory as it is difficult to do in practice. An obstacle to close rapprochement between Bucharest and

Vienna was served, as already mentioned above, by the question of the great Romanianpi, that is, the desire of the Romanians to unite with the "brothers in Semigradia." The Hungarian point of view, of course, went completely against these wishes.

By the way."

Noting that Filippescu, one of the instigators of the war, proposed to Chernin the project of Romania joining Austria-Hungary on the rights of Bavaria, Chernin writes: "I frankly admit that I seized on this plan with both hands." Cherpip didn't know that the butcher of the general staff of the monarchy had long claimed authorship in this project.

"I still think even now that if this idea had been carried out then, it would really have resulted in a coalition of Rumania with Austria-Hungary, that the publication of an alliance treaty would not meet

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there would then be no obstacles and that, as a result, the outbreak of war would find us in a different position. Unfortunately, this idea met with a sharp rebuff from Tissa from the very beginning. Emperor Franz Josich fully agreed with his point of view, and it immediately became clear that no arguments would help here. On the other hand, no one at that time thought that the great war, along with it the test of the alliance, was so close.

Romania, on the one hand, entered the orbit of influence of the future Antapta, and on the other hand, tried to draw Turkey into the Balkan grouping (Romania, Serbia and Greece) in order to protect itself from Bulgaria. The military attache from Germany wrote to Koprad on May 5: "Waldersee considers the situation unsatisfactory. Rumania, in his opinion, should not be counted on. The Russian ruble and the franc strengthened there, working against the pass ... There is nothing to think about changing public opinion in the near future.

Garpilovich, who arrived in Vienna on May 25, pointed out to Konrad that Romania should be considered an enemy, but that there was still no agreement with Serbia against the monarchy, but there was an agreement directed against Bulgaria, since the Romanians were very afraid of her.

My: We already know that the Chief of the General Staff made a definite decision, striking Romania out of the list of allies of the central states of Europe.

With the "main" ally, without whom, in the opinion of the chief of the general staff, any active policy was unthinkable—with Germany, relations were, as before, not specified. True, the German emperor lately seemed to support Austria in her actions in the Balkans, but at the same time pursued his policy in Greece, which, "in the end, must turn against us," as summarized Francp-Josich. Austria's aspirations to establish itself in Asia Minor were hindered not only by German diplomacy, but also by the "German General Staff," as a military agent from Constantinople reported to Konrad.

Thus, the policy of both allies did not go hand in hand, and at serious moments in history, additional conversations were still needed, and therefore, in order to avoid any surprises, as we have heard, Konrad suggested that Franco-Josich decorate all negotiations with a documentary 10s-

a deed of gift signed by the ministries of both countries, and not rely on the good mood of Wilhelm's spirit alone.

To outline the policy of Germany before the war of 1914, it is necessary to write a lot of straps. A myriad of authors of various paths and shades have written books on this subject, and it is not for us to enter into competition with them.

It is not our task to obviepie or justify Germany in the wake of the world war. For us, it is only interesting to trace the general tendencies and work of the German General Staff before the World War, its connection with the policy of its own country and its relations with the Austrian General Staff. And this task is vast, and, given the size of our work, we can only embrace the general whole, giving details in those cases when they are necessary to characterize this or that person, this or that assumption.

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DIARROW ADVOCACY

"The winter of 1914 passed outwardly calmly," writes Jagow, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Germany, in his book "The Causes and Beginnings of the World War," but he immediately admits that the mission of Limap Von-Sanders aggravated relations with Russia. One way or another, but for German diplomacy it could not be a secret of Russia's preparations for war, showing that without blood she would not yield her influence in Kopstantinopol. The whole question was how much France and, mainly, England would support Russia. Without the latter, the Franco-Russian alliance was not terrible for Germanip.

In short, German diplomacy, seeing the looming specter of a European clash, nevertheless tried to put it off until a time of greater military readiness.

If you listen to Tirpitz, and other Germans as well, a large share of the responsibility for the war falls on the head of German diplomacy headed by Capzler Bethmann hfon-Hollweg.

Tirpitz, in his Memoirs, states categorically that before the war Germany had not yet attained sufficient power to ensure her security. "Germany in its position could only be protected from harm by a completely exceptional adaptation to changing conditions. We dared not allow ourselves to make mistakes. Bismarck once said, when someone complained to him about the Reichscanpler, General Caprivi: "Wait, only when you get a real bureaucrat in your Cavaliers, you will have to go through something" ...

"Such a Dreamer as Bulow's successor (Bethmann-Hollweg - B. TsG.), due to his insufficient ability to assess the situation, fell victim to the intricacies of our world situation. The main condition for any leader of the German Empire was and always remains an understanding of foreign policy. This does not necessarily require the black magic of diplomacy; knowledge of the actual basic relations of the world and the ability to make a certain forecast are necessary. The Chancellor and the Democracy had no idea of the real difficulties and dangers of ours. position, to which we had to touch carefully, armed with tweezers. |

The common basic mistake of our time was that he



the great, but still insufficient prestige of force which Bismarck left us as a legacy, we used up piecemeal, in constantly repeated antics, in which our peacefulness as well as our nervousness showed through, and which were easily followed by simple submission, so that . among the enemies, a fatal nickname for us could have become stronger: "roMkhonz vaPengeikh" ("brave cowards" - B. Sh.).

The tragedy of the denouement lay in the fact that the most peaceful policy in the world (! B. Sh.) imagined that the unfavorable situation could be corrected by such antics that gave our malicious enemies a reason to suspect us of striving for war and, thus thus, gave them the opportunity, by means of the most monstrous slander in world history, to distort the image of our people ...

The situation in my own department (in the navy - B. Sh.) allowed me to doubly condemn any of our demonstrative actions in.

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world politics. On the other hand, I noticed, not without fear, what a poor idea we had in general about the political, strategic and economic situation in the Soviet Union, about its gigantic prospects and about its special pitfalls ...

Our political leadership failed to attract  
allies and sympathies "...

Tirpitz even tells us: "In one of his conversations with Wagenheim, the cannibal, according to Wagenheim's broadcast of April 23, 1914, also spoke of a "policy without war" and the dangers of preventive war; while he declared that our national wealth is growing to such an extent that in ten or fifteen years we will overtake all the nations of the world. Then in world politics, which ultimately represents economic policy, it will be in a secure position. Our task, in his opinion, was to survive this time without big CONFLICTS.

The reader, of course, will agree that the "policy without war" was also very smiling at the Viennese diplomacy.

Koprad did not believe in it, Moltke, the chief of the German general staff, did not believe, who had long been preparing for the bloody battle of the "German  
nism with Slavism.

Germany, like Austria, actively sought out allies and sought to strengthen ties with Italy. We heard that Wilhelm "flirted" with Greece, introduced his influence in Turkey and tried to keep Romania in the union. Finally, he was not in the least prone to bullying in relations with England.

In the winter of 1914, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff discussed current political events with both the German military agent and the German ambassador in Vienna.

On January 4, a military agent initiated Konrad: "General Molte tends rather towards war, but the Higher Georgias are for peace... The Kaiser wants to have free hands for a big war."

Konrad believed that there could be three possible solutions: 1) do nothing that would deepen the danger; 2) go to a big war, which would be an all-in game, and 3) wage an isolated war against Serbia, which is possible with Russia's neutrality.

A month later, the conversation was repeated, and the military agent informed Konrad that the Italians would abandon their corps against France.

"If it comes to a big war," Konrad objected, "they will hardly be zealous. If the war is successful for us, then the birds will make a good deal: they will get Nitzpa, etc. If the war is lost, they will say to the Entente: "We did not particularly come out against you, give us South Tyrol for this, etc. ". Therefore, Italy should be more strongly bound by obligations.

Konrad then warned his interlocutor that Germany must be on her guard at all times against Russia, which was pursuing an active westward policy.

When the military agent questioned whether Russia would come forward, the chief of staff replied: "I think more yes than no. It would seem better if

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It happened sooner, for our situation will not improve. We must realize clearly that we are moving towards a struggle for "being." If we win, then Germany and Austria will keep everything in their hands, if we lose, then Germany will break her neck. The Slavic danger is coming. In 1908, I was the only one who foresaw this and said: "fate." But, at the wish of Germany, they limited themselves to a peaceful policy. If a German emperor had been like Wilhelm G with Bismarck on the side, who knew well that the solution of this Austro-Hungarian question affected the interest of Germany as well, it would have been completely different.

We know that Konrad lost faith even in Wilhelm and on March 16 offered Franz Joseph to take a receipt-document not from the Kaiser, but from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Empire in loyalty to the alliance.

On the same day, the chief of staff saddened Chirsky (the German ambassador in Vienna - B.Sh.) that he would like a quick war with Russia, to which the ambassador replied: "Two personalities interfere with this - your Archduke Franz Ferdinand and my Kaiser." In the opinion of the ambassador, both can only be sent to war when they stand before the accomplished *Faht*, and for them the political situation should be such that there is no other way out than war.

Konrad confesses that he thought to himself of the Balkans, where there was no lack of such occasions.

Chirsky was convinced of Romania's allegiance to the tripartite alliance and asked not to strengthen the borders and not to frighten the Romanians, to which Konrad replied that one had to reckon with Germany's desire.

As we have seen, in the opinion of the German military agent, his chief Moltke was more inclined towards a big war than to a "policy without war."

In the quiet of his office in Berlin, on February 22, in a tender letter to his wife, the Chief of the German General Staff wrote, among other things: "With the approaching spring, the political crisis begins again, as every year. In Austria they see that Russia's policy is directed against her. and Austria, in military relief, as a result of her incomprehensible policy against Rumania, put herself in a difficult position. Well, Berlin has to settle things again. However, it's not that easy."

Poor Conrad did not suspect that his monarchy caused so much grief to Berlin, and even more so to his friend.

The latter at that time was busy with the arrival of the Italian military mission with the future commander of the army against the French at the head. As usual, in these cases, after business conversations, they always reinforce friendship with good wine and then say nice things to each other. So once again an Italian general flattered Moltke that his services were highly valued in Italy and Austria, and that he was regarded with great confidence in these countries. Moltke writes that such a review touched him very much. The descendant of Machiavelli knew how to find his way into the heart of the German "soldier", as the nephew of the "great" uncle liked to call himself.

Already in the middle of February, Conrad was already worried about the approach of March, and on February 14 he addressed a letter to his friend in Berlin, Moltke.

Konrad begins the message by 'indicating that he has been 'for some time

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hesitated whether to write this letter," but "a very serious situation" convinced him of the need to do so.

"I think," said the chief of the Austro-Hungarian staff, "it is hardly necessary to prove that Europe is again moving towards big, perhaps catastrophic, events and that, at least, the possibility of them requires being on the alert." Pointing out that the danger of war had not diminished, but, on the contrary, increased, Conrad was sure that Moltke was in solidarity with this.

Turning to an assessment of the present political situation, Conrad points out that France is lending money to Russia in order to throw her on the offensive. Hand in hand with these powers are the Balkan states, among which Romania must be included.

Serbia and Montenegro are definite enemies. Bulgaria and Albania will render weak assistance to the tripartite alliance. For the time being, it is impossible to speak reliably about the position of Turkey and Greece. What would be of great importance would be to sort things out with Rumania and keep her in the alliance.

Pointing to the antagonism that develops between the monarchy and Rumania, Conrad considers her a future enemy; it would be very nice, according to him. opinion, if this country could be kept neutral. Ekonrad finds it necessary that Germany take steps in this direction. "Had this succeeded," he writes, "an improvement would have been achieved in our military situation." <

If Italy agrees to help Germany on the French front, then it would be very good if they allocated part of their forces to the Russian

A front where the Austrians have to fight alone.

"With the enormous consequences that a great war will lead to, not a single state will decide on it lightly, but," Konrad predicts, "experience teaches that often a small stone is the cause of the crash."

At the end of the letter, Konrad asks Moltke to evaluate the modern political  
tic position.

We heard how, on February 22, the chief of the German staff pictured the role of Berlin to himself in the spring and was disturbed by the policy of Vienna, recognizing that now it is not so easy to dispel the clouds.

On March 17, a military agent gave Konrad a letter to Moltke, dated March 15.

At the beginning of the letter, the Chief of the German General Staff dwells in detail on Italian assistance, expresses his desire to complete all plans for the transport of Italian troops by April 1, hoping to reach a decision on the French front on the 22nd day of mobilization and not thinking of delaying the start of the operation due to the delay of the Italians. , which can appear in the theater of war only on the 22nd day.

Then, after arguing why Germany could commit few forces to the east, and pointing out that from April 1, 1915, these could be greatly increased, Moltke moves on to the political situation.

France is lending money to Russia in order to prepare her offensive in the west as early as possible —this must be reckoned with. Nevertheless, Moltke is more optimistic about the danger from Russia: "All the data that we have on Russia," writes Moltke, "do not speak of an aggressive

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her current position. I do not think that Russia will soon look for an opportunity or give a pretext for war with Austria or with us. Moltke is convinced that the loan is used to build barracks for the growing contingent of the army, which must be reckoned with.

"Even less than from Russia, one should expect aggressive steps from France. At present, the military situation of France is very unsatisfactory. This leads Moltke to the conclusion that France seeks to strengthen Russia and will not risk war.

"England is cautiously restrained," sums up the butcher of the German headquarters. "She is not inclined to war, but if one breaks out, she uses it to expand her power."

"What worries me as much as you," writes Moltke, "is the deterioration of good relations between the monarchy and Rumania." You can not change Romania to Bulgaria. Moltke assures Konrad that everything is being done in Berlin to keep Rumania in the union, and personally he "does not miss a single opportunity not to draw the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the importance of this issue, which is clear to him as well."

"Türkiye is militarily zero" | exclaims the chief of the German staff. "If Turkey was previously spoken of as a sick person, now it can be judged as a dying person. She no longer has any vitality and is now plowing in goppi. Our military mission is likened to a council of doctors who stands at the deathbed of an incurable patient."

"I consider the viable states of the Balkan Peninsula," writes Moltke, "Serbia and Greece." Serbia is dangerous for the monarchy. Moltke does not undertake to judge her propaganda among the Serbs of Austria-Hungary, but thinks that Serbia can be tied economically. "An analysis of what would have happened if your advice had been followed in 1908 will not now correct matters. It is necessary to take into account the situation as it is developing now, and you are right when you say that it is necessary to openly look at what is happening and, as far as possible, go ready to face the danger."

"There is no doubt that such an incredible voltage of electricity has accumulated in the European atmosphere, which threatens to discharge. But can a storm shake the strong triple alliance!? Its strength lies in mutual trust and in the honest will of each individual to strive for a common song. The above is an encouragement to me, and I am very grateful that you stand in solidarity with me on this."

So cheerfully finished Moltke's letter to his military ally, cooling his ardor and instilling fear that this time it would not be difficult for Berlin again to save the world, which Vienna threatened to parry.

From the same document it is clear that Wilhelm's "coquetry" with Greece was supported by Moltke, despite the fact that it was not to the liking of German diplomacy.

The chief of the German General Staff was concerned about the growing contradictions among the European states, but he had the hope that "this one. once, everything will go well. On April 27, regarding America's misunderstanding with Mexico, Moltke spoke in the sense that it would not lead to "international complications."

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His closest assistant, Chief Quartermaster Waldersee, wrote in a special report in May of this year: "To will now consider the world situation and the factors on which it rests, will try, without pretending to prophecy, to sketch a picture of the future, he will not pass by in order not to see that the German Empire, as far as the strengthening of the army allows, has every reason to pay serious attention to tension

all your strength."

"The main burden in the coming great war will fall on her, on her alone. Our enemies are not so stupid as not to know that only the defeat of Germany will clear the way for them. The geographical position of the latter facilitates the simultaneous attack from Phhropt and the rear. That this is envisaged - there can be no doubt about it.

Based on this, Waldersee found it necessary to conduct a more complete

universal military service.

In accordance with this proposal, the chief of the general staff sent a report to the chancellor and the minister of war, in which he insisted that every German liable for military service be trained in military affairs. Moltke asked that this measure not be postponed and that it be started from October 1914, at the latest from October 1, 1915.

Apparently, it was still possible to wait until that time. Events took their usual course, and Germany, brandishing her sword from time to time, tried to resolve disputes with England and France in Asia Minor.

Now Jagow points out to us that a great danger threatened Germany from Russia, but, as we heard from the lips of Moltke himself, so far there has been nothing to indicate the aggressive steps of the Russians against Austria and Germany.

Meanwhile, the health of the Chief of the German General Staff needed to be repaired, and on April 15 he was already at a resort in Carlebad, on the territory of the allied Austria. Taking the opportunity to see Konrad again, on April 20, Moltke invites him by letter to Carlebad for a date, if Konrad's trips lay near the resort.

Konrad immediately responded to the invitation and, thanking for his friendship, emphasized that the meeting in Carlebad smiled at him very much. However, in view of the love of "our press" for the search for sensations, there is a danger of various comments about the meeting, and therefore Konrad found it necessary to ask permission from Franz Joseph. The letter ended with the message that the chief of staff's life was proceeding normally and his health did not inspire fear.

On May 8, Konrad received permission to travel and, having agreed with Moltke on the time of the meeting, on May 12 he left Vienna and on the same day, towards evening, he already cordially shook hands with his friend.

The conversation began with an assessment of the political situation, and in response to Konrad's remark that the Romanians could not be counted on and should be considered enemies, Moltke declared that Romania would remain neutral at first and would wait.

Subsequently, the conversation touched upon the sore point for the Austrians about the strengthening of the German troops in the east, which we will not touch on for the time being.

"Can any direct support be expected from Italy?" Konrad asked.

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"Pollio is inclined," answered Moltke, "in addition to three corps, to put up another part of the forces to help Austria-Hungary"; Subsequently, Konrad and Moltke discussed the use of this support.

Then "talked about the possibility of war."

Moltke expressed the opinion that every delay in the war worsens the chances of a tripartite alliance, because one cannot think of competition with the "Russian masses." Germany is waiting for England's announcement that she will not intervene in the war, but, in Moltke's opinion, England will not give such an assurance. Concerning

Italy, then the Chief of the General Staff is confident in the real loyalty of the Italian official circles, and especially General Pollio.

Conrad was also inclined to such an assessment of Italy, but... "Pollio is just a man who may not be tomorrow," the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff predicted the death of an Italian associate. And therefore, - said Conrad, - "we cannot count on Italy with confidence." He was not convinced by Moltke's report that Pollio proposed signing a military convention and even sent military considerations to Berlin, which, however, after consideration, were not accepted.

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The Austrian colleague felt that Italy should in practice prove its loyalty to the alliance by refusing assistance from Albania, Serbia and Montenegro. "A treaty signed by only three chiefs of general staff," Conrad categorically stated, "does not have any obligatory force, it must be an agreement of sovereigns."

Subsequently, the conversation turned to the development of the Austrian reserve formations, and Moltke found the ten-year period for their readiness to be too long. He was also interested in the question of how much Austria is counting on its Slavic and Romanian parts. "No one can be a prophet," Conrad replied. "At this time, any worries about them are excluded, but fertile ground is available and the later, the greater the danger."

After exchanging views on purely military issues and once again discussing the political situation, with Conrad expressly pointing out that "the South Slavic question remains a sharp point," the friends shook hands for the last time, never to meet again on the path of life.

On May 13, Conrad submitted a written report on the meeting to Franz Josich, and on May 25, through a military agent in Berlin, he received a written invitation to German maneuvers, which he sent to the office of Franz Ferdinand.

Thus ended the personal communication between the two Allied Chiefs of General Staff before the war. They both believed in a near armed battle, but Conrad was more pessimistic than his brother in arms. The latter was very worried that the Kaiser would take him with him on a voyage to the coast of Norway and would not give him the opportunity to undergo a second course of treatment in Carlebad, because the first one had not yet brought the necessary restoration of health.

During this period, even higher persons sometimes had friendly meetings, namely: in April and in the middle of June (on the 12th) Wilhelm came to Konopist to visit Franz Ferdinand, since, according to Yagov,

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"The heir to the throne wished to show his friend the emperor a bloom of roses in his Bohemian estate, especially beloved by him."

We have just caught a glimpse of how more important matters are decided in the resorts than those concerning everyday life, and therefore this time, according to the report of Ambassador Chirsky to Betman of June 17, Frapp-Ferdinand

I talked a lot with Wilhelm, and the former "could ascertain complete agreement of views in everything."

The conversation concerned Austria's resignations to Romania, and Wilhelm was very dissatisfied with Tisza's tough policy towards the Hungarian Romanians.

After the meeting in Konopiste, the Vienna Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to draw up a memorandum with the aim of proving the unbearable situation in the Balkans, as a result of which Austria would be forced to oppose Russia.

Pointing out that it is impossible to improve relations with Romania, the compilers of the memorandum say about Rosspi: "The last state is a danger not only to the Austrian monarchy, but also to Germavia. ...".

"For these reasons, the leaders of the foreign policy of Austria-Zengria are convinced that the common interest of the monarchy and, to no lesser extent, of Germany, requires its own in the past stage of the Balkan crisis. a temporary and vigorous action against a plan systematically outlined and encouraged by Russia, which subsequently, very possibly, will no longer be able to be counteracted.

The document ended with the drafting at a time when the Serbian student was already unloading his pistol at the mastermind behind this memorandum.

Kautsky, in his book How the World War Arose, says that "this memorandum can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a demand in the language of diplomacy for a preventive war against tsarism."

Thus, the apostle of the preventive war now turned out to be Conrad alone, followed by Berchtold, who a year ago did not want to associate his name with the war with Russia.

As for the other ally, Italy, as it went against the inner conviction of Conrad, now he saw the need to maintain good relations with this state and pastored on sending an heir to Rome in order to strengthen the sotosis more. We have heard that the Italian General Staff was actively working on the option of sending troops to the Khranpuz Front and not even helping Austria on the Russian Front. But the chief of the general staff, Pollio, according to Konrad, was a mere mortal, and with his departure everything could change. In a word, the position of Italy continued to remain enigmatic, and the statements made by her representatives did not yet signify the firmness of her fulfillment of her political obligations. Berlin and Vienna politicians forgot one factor in the policy of Italy - the threat of the English Navy. This or that policy of Italy largely depended on the policy of England.

So, by June, the triple alliance could count on the allegiance of only two states - Germany and Austria, and even then the chief of the Austrian general staff found it necessary in exchange for Wilhelm's "Nibelungen allegiance" to get a document with a Kani visa in hand.

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Lera, for he understood perfectly well that it was no longer necessary to rely on the "Nibelung" talker from the banks of the Spree. The "bones of the Pomeranian grenadier" were still dearer to Wilhelm than the Austrian interests in the Balkans.



Even in the tone of Moltke's words, during the Carlebad meeting, Koprad noticed that he treats his units with great love and care than the Austro-Hungarian ones.

Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece were among the Balkan states on which the middle states could count.

How Türkiye was regarded by the military circles of Berlin, we heard; however, this state gave a niche to the imperialists from the banks of the Spree, and they, of course, would not have broken with Turkey so easily.

We know that the idea of dividing Asia Minor captured even Vienna, which met with stubborn resistance from Germany and Italy.

Conrad did not appreciate Turkey so low, seeing in it a good patch for Russian and Serbian forces, and therefore the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff really wanted to see Turkey in alliance with Bulgaria or Romania. However, the reports of a military agent from Constantinople were far from encouraging: the desired alliances were not being established, and Turdia, on the contrary, sought to get closer to the Entente, and a special mission was sent to Russia in the summer. The secret of Turkey's gravitation is simple: money was needed, but Berlin was reluctant to give it, because of this, the Turkish government pushed to Paris. The French government, putting forward various restrictive conditions, nevertheless agreed to the quotation of the Turkish loan.

Bulgaria was shocked by the defeat and rushed from side to side without making a decision and at the same time not inspiring confidence in both camps.

Greece, in which Wilhelm pursued "his" policy, was economically heavily dependent on the French banks, and a dispute with Turkey over the islands, ready to go to war, cooled the sympathies of the Greeks for the Germans, as allies of the Turks.

Thus, all three possible allies in the Balkans turned out to be very unreliable for the Austro-German bloc.

The offspring of the German princes, who was placed in Albania to restore calm, was forced to flee, frightened by the Albanians who raised their arms. Albapia not only could divert the Serbian forces, but, on the contrary, threatened to draw in the Austrian ones, against which, as we heard, Konrad vigorously rebelled.

There remained Serbia, which had long since been counted among the mortal enemies of the Danubian monarchy. There was no need to think about any economic rapprochement with this country, because Serbia itself did not strive for this.

If we discard 15 years and recall the time before the World War, then Serbia, against the backdrop of European politics, seemed to be an "unfortunate" country that Austria was ready to swallow. "Poor Serbs" could only seek protection from strong states, not thinking about any treachery against the Habsburg monarchy, which the latter accused Serbia of.

Fifteen years have passed - instead of Serbia, Yugo-Slavia appears on the map of Europe, and the Danubian Empire is buried under the ruins of a medieval

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structures of absolutism. Now you can calmly realize the role of a small country: shepherds and pig breeders, which Serbia played in the wake of the world war.

We left the Serbian premier Pasic asking for money from the French government. The Serbian Minister apparently liked the trip very much, and after Paris he went to St. Petersburg, where on February 2 he was received by Nikolai Romanov.

The cunning Serb began, of course, with outpourings of gratitude on behalf of the king and the Serbian people for the support that Russia had given to Serbia in 1913, which had protected it from Austrian intervention.

Pashich pitifully described those ordeals and sufferings that the South Slavs endure in the Danubian Empire, waiting for help either from Russia or from Serbia.

The conversation turned to the Serbian army, which Pasic defined as 500,000 people. And then ... if you flatter, so to the end, - and in the end Pashich appeared in the new role of the matchmaker of Romanov's daughter for the Serbian heir.

\_ In a word, according to Bogaevich in his book "The Causes of War", the former boyfriend said goodbye to Pashich in a cordial way, declaring. at the same time: "for Serbia we will do everything."

Indeed, Serbia was taken under the protection of St. Petersburg, which, moreover, sought to put an end to the Montenegrin dynasty by joining Serbpi and Chornaya Gora into one state.

Having received such a letter in St. Petersburg and met with a warm welcome in Paris, relying on Rumania and Greece, the Serbian government could calmly look at the other side of the Danube, continuing its energetic work among its ugly brethren.

It would be ridiculous now to prove that Belgrade had nothing to do with the fermentation that was observed among the Slavic population of Bospiya and Herzegovina.

While Pašij was cautious in approaching the solution of the second task he had set for himself - the separation from Austria-Hungary of the areas just indicated, then the extremely napiallist groups in Serbia itself, and then the Serbian general staff, thought differently.

The Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Hartwig, constantly fanned the flames of hostility towards Vienna, and the Russian General Staff infused activity into their colleagues on the banks of the Danube.

We would begin to tell fairy tales if we repeated after numerous authors the version of the bloody insult to the Serbs inflicted by Franz Ferdinand, who chose "Vidov Dan" for his entry into Sarajevo, that is, the day of national Serbian mourning, etc. The situation was much simpler, which was well known to both Serbian and Austrian intelligence.

The reader is dreaming that to "destroy the European balance" it was enough to throw a small stone, as Konrad said about it. It was this stone that Franz Ferdinand was marked for - and, of course, not by fate,

as they would say of old, but by the employees of the Serbian General Staff.

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Serbian professor Stanoevich testifies: "After a meeting between Kaiser Wilhelm P and the Austrian Crown Prince Ferdinand in Konopiste, Colonel D. Dmitrievich, head of the information department of the Serbian General Staff, received a secret message from the Russian General Staff that the Russian government had received accurate information about the nature and purpose of the meeting between Wilhelm II and Crown Prince Ferdinand, during which Germany approved the plan of Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia and conquer it, and also promised her help and support; other information, which after that was received by Colonel D. Dmitrievich, confirmed the accuracy of the data received from the Russian General Staff. Among the Serbian public, fantastic and exciting rumors were circulated about the decisions taken at the meeting of the two monarchs in Konopiste; everyone was seized by a terrible nervousness, and the air was filled with electricity.

"When the appointments were made: the maneuvers of the Austro-Hungarian troops in Bosnia and when it became known that Crown Prince Ferdinand intended to arrive in Sarajevo, Colonel D. Dmitrievich was sure that Austria-Hungary wanted to attack Serbia. After a long deliberation, as he (Colonel Dmitrievich) himself spoke about by mouth in April 1915, Dmitrievich came to the conclusion that an attack on Serbia and a war could only be prevented by Ferdinand's decision, Kotorozo's heartfelt public opinion at that moment considered how self-defeating is dangerous against Serbia and the Serbecoto of the people, and Kai zlavnozyu the initiator of all actions against them "(our italics. - B. Sh).

Marinovich in his article "Murder in Sarajevo" ("Pravda" 1924, No. 169) writes like this:

"Serbia came out of the two Balkan wars territorially and politically strengthened, Serbian nationalism began to grow, especially in those areas that were captured by Austria-Hungary. Secret nationalist organizations were created, which found supporters for themselves mostly among the intelligentsia, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina ...

The assassination of Frapp-Ferdinand ... had been prepared even earlier by a secret organization that was in contact with a group of Serbian scoundrels known as the Black Hand. This group of officers played an important role in the preparation of the war with Turkey, it also prepared the ground for the war © Austria. At the head of these officers was Colonel Dragutin-Dmitrievich, known as "Apis"...

The epilogue of the murder in Sarajevo is interesting. During the World War, the Serbian government itself executed Dragutin-Dmitrievich, not believing in the victory of the Entente over Germany and Austria, and wanted to pave the way for negotiations with Austria, if only to preserve the power of the dynasty in Serbia.

The war ended successfully for the Serbian Patientists, and now they honor Princip as a national hero, keeping silent about the fact that the organizer of this assassination and one of the organizers of the war with Austria-Hungary was killed in the interests of the dynasty and the Serbian bourgeoisie.

We're not going to do any murder investigation.

young Habsburg, which served as a formal pretext for a world war, because for us it is completely indifferent.

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We are more interested in the fact that the organizer of this act occupied a responsible position in the Serbian General Staff, and so far it is obscure whether it was his initiative or whether the assassination was ordered and authorized by his superior commanders.

One way or another, but the hand of the Serbian General Staff was attached to the "Sarajevo murder", and one cannot but agree with M. Pokrovsky, who says in his preface to Kautsky's book: "There is no doubt that Dmitrievich lied, assuring that the murder of Ferdinand it seemed to him the only way to "prevent war": even a not very stupid little child would understand that war can only be caused by any other means. But the Serbian military, feeling the mighty hand of the northern patroness on their shoulders, did not endure the war, and the patroness played a big game - and it's not for nothing that one of the players closest to the scene of action, not mentioned by Stanoevich, but invisibly hovering over this whole picture, - Hartwig (Russian envoy to Serbia - B. Sh.) could not stand the excitement and died suddenly on the very day when the news of the Sarajevo shot came to Belgrade.

The head of the intelligence bureau of the Austro-Hungarian general staff knew about the assassination attempt on Franz Ferdinand, which was being prepared during the maneuvers, Konrad knew about this, and, perhaps, Franz Ferdinand himself. Kish, in his book The Crime of the Chief of Staff Redl, speaks of this circumstance with sufficient clarity from the words of the former head of the intelligence bureau Urbansky.

Of course, without a salary in Russia, the Serbian nationalists would hardly have dared to take a step that threatened to wipe Serbia as a whole from the map of Europe.

We left Petersburg a diplomatic victory on the question of the Liman Von-Sanders mission. However, such a victory did not please the diplomats from the banks of the Neva, and it was clear to them that the encroachments of the "other" power, i.e. Germany, to gain a foothold in Constantinople would not end with this, that this was only a temporary deviation from the program "Ogapa pasv Oz {ep "(pressure to the east - B. Sh.).

Bearing in mind the future role of the Fleet in resolving the "historical" task of mastering the straits, the Naval Ministry was greatly concerned about the future superiority of the Turkish Fleet in the Black Sea. Next to the letters addressed to Sazonov and Kokovpov, the Minister of Marine is strenuously fussing about the purchase of military ships available on the market for the Russian Navy, about the prohibition of Turkey to do the same, about the delay by England of building two dreadnoughts for Turkey and about permission to pass to the Black Sea. dreadnoughts of the "Petropavlovsk" type in the Baltic.

"International political considerations, the crisis of the "Eastern question" and the associated anxieties, dangers and the threat of irreparable damage to the state interests of Russia in the issue of mastering the straits of Bosphorus and the Dardanelles ... Strategic considerations: then the inevitable rejection of the operation of the attack on Constantinople and the Turkish straits, the plight of our Caucasian armies, deprived of their naval

communications and a threatened bypass from the right flank by means of a Turkish landing, and the risky position of the left flank of our mass army

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on the western border, with the insecurity behind us of the Black Sea coastline from Odessa: to Sevastopol and, finally, considerations of domestic policy (in the event of war - the moral impression of a new defeat of our fleet, inflicted on memory long ago, it would seem, by the crushed Turpia) - all these considerations, as well as the inevitable, in view of them, an even greater decrease in the weight of the Russian voice in an international concert, which, in the opinion of wide circles of society, is not significant enough, force us to take all possible measures to weaken the heavy consequences effects of the temporary domination of the Turks in the Black Sea.

"What is not the style of Conrad!" - the reader of these lines from the letter of the Russian naval ministry will say. Sazonov gave full approval to the thoughts of the authors of the letter, and Kokovtsov doubted the possibility of escorting ships to the Black Sea, but the maritime ministry explained that it was possible to form a special detachment in the Mediterranean Sea, because it was possible to use the Francoise base for our fleet.

As a result of the efforts of the Naval Ministry, on March 17, a draft law "On the allocation of funds for the hasty strengthening of the Black Sea Fleet in the period 1914-1917" was submitted to the State Duma.

"The year 1914 has come ...," writes the former Russian Quartermaster General Danilov in his book Russia in the World War. "Nothing in Russia foreshadowed the beginning of the storm that was destined to break out in this fateful year. True, a clash of peoples in Europe must have seemed inevitable in the more or less near future. The atmosphere became more and more tense every year, but everyone, however, hated to think that the clouds had not yet hung so low that a thunderstorm could break out with such stunning speed and menacing force.

"Europe was strenuously, but still only gradually preparing for war."

"But who threatened the world peace"? - Danilov asks and gives the answer: "Undoubtedly, the main threat to the world was the new international position that Germany wished to occupy after a series of victoriously waged wars of 1864-1871."

"The continental plan of Germany, which tended to assert its influence in the Balkans and the Middle East, naturally could not but arouse the most cautious attitude towards it on the part of Russia, for which this plan created the greatest threat to her most vital interests - ideological, political and economic. Russia, in fact, under no circumstances could give up its historical role as a protector and patroness of the small Slavic peoples, whom Germany was to meet on her all-destroying path in the east. At the same time, deeply interested in the regime over the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, Russia could not, of course, allow the establishment of the predominant influence on the shores of the Sea of Marmara of the Germans, as a force clearly hostile to it. Finally, a certain danger to the economic interests of our homeland was also the desire of Germany to penetrate into Persia.

This is how Danilov now evaluates Germany's policy, making it clear that every step taken in the east caused damage to Russia's various interests, up to and including its "historical" missions in the Balkans.

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Although Russian diplomacy won the appointment of Liman Von Sanders, however, it was necessary to prepare for a new struggle for Constantinople and the straits, and therefore the adjourned special meeting, which Sazonov requested in his report on November 23, 1913, was nevertheless convened. February 8, 1914.

In view of the interest of this meeting, we allow ourselves to dwell on it and warn in advance that we will give a significant place to the role of Russia in the unfolding events of 1914.

"Journal of a special meeting on February 8, 1914" says that it took place under the chairmanship of Sazonov, with the participation of: Chief of the General Staff Zhilinsky, Quartermaster General Danilov, Second Chief Quartermaster Averyanov, Minister of the Navy Grigorovich, temporarily and. about. Chief of the Naval General Staff Nenyukov, Chief of the Second Operational Unit of the same Staff Nemitsa, Comrade Minister of Foreign Affairs Neratov, Russian Ambassador in Konstantinopol; Girs and three officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Trubetskoy, Byutspov and Basili, of whom the last two kept the journal. Minister of War Sukhomlinov was absent.

As can be seen from the composition of the meeting, it was exhaustive for the departments concerned.

Opening the meeting, Sazonov introduced the purpose of the conference to those present, pointing out that he had submitted a report in which he expressed the opinion that "due to the change in the political situation, it is impossible not to foresee the possibility of an offensive, perhaps even in the long term events that will drastically change the international situation of the Fontan- tinopol Straits" and that therefore "it is necessary without delay, with the cooperation of the relevant departments, to begin the development of a comprehensive program of action aimed at ensuring a favorable resolution of the historical question of the Straits".

"Remarking," says the journal, "that at the present moment the occurrence of significant political complications seems unlikely, the Minister for Foreign Affairs declares that it is impossible, however, to guarantee the preservation even in the near future of the existing state of affairs in the Middle East."

Referring to this in detail, Sazonov "expresses his firm conviction that if, by the force of events, the straits should blow out of the power of Turkey, then Russia cannot allow another power to strengthen their faco-lido on the trees and may therefore be forced to take possession of them." Therefore, Sazonov proposes to discuss the issue of the landing army, its composition and mobilization.

The chief of the general staff, first of all, points out that a fairly significant number of troops is needed to take possession of the straits, which will be determined depending on the political and strategic situation of the operation. Zhilinsky plans the appointment of two corps and in the first eshe-

none at least one building.

Of the opponents, Zhilinsky first of all names Turkey, which intends to leave three corps in the area of the straits.

To this, Sazonov adds that Greece may turn out to be against Russia.

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and Bulgaria, but, most likely, due to their mutual enmity, one of them will be with Russia, and the other against Russia.

"To the question whether we cannot count on the support of Serbia in such a case, Sazonov replies that it cannot be assumed that our actions against the straits would take place without a general European war, and that one must think that under such circumstances Serbia will direct all its forces against Austria-Hungary".

In response to Zhilinsky's instructions about the important role for Russia of Romania, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, noting that there was a military convention between Romania and Austria against Russia, "to some extent" doubted whether Romania would really oppose Russia in the event of a war with Austria; According to Sazonov, Russia has no positive grounds for counting on this.

"Returning to the question of our possible adversaries in the straits," the protocol reads, "Sazonov points out that in the event of a collision with the triple alliance, Germany and Austria will not send any troops in the direction of the straits and that only, in the worst case, Italy can send a landing detachment there, although it will be dangerous for her to expose her frontier with France.

In response to these strategic considerations by Sazonov, "referring to what the Minister of Foreign Affairs said about the general situation in which a resolution of the question of the straits can be expected, the Chief of the General Staff, for his part, expresses the conviction that the road for Constantinople is hardly possible without a pan-European war. In view of this, Zhilinsky considers it his duty to emphasize that the expenditure of troops on an expedition against the straits, and even the very possibility of this operation, depends on the general conjuncture of the war. The southern corps planned for this expedition, according to Zhilinsky, can be moved to Constantinople only in the absence of a struggle on the Western Front or a favorable state of affairs on it. Otherwise, these troops will have to be sent to the western border, for a successful struggle on the western border will favorably resolve the issue of the straits. According to the war plan, the planned forces for the landing force are going west, and there is no one to replace them, and troops from the Caucasus cannot be taken, as Girs suggested.

Danilov points out that the Caucasian troops are lagging behind in mobilization, and therefore their use for landing is impossible. "The Quartermaster General," reads the magazine, "then expresses himself resolutely against the possibility of destining certain units exclusively for the expedition to Constantinople. According to him, regardless of the difficulty of the task of capturing Constantinople, which lies in the depths of the Bosphorus, no matter how many troops we have, even much more than now, we will always have to provide for the need to direct all our forces to the west against Germany and Austria. We must strive to ensure success at the core. war theater; with a victory in this theater, favorable solutions will come to us for all private issues.

Of course, the soul of a Russian sailor could not recognize the "seizure of the straits" as a "private issue", and Nemits issued a rebuke to the land general staff.

"Captain Nemits," the log says, "thinks that we should

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Precisely at the same time as the operations on the western frontier, occupy the straits of Constantinople by military force in order to create, by the time of the peace negotiations, the accomplished Fact of our taking them over. Only in this case will Europe agree to the resolution of the question of the straits on the conditions on which we need it. According to Nemid, it is necessary to form three new corps: "Such a new sacrifice for armament cannot be recognized beyond the strength of Russia, if this should ensure the achievement of our historical tasks."

"Responding to Nemits, the chief of the general staff points out that his idea of creating three more corps for the Constantinople expedition is not currently feasible. The straits are of such great importance in the eyes of every Russian that we can say for sure that if there is a danger of their passing from Turkish rule into foreign hands, we will not be able to refuse to seize them and, consequently, we will immediately send a landing army to Constantinople. One must think that this can happen only during a crisis that will break out into a pan-European war. But a war on the straits for Constantinople may precede a clash on our western front."

The meeting then proceeded to discuss the state of the technical preparations for the Expedition of Constantinople and to determine the measures needed to improve and speed it up. The exchange of opinions showed that the preparations were in a rather deplorable state, because there were not enough means of transport and the troops could arrive in Constantinople within 14 days, or, in case of preliminary preparations for the mobilization of the voluntary Fleet, within 7 days. Sazonov expresses the wish that the said period be reduced to five days after the announcement of mobilization.

"Having finished reviewing the main questions," says the journal, "raised by the need for systematic preparation in the near future for our occupation of the straits, the meeting, at the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, expresses the general wish that the government, in the person of all concerned departments, take all the measures that require technical execution. this task."

The meeting further concretizes a number of measures, which we, unfortunately, are forced to omit as not affecting the issue of interest to us at the present time.

So, it was decided, "in the near future, the occupation of the straits," although the land general staff objected to the mouth, which in the end made a concession.

What was meant by "the near future"? Looking ahead a little, we will turn to the report of the Naval General Staff to the Minister of Marine dated June 9%, in which, on the basis of the decisions adopted on February 8, 1914, a number of considerations are presented on the possibility of preparing a landing force against Constantinople calculated for the time after 1917, i.e., for the time when the Russian Fleet will dominate the Turkish. It was believed



that up to that time \$490 would remain in the straits. general

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headquarters, "should be used to capture Constantinople and provinces".

That this affair was steadily and relentlessly pursued by the Russian Naval General Staff, we think there is no doubt.

Another thing is the land general staff. Already from the very journal of the meeting it is clear how Zhilinsky and Danilov repelled this operation from themselves.

The latter now testifies: "Long before the war of 1914, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised the question of strengthening the readiness of the troops of the Odessa Military District, in order to be able to directly influence Turkey. I was a staunch opponent of such a measure and argued that in the future a war with Turkey was hardly possible without the occurrence of military complications on our western borders, and therefore it would be much more expedient to direct all the means at our disposal to strengthening our military position against Germany and Austria. . My point of view, however, was not accepted, due to the disagreement with it of the former chief of the general staff Zhilinsky, who apparently believed in the possibility of resolving the problems that were of interest to Russia through direct influence on Turkey.

Danilov, apparently, forgot Zhilinsky's speech on February 8, but, in any case, the latter showed greater compliance with Sazonov than his assistant, the quartermaster general, wanted.

We heard that Nikolai did not want to admit, according to Sukhomlinov's report as early as 1913, the technical difficulties of the landing operation to seize the straits.

Sukhomlinov now states in his "Memoirs": "With a similar view of this matter (the technical difficulty of the operation - B. Sh.) in a special meeting that took place on February 8/21, 1914 under the chairmanship of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, I did not personally participate - small. The cunning Sukhomlinov did not want to speak out against the wishes of Nikolai.

"My view of the matter," continues the former minister of war, "was well known to the chief of the general staff, who could therefore be my deputy in the meeting. In the latter, the difficulty of carrying out this enterprise was revealed ...

It was clear to me that the whole mouth of a fantastic idea in words and on paper could not have any practical result. I did not manage to convince the sovereign with my mouth - this was obviously the case when His Majesty considered the Minister of War to be incompetent in matters not of his department.

The king thus found himself on the side of diplomacy. But military. the department did not really have to then lift a finger on a finger

to carry out the project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs".

"I didn't even suspect then what a serious reason Sazonov's meeting had," the now cunning diplomat in military uniform dodges.

We heard that Sazonov himself did not deny that the straits could only be obtained through a European war, and hence the conclusion that it was necessary to prepare for such a war.

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The most war-threatening state was Germany, whose claims to Constantinople and the straits were most sensitive to Russia. True, Austria could also start a war in the Balkans and be supported by Germany. But if, in general, the war could break out in the Balkans, then Russia could not miss the opportunity.

Russia's direct ally was France, with which a military convention was concluded, known to all. After a sad lesson 1906 - 1909. Russian diplomacy persistently took up Frappia with the aim of dragging her into the war, if one broke out because of the Balkans. By the persistent and lengthy persuasion of the French diplomats, the gradual involvement of the financiers of Paris in the Balkan affairs, Russia by the summer of 1914 could be sure that France would always support her.

Another thing is England, an agreement with which was being established very slowly. If we remember, then Sazonov was saddened by Bukepan about the coldness of the island state. Kopzis, in connection with the appointment of the Liman Von-Sanders mission, further convinced the Russian diplomat of the need to strengthen the Anglo-Russian agreement. "The agreement we have concluded with England," Sazonov told the French ambassador in early May 1914, "will ensure balance and peace. The tranquility of Europe will no longer depend on the whim of Germany.

The introduction to the British documents on the world war says that the most important. the problem for the British government in the summer of 1914 was to establish certain relations with Russia. Particular difficulties were encountered in this regard in the Asian question, where the British government feared for its control over Mesopotamian oil. On the other hand, the competition in Persia, the fear of Russian influence in Akhgapistapa further increased the mutual disagreements between London and St. Petersburg. An additional agreement was needed.

Already on March 5/18, Sazonov suggested that Izvolsky use the arrival of the English king with Gray in Paris in order to! with the assistance of France to find the ground for such an agreement. Izvolsky, of course, responded eagerly to such an order, recognizing the tripartite agreement as "the best guarantee of maintaining peace in Europe." Poincare also began to make efforts in this direction. The British did not turn away from the proposals made: "According to Sir Edward Gray," Izvolsky wrote on April 29, "only a naval, and not a land convention could be concluded between us and England, for all the ground forces of England have already been distributed in advance and, obviously, Apparently, they cannot cooperate with the Russians."

The Franduzes, according to Izvolsky, "were struck by the clear and definite readiness expressed by Gray to embark on the path of close rapprochement with Russia."

The attack went on and © the other end. Buchanan tells us the following: "In the audience on April 3, the guy himself spoke about Anglo-Russian relations. No matter how much he wanted to keep good reparations with Germany, an alliance with her was, according to her, impossible, in addition to general reasons, also because Germany tried to take such a position in Constantinople that would allow her to lock Russia in the Black Sea ". Then, from the side of Nicholas, an offer of an alliance with England followed,

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to which Buchanan argued that a mouthful union would be of little use. It is much better when England is not bound by an alliance and can moderately, with more confidence than an ally of Russia, mediate in Berlin and Vienna. However, "the guy ... would prefer to give the Anglo-Russian agreement a more definite character."

The former English ambassador does not let us in on the vicissitudes of concluding a maritime convention with Russia; we won't get carried away with them either. It is important for us that such a convention was signed, morally binding, to some extent, the British. Buchanap, who argues that England did not want war, certainly does not like the stories of the convention, as does Gray, when he emphatically told the German ambassador that there were no such negotiations with Russia.

On May 13, a meeting was held with the Chief of the Naval General Staff "to exchange views on the upcoming negotiations on an agreement between Russia and England, on coordinated operations of their naval forces in the event of joint military operations between Russia and England with the participation of France."

Russian sailors and diplomats gathered, the "land" was not represented, apparently, according to the usual sea look, that the land general staff was not versed in naval strategy.

Document 0b of this meeting reads:

"Having noted, first of all, the desirability of concluding such an agreement, both from a specifically naval point of view, and, in particular, from a general political point of view, the meeting, after a comprehensive discussion of the issue, came to the following conclusions.

First of all, it was recognized that our maritime agreement with England, like the Franco-Russian Naval Convention, should have in mind the coordinated, separate actions of our and British seashores.

In relation to the strategic goals put forward from our point of view in the event of a war between the powers of the triple agreement with the powers of the triple alliance, it is necessary to distinguish, on the one hand, maritime operations in the area of the Baltic and German seas, on the other hand, the struggle of naval operations in the Mediterranean Sea. . In both of these areas, we must strive to obtain compensation from England for the diversion of part of the German naval forces to us.

In the northern theater, England should divert as much as possible of these in the German Sea, which, "perhaps, would allow, in a favorable case, to undertake a landing operation in Pomerania." With this operation,

as with Constantinople, things were again unfavorable: there were not enough vehicles, which England was supposed to provide. The poor Russian Naval General Staff: the wide flights of its strategic Fantasy ran into one thing - the lack of transport. We will refrain from criticizing naval strategic monograms—history will do it for us.

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“In the Mediterranean, we needed the help of the English fleet in order to gain an advantage over the Austro-Italian fleet, 'English bases for our ships'; 'if, in connection with the situation in the Mediterranean, we were talking about the straits, it would be necessary, without touching on the political question

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about the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to provide only temporary military measures in the straits, as one of our possible strategic operations in case of war.

We omit the technical part of the document. The convention has been concluded. “After the conclusion of the naval agreement with England,” writes Sukhomlinov, “Russian diplomacy felt strong enough to carry out plans without regard for the Germans. Public opinion was of the opinion that Russia should not again lose an opportunity and that Russian interests should not be dependent on the internal political currents of France ...

In mid-June, to cement a new military friendship, Beatty's English squadron came to Kronstadt "for a welcome visit," as Buchanan writes.

With the same visit in the middle of summer, the President of the French Republic “Poincaré – War” himself was supposed to arrive in St. Petersburg, who now emphasizes in his memoirs that his arrival can by no means be connected with the Austro-Serbian conflict. We will not object to this now, we only recall that back on June 18, Izvolsky reported to Sazonov: "Noincaré said that these visits, in his opinion, could bring a certain share of benefits to the policy of tripartite consent."

Petersburg, bureaucratic Petersburg, lived its own life, "statesmen" talked about traveling to the resort: and some, like Sukhomlinov, had already managed to go to the resort. True, workers' strikes were spreading in St. Petersburg, a revolutionary wave was approaching, but ... this concerned the Ministry of the Interior, while in the rest everything was “calm”. Diplomats planned the war for 1917, by which time the army and navy were preparing.

My!: We heard Danilov's thoughts about calm in St. Petersburg. Sukhomlinov also writes that "at the beginning of 1914, the Russian military ministry did not expect war." “In the main department of the general staff at the end of the winter of 1913-1914. The camp schedule was drawn up as usual... As usual, in May, all the troops left their barracks, the artillery began practical firing. In July, preparations were made for the maneuvers planned for the winter. Contrary to the calmness in the army, in the press the political horizon became darker and darker. The assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne and the Austro-Serbian conflict were distant flashes of lightning, while the trip of the French president to St. Petersburg was a thickening of thunderclouds over the Neva; an unbearable oppressive stuffiness prevailed.

However, the Minister of War himself was also not averse to thickening this atmosphere, giving food for the press.

"In the spring and summer of 1914, I was twice forced to intervene in political issues. The controversy in the press assumed extraordinary proportions. All the newspaper editorial offices of the world turned out to be highly nervous in our St. Petersburg and Berlin. The mission of Liman Sanders in Turkey gave us the impression that in Constantinople they want to organize military units to help the Turks at any time, according to need, and to close the straits. And that meant war. Of this the sovereign had no doubt. In "Kelnish Zeitung" appeared

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article © with attacks against the Ministry of War, which could not remain unanswered in view of the fact that it was full of false evidence about the development of the Russian army and accused us of preparing an attack on Germany. I strongly objected to this article. German pilots, descending even in the Urals, gave public opinion reason to fear that Germany, for its part, was preparing an attack on Russia. These frictions would not have had such a profound effect, perhaps, if the danger had not simultaneously appeared on the horizon, at the moment of the critical situation in the Balkans, consisting in the possible loss of the practical foam of the Russian-Franpuz alliance. In France, the Doumergue-Cailliot cabinet, backed by a radical leftist majority that was not at all sympathetic to Russia, was given the opportunity to direct new elections, which, in turn, gave Doumergue the opportunity to place the electoral apparatus entirely at the disposal of these pacichist, in relation to us hostile parties. In this regard, the result of the elections in favor of the left radicals coincided precisely with that important moment when the question of introducing a three-year term of service, which Geoffre and Poincaré had promised us, was adopted by Parliament. In order to force the French to remember their duty, at the same time to alleviate our panic mood and raise our self-confidence, I ordered the publication of that article in Birzhevy Vedomosti, which the Germans took for a threat at the address: Russia is ready, France should also be ready." It was at the beginning of June. This article failed to calm St. Petersburg, just as the information about the attitude of the new French government towards Russia, which soon became public, failed to calm the nervous mood.

Of course, this crude chauvinistic trick of the Minister of War "could not calm anyone down," as he himself admits today, for it was an excessively crude juggling of reality.

"If geperakh Sukhomlinov, who held the post of Minister of War, threw in one of his interviews, which caused a lot of noise, his own: "Russia is ready," writes Danilov, "then, in essence, these words were only frivolous drivada or rather cheap political bluff" (B. Sh.)

However, the fact remains that the Minister of War frightened his opponents and even his co-defendants with "obviously unsuitable means", because, as mentioned above, if Koprade saw a threat in the armaments of Russia, then the chief of the German General Staff did not particularly trust Sukhomlinov's enshchlag "Russia ready", posted in 1914, also assessing the military readiness of France. Konrad explains to us partly such a difference

in the views that the lack of financial allocations and the brake on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prevented Austria from developing intelligence in Russia.

We will focus on Konrad's orientation about Russia. On January 8, the military agent Hohenloe, who had arrived from St. Petersburg, came to him and began his report © of the Russian military preparations for the invasion of Armenia. |

"It doesn't really matter to us," Konrad interrupted and asked for an answer, "is Russia preparing for a war in the west in the near future."

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PONY AS BEER

"Yes, I think so," the military agent replied, confirming this by the fact that Russia avoids disrupting its systematic preparation for war with petty performances; the reservists were secretly detained; in the guard, which in case of war should have remained in St. Petersburg, suddenly appeared

\_warlike mood, and the guards cavalry division will be moved against Austria; The guards are pulling the Russians on the offensive to the west.

In a word, the military reforms of Russia greatly worried the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and it must be said that not without reason, because Russian diplomacy firmly decided not to take a single step back before Berlin, and as for Austria, for a successful fight against it back in late 1913 years, both the Minister of War and the Chief of the Russian General Staff vouched for their heads.

It was noted above that both chiefs of the general staff of the middle states did not think about the activity of France, and the Russian minister himself was afraid of the pacifist sentiments of the Doumerg-Cayo government of France, which was in power.

France, indeed, entered the realm of internal crises and a heated parliamentary struggle was seething in it. The financial situation of the state was difficult. As for the three-year term of service in the army, around which an energetic struggle was also in full swing, then in the end "during their 5-month stay in power, Doumergue and most of his colleagues could be convinced of the absolute need to maintain a 3-year term of service under the banners", - as Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov on June 3, 1914, adding: "They say that the Left bloc does not intend to demand the slow repeal of this law and a return to a two-year period."

As for the mood of the Francoise cabinet in relation to Russia, about which Sukhomlinov was so worried, Izvolsky noted in his letter of May 21: from the point of view of our immediate interests of the Russian-Kranpuzian union, we will have no reason to rejoice at the departure of Doumerga, who expressed and continues to express in relation to us no less loyalty and courtesy than his predecessors.

When Doumergue left and Viviani became the head of the cabinet, on July 1, 1914, Izvolsky wrote to Sazonov: "You, of course, noticed Viviani's conversation with the local correspondent of Novoye Vremya. This speech obviously has a double purpose: to explain at once to the French public

the opinion and the parliament that the current cabinet, although it relies on extreme left parties that are fundamentally not sympathetic to Russia, is nevertheless quite sincerely devoted to the Russian-Kranpuz union; then Viviani's words, no doubt, are also addressed to the Russian public, in view of his forthcoming arrival with the president of the republic in St. Petersburg. I know that Viviani is deeply happy with the idea of his trip and is very fond of making a good impression on us.

In the month of April, the ties between Paris and London were also strengthened - during the arrival of George and Gray in Paris. Between France and England there was a Naval Convention, worked out in detail, and a political agreement in the form of an exchange of letters between Gray and the French Ambassador in London.

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in November 1912. Its essence boiled down to the following: "If one of the governments had good reason to fear either an attack by a third power or any event threatening the general peace, this government should immediately carefully consider © others whether both governments should act together in the form of prevention attack or keep the peace. In this case, both governments would discuss the measures they would be inclined to take together; if these measures provoked active action, both governments would immediately begin to consider the plans of their general staffs and would then decide what course should be given to these plans.

That the two General Staffs held meetings on questions of the war plan is already known to the reader of our work.

On April 29, 1914, Izvolsky reported on the meeting between the French and British people as follows: "The exchange of opinions between the French and English statesmen primarily focused on relations between France and England; in embarking on it, both sides unanimously recognized that the agreements existing between the two sides did not need any formal change and addition, and that, continuing to consistently and loyally apply the so-called "epsesche cog@ae" to all put forward political issues ( cordial agreement - B. Sh.) - France and England thereby strengthen and develop the bonds connecting them every day; at the same time, it was also recognized that Russia, both France and England, is joining in the closest possible way to their joint positive attitude.

From what has been said above, we know how hard even the "radical" Frenchmen tried to conclude an Anglo-Russian agreement and, indeed, succeeded in this.

"England is cautiously restrained," Moltke defined the position of the islands. We have said enough above about the British policy of the beginning of 1914. England still wanted to have "hands free". A struggle was going on within it, the Irish question was aggravated, relations with the colonies were still not settled. There was no particular confidence in Russian policy in the East, and therefore Gray "did not hide, however, from Doumerg," as Izvolsky wrote, "that not only among the government party, but even among the members of the Cabinet, there are elements!, prejudiced against Russia and little: skeptical towards further rapprochement with her; he expressed, however, the hope that he would be able to persuade Asquith and other members of the government to his point of view. This was that "personally, he is quite ready to conclude an agreement with Russia similar to those

which exist between England and Frapdia. If there was no political document on this at the beginning of the World War, then the Naval Convention was there.

True, the agreement between England and France also did not oblige Great Britain to war, but the presence of two conventions (with Frappia and Russia, predetermined her intervention in a European war) needed only a loud pretext for this.

One can agree with Tirpitz, who writes: "For many years, Bethmann-Hollweg was engaged in the construction of what he himself called "car-

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house," i.e., an Anglo-German agreement based not on Facts, but on diplomatic coquetry... We have idealized those motives that prompted England to take a "loyal" position in relation to Austria and to us in the Balkan wars of 1912-1914, and therefore nourished the belief that the Balkan war, in which Austria herself would have taken part, could be localized in this turbulent corner of Europe.

Mutual contradictions among bourgeois Europe, a fierce economic struggle for the colonies, covered by "national", "historical", etc. tasks, were already so ripe that only one revolver "Sarajevo shot" of a young enthusiast was needed in order to start what Europe has been moving towards for a long time - the European, and then the world war ...

### CHAPTER III THE SARAJEV SHOT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Sarajevo shot is not the cause of the world war. — Three lines of policy guidance. — Conrad receives the first news of the murder of the heir. — His thoughts on it. — Conrad's return on June 29 to Vienna. — Postscript to Berchtold's memorandum. - Berchtold for restraint in actions against Serbia. — Death of the Chief of the Italian General Staff, Zollio. - Conrad's proposal to find out the position of Germany and Franz Joseph's doubts about it. — Conrad and the triple alliance. — Konrad's advice to Berchtold on Germany's response to the aims of the war. - Life in Berlin. - Vacation Moltke, Yagov and Tirpitz. — Wilhelm's malice and his fears. — Reprimand to Chirsky for advising moderation in Vienna. - Impressions in Berlin from the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. — Letter from Franz Josef and explanations from Goyos. — Berlin's decision of July 5 to support Austria. - Wilhelm's conversations on July 5. - In Berlin, they do not believe in the possibility of a European war. — Falkenhayn's letter to Moltke. — Tirpitz's reasoning. — The mood of St. Petersburg, Paris and Rome upon receipt of news of the events in Sarajevo. — Anxiety in Serbia. - Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Vienna on July 7. - Tisza for diplomatic success. — Decision of the Council of Ministers on sending an ultimatum and war. — Tisza's report. -July 8 Berchtold outlines a deadline for presenting an ultimatum and invites Konrad to go on vacation. - Nismo Konrad on July 140 to Potiorek. — Conrad's seriousness and its causes. — Letter from Conrad to Berchtold, 14 July. Konrad insists on a short-term ultimatum. — Departure of Konrad on July 14 on vacation. - Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Vienna on July 19 and the arrival of Konrad. — Discussion of the aims of the war and the protests of Thissa. — Conrad's return on July 22 from a vacation under guard. — Verification by Vienna of the time of Poincaré's departure from St. Petersburg. — Berchtold's instructions to Belgrade to declare war. — Presentation of an ultimatum in Belgrade. Serbia's refusal. - On the morning of July 95 - a decree on mobilization in Vienna. - Konrad considers diplomatic preparation insufficient. —



Wilhelm's dissatisfaction with the slow actions of Austria. — Aims of the war for Austria at the behest of Wilhelm. - "Only step harder on the corns of this bastard." Jagow asks Vienna about the aims of the war. - Jagow on the position of the triple agreement and against preventive war. "When a fight comes up, we can't back down." - Diplomats are against the return of Wilhelm to Berlin. — His resentment of it. — Berlin is hushing up its acquaintance with the Austrian note. - Confidence in Russia's non-intervention in the war. - Likhnovsky's report of July 16. "Austrian arrogance." — Bribery of Italy and its claims. - Calm Moltke. — His letters to his wife. - The return of Moltke to Berlin on July 26 and his conversation with Jagow. — Tranquility in St. Petersburg. - The first news about the presentation of an ultimatum by Austria to Serbia. - The return of Sazonov to St. Petersburg on July 18 and his meeting with the Austrian ambassador. - Arrival of Poincare, his negotiations on the Austro-Serbian conflict. - Receipt in St. Petersburg on July 24 of information about the Austrian ultimatum. "This is a European war." — Diplomatic breakfast. — Russian General Staff and private mobilization. - The Council of Ministers in Krasnoye Selo on July 24 and the decision on private mobilization. — Meeting of Sazonov with Pourtales. - Guiding instructions Sazonov abroad. - Meeting of the Council of Ministers in Krasnoye Selo on July 25. — Council optimism. — Sukhomlinov on the meeting of the Council of Ministers. - Sukhomlinov's excuses. - Conversation. Sazonov with Buchanan. — The optimism of diplomats in St. Petersburg. - Announcement of the pre-mobilization period. — Pourtales

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about Sazonov's inexperience in military affairs. - Pourtales' conversations with Sazonov and the latter's peaceful mood. - Reasons for Sazonov's restraint. "Don't give the floor to the general staffs!" Pourtales explains to Sazonov the significance of the declaration of mobilization in Germany. - Sukhomlinov and his conversation with a German military agent. - Danilov's family concerns. — Danilov on the issue of private mobilization. - The role of Sazonov, according to Sukhomlinov, in choosing the type of mobilization. — Poincaré's travels and his anxieties. - The mood of Paris and the speech of the German Ambassador Shen. — Restraint of England. — Gray on the aftermath of a European war. — Mobilization of the English Fleet and its explanation by Gray.

The "Sarajevo Shot" was the stone thrown under the train of the "European balance" that was rapidly rushing towards an inevitable catastrophe, about which Koprak spoke back in May to the Chief of the German General Staff. We have come close to the beginning of the European war of 1914, and we are obliged to introduce the reader to the events already known to him, which served as a choral pretext for armed struggle, for it is absolutely obvious that it was not the blood of Habsburg that was the cause of the war.

The contradictions between the states of Europe rested primarily on economic foundations, which, in turn, gave rise to political misunderstandings and disputes.

We cannot write an exhaustive political history that led to the world war after the assassination of Frapp-Ferdinand, but we will cover diplomatic correspondence, referring, in large part, to documents, mainly in connection with the activities of the general staffs at the same time, because this is the task of our work. Meh! Let us try to establish a more or less clear picture of reality.

We say in advance that maybe we will err in this, but openly mutually

We express our sincere intention to depict the situation as it actually happened.

— We consider it necessary to stop the reader's attention on yet another circumstance, namely: from the foregoing, one can be quite clearly convinced that in all the states of Europe, not excluding even republican France, foreign policy was represented by two lines - dynastic and governmental (in France, the dynastic line led Poincaré), and both these lines often diverged sharply. If we add to this that the General Staff also pursued "its own" foreign policy, then we are faced with the obligation to combine all these three lines in order to clearly understand certain diplomatic steps. That we are not unfounded in our statements is shown at least by Conrad's demand that the treaty with Germany be sealed not only by Wilhelm, but also by Bethmann; Below, a description of the events themselves will bring even greater clarity to this.

So we left the Chief of the Austrian General Staff on June 27 on the way from Sarajevo on a field trip. Already at 2 pm on the 28th, the first news of the assassination of Franp-Ferdinand reached Konrad, which was quickly confirmed by Potiorek's official report. There was no longer any doubt about the reality of the event... "The whole severity of the blow," Konrad writes in his memoirs, "was clear to me, as well as the consequences that it led." "The assassination in Sarajevo ... was a declaration of war against Serbia by Austria-Hungary," thought the chief of staff, reading the documents received about this, "the latter could only respond with war."

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"What I thought about after the end of the Balkan war," Konrad continues, "happened earlier than I expected. The hope for a peaceful development of the armed forces in a long peaceful period was unexpectedly shattered ... This moment called everyone to their place and knocked everyone out of a peaceful, normal track.

Having requested by telegram through the office of Franz Josef for instructions of the latter whether to continue the trip or to arrive in Vienna, and having received an order to return, Konrad was already in Vienna on the morning of June 29, where Frand-Imosich from his country dvorp arrived on the same date. .

If we recall, Austrian diplomacy, after Wilhelm's meeting with Frand-Ferdinand at Konopiste, was thwarted by the drafting of a memorandum intended to outline the plight of Austria's external situation, for it was threatened by Serbia, Rumania and Russia, supported by France. "The leaders of the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary are convinced that the common interest of the monarchy and, to no lesser extent, of Germany requires, in the pasture of the Balkapian crisis, an all-embracing and energetic action against the plan systematically outlined and promoted by Russia, which subsequently, very possibly, will not be possible. already oppose.

"This memorandum," declares Kautsky, "can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a demand in the language of diplomacy for a preventive war against tsarism."

The document was completed at the time when revolver shots were already fired in Sarajevo. The authors accompanied the memorandum with the following postscript:

"The proposed memorandum had just been smoked when the terrible events in Sarajewo took place.

The whole meaning of a villainous murder is now comprehensible. But, in any case, if there were still a need for this, the fact of the atrocity undoubtedly proves how insurmountable the contradictions between the monarchy and Serbia are and how dangerous and active the great Serbian movement stops at nothing.

All the more urgent for the monarchy is the need to break with a decisive hand the threads from which all the opponents want to weave a net over their heads.

Thus, Viennese diplomacy went on an open offensive, and now not Romania, but Serbia concentrated on itself all the malice and hatred of Austrian diplomacy.

We will not acquaint the reader with Konrad's thoughts upon his return to Vienna about the inevitability of war with Serbia, because for him it was always in the foreground, and the Sarajewo event only strengthened the belief in the immutability of this. The chief of staff confesses to what flashed through his head: "You didn't follow my advice, so now pull out the cart stuck deep in the sand," he mentally told the diplomats. But the realization that now was not the time to quarrel with diplomacy, when its "house of cards" was demolished by cruel reality, strengthened Conrad in the need to exert all his strength in order to prepare for the coming events. |

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Immediately upon his return to Vienna, the Chief of Staff received a letter from Potiorek, who was worried about possible disturbances in Bosnia and Herzegovina; but in the opinion of this general, they could only be prevented by energetic steps in foreign policy.

On the evening of the same June 29, Conrad visited Berchtold.

"We are meeting again under circumstances," the Chief of Staff began, "very different from those under which we parted."

Konrad immediately announced the need for immediate action on Serbia, for which it is necessary to announce the mobilization of "B", which seems to him inevitable. Berchtold rejected this, because, in his opinion, there were no external reasons, and public opinion was not prepared. The minister was concerned about the possibility of a revolutionary outbreak in Bohemia, which Conrad was skeptical about. Both interlocutors came to the conclusion that the moment for decisive demands from Serbia had come, but the minister found it only necessary to wait for the results of the investigation.

On July 1, Berchtold, initiating Konrad into the mood of Franz Josef, who was postponing a decision until the end of the investigation, reported that both ministers of the president were for restraint. At the same time, the minister had doubts whether Germany and Romania would leave Austria. The chief of staff believed that an alliance with Germany existed, and therefore it was necessary to find out in Berlin whether the rear of the monarchy would be covered by Russia in the event of war.

Meanwhile, "fate," as Conrad writes, "dealt a new blow: on July 2, the chief of the Italian general staff, Pollio, a supporter of the tripartite alliance, died.

Disturbing information came from Serbia: a large number of Serbian armed comitajs crossed the border in order to make an attempt on the life of Berchtold himself.

On July 5, the chief of the general staff arrived © with a report to Franz Josef, starting it with an indication of the inevitability of war with Serbia.

"Yes, that's true in general," answered the old man, "but how are you! do you want to wage war when everyone will attack us, especially Russia?

"We are covered from the rear by Germany," Konrad objected.

Franz-Josich looked inquiringly at his interlocutor and asked: "Are you sure about Germany?" According to Habsburg, at a meeting in Konopiste, Wilhelm evaded answering the question put to him whether Austria-Hungary could count on Germany in the future.

To Konrad's proposal to find out Germany's position, Franz-Josich replied: "Last night a note was sent to Germany in which we demand a clear answer."

"If the answer is that Germany is on our side, will we then wage war against Serbia?" asked the chief of staff.

"Then yes," the old emperor replied after a moment of thought.

In a word, the chief of staff gave the impression that Franz-Josef was not sure about Germany and was therefore wavering in his decision.

At the end of the report, Konrad asked for permission to immediately take security measures against the impending attempts on the part of Serbia on certain responsible persons, on bridges, etc.

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Considering that such measures: the guards are taken only with the announcement of mobilization, Franz Josef, despite the arguments of the chief of staff that it could be late, resolutely refused to give his consent to them.

Then Franz-Josich announced that he intended to leave for a country palace; in turn, and Koprade. ask permission after the crisis to go to Tyrol for a few days. Consent was given. Today, the Chief of the General Staff cites this fact as proof that on July 5 there was still no firm decision to wage war on Serbia. We willingly agree, because in Vienna we were sure that Serbia would fulfill all the demands placed on it.

Leaving the office, Konrad, impressed by the report. I started a conversation with Hohenloe, who was present in the adjutant room, who assessed these days as difficult and decisive.

"Yes," replied Konrad, "but if Germany is as unreliable as it seems now, the question arises: how long will we still remain in the union,

because politically we do not benefit from this, but economically Germany crushes us. But in that case, I'll leave; I cannot change, for I would find myself in an even more difficult position than Averescu. I build all my judgments on joint actions with Germany, and I am not in a position to remain if the wheel of control passes into the hands of the Slavs.

Berchtold waited anxiously for a reply from Berlin, which they expected to receive no earlier than July 7th. Wilhelm will probably give his consent, but he must also discuss this with Bethmann. Conrad, who talked with Berchtold, believed that it was necessary to find out whether Austria-Hungary would reckon with the war or not, since in the latter case one should not raise a fuss, but conduct an investigation as a normal legal action, but one must take into account that, perhaps, this is the last opportunity

Berchtold believed that one should limit oneself to a partial call-up of reservists, against which Konrad resolutely rebelled, declaring the need for mobilization according to option "B".

"Tissa is against the war," replied the minister, "he is afraid of a Rumanian invasion of Semigradia."

Berchtold was also occupied with the question: what would Germany answer, which would probably ask about Vepa's intentions after the war.

Koprad immediately gave wise advice: "Tell us what we don't know ourselves."

Thus, the center of gravity of the issue moved to Berlin. If we pointed out earlier that, in the opinion of St. Petersburg, the way to Constantinople lay through Berlin, then it turns out that the road to Belgrad went equally through Berlin. Since the paths of Russia and Austria, heading towards the two indicated cities, crossed. In the Balkans, it is natural that the decision on peace or war should have come only from Berlin, where we will now be transported.

Berlin lived its normal life: Wilhelm made speeches intimidating other countries, and his son, Kronprinz, expressed solidarity with the ultra-right chauvinist authors of various incendiary articles. True, at the insistence of Bethmann, it was necessary to curb the little one a little and forbid him to put pressure on politics, but Germany, as before, remained confident in the power of its weapons.

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My: we know that Moltke, Chief of the German General Staff, was afraid that instead of Carlebad he would be on Wilhelm's yacht off the coast of Norway. On July 19, Moltke wrote: "Circumstances do not get in the way, and he (Wilhelm) agreed that I would not go with him." Following this, Moltke departed for Carlebad.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Jagow, was also absent, which was not interrupted by news of the events in Sarajevo, since Jagow's request to Berlin whether his return was necessary was answered that there was no need for this.

Finally, the secretary of state for maritime affairs, Tirpitz, was also on vacation at the resort.

In a word, the "statesmen" were resting when the Sarajevo shot gave them their first warning.

Having received the news of the death of Franz Ferdinand, Wilhelm boiled up with anger and hatred towards the "parakillers", of course, not towards those directly involved in this, but towards those who pushed them on this path, i.e. towards Serbia. Kautsky tells us that in addition to anger against violators of the "moparchic principle," Wilhelm was seized with personal fear, refusing to attend the funeral of Franz Ferdinand, because he was afraid of an attempt on his person in Vienna.

On June 30, the German ambassador in Vienna submitted a report to the Reich Chancellor, in which Wilhelm made his remarks, which we placed in brackets.

Noting that, according to Berchtold, the threads of the conspiracy lead to Belgrade, the staff wrote: "The case was so well conceived that in order to carry out the crime, very young people were deliberately found, to whom only milder penalties could be applied." (Hopefully they won't! B).

"Here, even on the part of serious people, I have repeatedly heard the desire that it is necessary once and for all (now or ever. V.) to thoroughly settle scores with the Serbs. First of all, Serbia must present a number of demands and, if the opposition does not accept them, act energetically. I take advantage of every opportunity to cautiously, but very urgently and seriously, warn against rash steps. (Who authorized him to do this? Very stupid! This does not concern him at all, since it is exclusively the business of Austria to think about his own steps. The donkey will say when things go badly: Hermapia did not want to!!! Let Chirsky please leave this nonsense! the Serbs must be put an end to, and right now. B.).

In a word, in a fit of "Piebelungian" fidelity, Wilhelm was seething with anger and decided even before receiving a letter from Vienna that "the Serbs must be finished off and, precisely, now."

For his moderate actions, Chirsky received a reprimand from Wilhelm.

"The news of the murder made a most painful impression on all of us," writes Tirpitz. It was expected that the crime would cause retribution in one form or another and, consequently, also the well-known tension in European relations. I didn't fear a world war. Who would dare to take on such a responsibility? In addition, our military intelligence pointed out that if we had to reckon with the Russian attack at all, then not earlier than 1916. Suspicion that the sheds-

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The murder was planned with the knowledge of Parya or England, it never occurred to anyone."

"In an atmosphere of peaceful fun," the crown prince narrates, "the terrible news of the murder of an erpgerpog caught me. It was obvious that this political assassination would have serious consequences." =

Thus, if it was still too early to talk about the war, then one could say with complete certainty about a certain tension in European relations.

On July 4, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arrived in Berlin from Vienna with a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph to Wilhelm. The letter was not delivered to the addressee on July 5 by the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Berlin.

"All the aspirations of my government," wrote Franz Josich, "should be in the future to isolate and belittle Serbia."

Having set this goal, the old Habsburg ended the letter with the words: "Even you, after the last terrible events in Bosnia, will be forced to agree that it is no longer possible to even think about eliminating the contradictions that separate us from Serbia. The policy of all European monarchs, seeking to preserve peace, will be under threat as long as this hotbed of criminal agitation in Belgrade continues to exist with impunity."

If the letter spoke only about the belittling of Serbia, then Goyos, who brought it, explained to Bethmann that by belittling Serbia one should understand its division. .

After reviewing the letter of Franz Joseph, Wilhelm summoned Bethmann and his assistant Zimmerman, who replaced Yagov, with whom he discussed the political situation. There is no doubt that important decisions were taken during this discussion, on which we will leave the floor to the Austrian Ambassador Segzny.

"In his (Wilhelm's) opinion," the ambassador wrote, "we should not, however, delay for a long time with a speech against Serbia. Russia, in any case, will take a hostile stance. But Wilhelm has had this in mind for many years, and if it comes to war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we can be sure! that Germany, by habitual allied loyalty, will stand on our side. Russia, however, in the present state of affairs, is by no means yet ready for war and, undoubtedly, will still have to weigh everything carefully before appealing to arms. However, it will in every possible way incite the other powers of the Triple Entente against us and fan the flames in the Balkans."

"For him, it is quite clear that with all the known peacefulness of his imperial and royal apostolic majesty, it will probably be difficult for him to decide on an invasion of Serbia. But if we really found it necessary to move against Serbia, then he would be sorry if we did not use the present, so favorable hour,

moment".

True, Bethmann was more cautious than his emperor, but he also agreed to a war with Serbia, and the chancellor wrote to Chirsky: "In the conflict that arose between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the German emperor

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cannot interfere, as this is the business of the said countries. But the emperor Franz-Joseph can hope that his majesty (Wilhelm - B. Sh.), in full accordance with his allied obligations and his old friendship, will be on the side of Austria-Hungary.

In a word, Vienna received an affirmative answer to the question about the expediency of a war with Serbia and "it does not matter if a war with Russia breaks out because of this," as the German ambassador in London, Likhnovsky, testifies.

The European war on July 5 was not thought of in Berlin.

This was the decision, but during the course of July 5, Minister of War Falkenhain, the head of the cabinet Linker, the senior of the chief quartermasters of the general staff Bertrab, deputy Tirpitz Kapelle and from the headquarters of the admiralty - Zenker were called to Wilhelm.

The conversation with Falkenhain took place in the presence of Bethmann and Zimmermann, and Wilhelm read the memorandum and letter known to us from Franz Joseph and asked Falkenhain if the army was ready just in case. The Minister of War replied in the affirmative and in turn asked if any measures of readiness should be taken at this time. Dada not interfere with the work of diplomacy, Falketain's proposal was rejected. For the same reasons, it was decided that Wilhelm would leave on the 6th on his journey to Norway, and that Falkenhayn would leave on the 8th of July for the island of Just on leave.

Before his departure, the Minister of War wrote a letter to Moltke in Carlebad, in which, devoting Moltke to the decisions taken on July 5 in Potsdam, Falkenhayn reported: the Kaiser believes that the monarchy has now firmly decided to get even with Serbia, even if Russia was against it. The Minister of War sees from the Austrian memorandum that the Viennese government will not change its firm decision. In no case will the next weeks bring a decision, and therefore, if he writes to Moltke, it is with the aim of warning him, nevertheless, against any surprises that may be.

After the minister of war, Wilhelm had a representative of the general staff, General Hon-Bertrab. "History of the State Archives". so informs about this date. Wilhelm received Bertrab alone and spoke briefly. Bertrab was to inform the absent Moltke of what had happened; William. said that he "does not believe in major military events, since the guy will not take the side of the murderers of the heir; Russia and France are not in need of war and there is no need to take special measures" (our italics - RB.Sh.). -

\_Kautsky writes about this in his book How the World War Started: "Kaiser Wilhelm at the same time summoned a representative of the General Staff to Motsdam. As such, the general "on-Bertrab" appeared ... According to the report of Count Waldersee, the Kaiser informed the general, "for transfer to the Chief of the General Staff", that he, the Kaiser, promised Emperor Franz Josich to support him with all the might of Germany, if only in complications arose as a result of the uprising planned by Austria-Hungary against Serbia.

Graph Waldersee adds:

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"I, interfering with General Hohn-Moltke in all matters related to the war, had, of course, no reason to do anything because of the audience of General Fop-Bertrab in Potsdam. The systematic mobilization work was completed on March 31, 1914. The army, as always, was at the ready.

Finally, Tirpitz writes in his memoirs: "Kaiser Wilhelm", driven by ryparsky feelings, promised the Austrian emperor a faithful



support against Serbian assassins. According to the statement made by the Kaiser to mine. deputy on the morning of July 6, he considered Russian intervention unbelievable, since the guy would not support pareubiip, and Russia was not yet ready for war in financial and military terms. Further, the Kaiser somewhat recklessly assumed that France would hold Russia, thanks to her own unfavorable financial position - and a lack of heavy artillery. The Kaiser did not mention England; the possibility of complications with her was not thought at all. So, the Kaiser himself considered the serious danger improbable. He hoped that Serbia would give in, but nevertheless considered it necessary to be prepared also in case of a different outcome of the Austro-Serbian feud.

"The decision of the Kaiser," Tirpitz continues, "was approved by the chancellor on the assumption that the already shaken dignity of Austria as a great power would finally fall if she did not receive satisfaction from the conquest-hungry Serbian state. It is possible that memories of the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 also influenced him.

"If he (Wilhelm - B. IT.) had remained in Berlin, and the government machine continued to work normally, then, perhaps, in the middle of July he would have been our way to avoid war. But since the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of War, the Chief of the Naval Staff and I were kept away from Berlin for the near future, the matter fell into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Chancellor, who, being ignorant of the general European situation, could not determine the value of his employees. in a foreign agency.

We believe that we have determined with sufficient clarity the mood of Berdlin, who gave his consent to Vienna for a war with Belgrade and hoped, in the event of an aggravation of the situation, to resort to the old, more than once tested means, namely, to the "test: forces" (Kgayrgore).

In Peterdurla, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, of course, caused a sensation in right-wing circles, and aroused the liveliest joy among the nationalists. The heir to the Habsburg throne was considered an enemy of the Slavs, a gifted person who could support dying Austria, but meanwhile her death was eagerly awaited, and Buchanan testifies that already on April 14, 1913, Nikolai Romanov predicted: "The dissolution of the Austrian Empire is only a matter of time, and the day is not far off when we shall see separate Hungarian and Bohemian kingdoms." The person who could delay this disintegration has now been eliminated ... and therefore, how not to rejoice at this!

In Paris, Poincaré expressed to the Austrian ambassador "all the indignation that this terrible assassination had caused in all of France" and his "deep condolences on the misfortune that struck the imperial family."

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On July 5, 1914, Poincaré told the Austrian ambassador that "political assassinations are usually, as was the case with the assassination of President Carnot in France, the work of individual khanatics." The Austrian ambassador, who, according to Poincaré, did not think about a European war, replied: "Caserio's crime was not caused by Hranco-Phobic agitation in Italy. On the contrary, in Serbia for many years

openly and covertly all means to cause excitement against the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

However, on July 4, a military agent reported to YoKonrad from Paris that if officials express condolences and walk around with sour mines, then in general among French and Russian politicians the mood can be characterized as "universal relief."

The same "relief" was felt in Rome, where they did not like Franz-Ferdinand, seeing in him a direct enemy of the Italians, whose appearance on the throne could be fraught with great anxiety. But since Italy is now weak, then, according to the military agent, she does not hide her joy well and is happy that only it was not an Italian who committed this murder.

A similar mood was in Bucharest, and in other capitals of the states of Europe - Austria attracted sympathy in few places, as a "power" of the first rank.

The Sarajevo event, of course, caused a complete sensation in Serbia and poorly concealed joy, but it was necessary to dissociate ourselves from the perpetrators of the act, to prove one's innocence, therefore one had to be restrained and loyal.

Describing the preparations for the assassination in Sarzeva, we posed the question: was the Serbian government aware of the impending assassination?

An explanation is given to us by a certain Serb Ivanovich. Before zoina, Ivanoviĭ was a fellow Minister of Justice in Pašiĭ's office. According to him, members of the Cašiĭ government were aware of the impending assassination attempt, and it was decided to prevent the young people from crossing the border. When this failed, the government left events to their natural course. "In Vidov Dep I was alone in my apartment," Ivanovich writes in his memoirs. At about 5 o'clock, an official called me on the phone from the passport office and told me what had happened in Sarajevo in the middle of the day. Although I knew what was being prepared there, however, the message gave me the impression of having received a blow... One could hope that Vienna would not be able to establish a direct connection between Official Serbia and the events in Sarajevo. Therefore, Pasic, and with him we, his friends, took every measure to strengthen, as far as possible, all ties that would allow Serbia to easily get out of the situation when the claims for this accident were satisfied. It is known that the government tried to do everything possible to show friends and the whole world how far we were from the murder in Sarajevo."

This is how history was made, and now it is no longer possible to deny that the demands of Wen:, to some extent, were justified, and quite weightily. At the same time, however, ĩašiĭ and his company managed to play the role of innocent babies quite well in the eyes of public opinion in other countries. True, in the minds of politicians, even benevolent Serbia

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In those countries, doubts about the purity of the hands of the Serbian rulers crept in, but this should not be said, since circumstances led to success over the middle states.

On the morning of July 7, Konrad received word that Goyos had arrived from Berlin with a satisfactory answer. Konrad hurried to Berchtold, who informed him: "Germany is unconditionally on our side, even if our action against Serbia calls for a big war," notes in

his memoirs, Chief of the Austrian General Staff.

The answer came from Burleigh, but there was no agreement on the plan of action and the intended goals in Vienna itself, and therefore on the same day a council of ministers was held, to which the chief of staff and a representative of the naval command were invited only as experts, and Conrad was waiting for the call in his office. The agenda of the meeting said that the following were subject to consideration: 1) Bosnian affairs and 2) diplomatic action against Serbia.

Opening the meeting, Berchtold announced that the council should discuss internal measures to be taken in Bosnia in connection with the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand, but first of all, one must realize whether the moment had come to secure oneself from Serbia. A decisive blow against Serbia could have been carried out only with preliminary diplomatic preparation, which is why he, Berchtold, entered into contact with Berlin about this. The negotiations in Berlin led to a very favorable result. Both Wilhelm himself and Bethmann-Hollweg promised unconditional support with all their might in the event of a war with Serbia. On the advice of Berlin, an agreement should be reached with Italy and Romania. Then it is clear that a war with Serbia could also lead to a war with Russia, because she still seeks to unite all the Slavic states against Austria. "The logical consequence of what has been said would be to warn our opponents and by a war with Serbia to delay the development of a hostile coalition.

The Minister-President of Hungary, Tissa, resolutely objected, declaring that he did not agree to an unexpected attack on Serbia without diplomatic negotiations, since this would make a bad impression on the whole of Europe and would unite all the Balkan states against Austria-Hungary, except Bulgaria.

According to Tisza, it is necessary to formulate demands on Serbia and first send her an ultimatum. If Serbia accepts it, then we must be content with diplomatic success, which will also raise our prestige in the Balkans. If Serbia rejects the ultimatum, then declare war on it, but warn in advance that we are undertaking it only with the aim of diminishing, but not completely destroying Serbia, because: 1) it will not be possible to carry out the latter without a life-or-death struggle with Russia, and 2) he, as minister-president, will never agree to part of Serbia being annexed by the monarchy.

"It does not concern Germany whether we oppose Serbia or not," Tissa declared resolutely, pointing out at the same time that Rumania, Bulgaria and Turpia should be included in the tripartite alliance. At the same time, Tissa found it necessary to carry out reforms in Bosnia in anticipation not only of war, but also of diplomatic success.

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The remaining members of the Council, in one word or another, but in unison, spoke out in favor of a war with Serbia, rejecting the decision to be satisfied with only diplomatic success. The Minister of War, for military reasons, insisted on immediate war and the desirability of declaring mobilization before the diplomatic speech in Belgrade.

Subsequently, the council discussed the goals of the war with Serbia. Stürgk proposed to replace the Karageorgievich dynasty with a German prince and put Serbia

military dependence on the monarchy. Tisza found it desirable to involve Bulgaria in the war with Serbia, to distract Russia in Asia Minor. Berchtold doubted Tisza's projects, since there was no time for this.

As a result of the discussion, it was decided:

"1) All those present wish the earliest possible resolution of the conflict with Serbia by military or peaceful means.

2) The Council of Ministers would be willing to join the opinion of the Minister-President of Hungary, according to which it was necessary to mobilize only after the rejection by Serbia of the specific demands put to it and the presentation of an ultimatum to it.

All present, except the Minister-President of Hungary, are of the view that a purely diplomatic success would not be enough, even if it ended in the diplomatic humiliation of Serbia. Therefore, Serbia should put forward such far-reaching demands, the deviation of which could be foreseen in advance, and then proceed to a radical solution of the issue through military intervention."

Thus, the documents now clearly show that the Viennese diplomats decided to bring the matter to a war with Serbia at any cost.  
no matter.

The meeting was interrupted until lunchtime, and then resumed again, but this time with the participation of the chief of the general staff and a representative of the naval command.

At the request of Berchtold, the Chief of the General Staff was asked three questions:

1) is it possible to mobilize at first only against Serbia and only then, if necessary, against Russia as well;

2) is it possible to keep a significant number of troops in Transylvania to intimidate Rumania, and

3) where to take the battle with Russia.

The Chief of the General Staff gave an answer to all the proposed questions, which, as strictly secret, as well as the great debate that arose on it about the balance of forces and the probable course of the European war, were not recorded in the minutes.

Koprad, in his memoirs, quotes what was excluded from the protocol, starting with his answer to the questions put to him.

To the first question about the possibility of mobilization first against Serbia, Konrad gave the following answer: "This case has also been worked out, however, the decision must follow quickly (before the fifth day of mobilization), and then there will be no significant changes in the concentration against Russia. It would be difficult later."

In answer to the second question, Konrad pointed out that during the war with Serbia, a certain number of divisions were assigned to the Serbian-Montenegrin theater, and therefore it was possible to throw forces on the Romanian border. In the debate, Konrad explained that it would be possible to send HI and PU corps to Transylvania and this would not violate the plan of concentration against Russia, but he doubted whether this would lead to misunderstandings with Romania, which should be avoided.

On the third question, the chief of staff gave an explanation that if a war broke out by Russia, then the latter must be considered the main enemy, against which all forces should be thrown; only U and UT armies remained against Serbia and Montenegro. When asked where the battles with the Russian army would unfold, Konrad answered in general terms that they would take place partly in Galicia, probably partly in Russian Poland, and joint actions with Germany were also envisaged.

The chief of staff was greatly worried about the preservation of secrecy, and therefore asked not to record what was said, and himself, as far as possible, spoke in general places.

To the remark of Goyos, who had returned from Berlin, that they were afraid that Austria would not throw all its forces against Serbia and leave Germany alone in front of the Russians, Konrad replied that there was a corresponding agreement between both headquarters.

Then Konrad, pointing out that in 1908-1909. his proposal for a war with Serbia was not accepted, noted that the situation is undoubtedly worse now than then. |

To Tissa's question whether there were any chances of success in the event of a war against Russia, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro, the chief of staff gave a scathing answer.

On Tisza's proposal to determine what the balance of military forces of the great powers would be, due to the continuous growth of armaments, in the coming years, Conrad emphasized that it would be more likely to the disadvantage of the triple alliance and, taking the opportunity, noted that the opponents were intensively preparing for war. , while Austria-Hungary lags behind in the development of its armed forces, among which national strife is also flaring up.

Then Konrad, together with a representative of the naval command, left the council of ministers.

Subsequently, the council settled on the question of internal reforms for Bosnia and Herzegovina, on which a debate opened without leading to any definite conclusions, with the Minister of War again emphasizing that no reforms could be carried out unless the main question of the war was resolved. with Serbia.

The council ended with Berchtold's statement about his report on July 8 to Franz Josich, with Tisza asking to be told to the old Habsburg that he would present his considerations separately.

Indeed, on July 8, Tisza submitted a report to Franco-Joseph against the decision of the Council of Ministers "to provoke a war with Serbia and finally pay off this blood enemy of the monarchy."

The report had no effect, and therefore we will review it only briefly.

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Tisza is convinced that falling on Serbia will cause Russian intervention and then a "world war", and he is far from Berlin's optimism that Romania will remain neutral. Therefore, the balance of forces is not in our favor and it is better to postpone the war, which will make it possible to improve both the balance of forces and the political situation in favor of the monarchy in the Balkans, attracting Bulgaria and Rumania to our side.

If we add to these considerations the financial and economic condition of the monarchy, which will make the conduct of the war extremely difficult, then Tisza cannot take responsibility for the offensive war.

Tisza is far from not setting certain conditions for Serbia, but they must be acceptable to her. If Serbia refuses to comply with them, then war should be resorted to, with all responsibility falling on Serbia. This way of posing the question makes it possible to localize the war, and it is necessary to declare in advance that Austria-Hungary does not seek the destruction of Serbia and, even more so, its annexation. With a successful war, we will only demand the correction of the border.

At the end of his report, Tisza again stressed that he could not be held responsible for a war with aggressive slogans.

Returning from a meeting of the council of ministers, the chief of the general staff shared his impressions with the chief of the operational bureau, informing him of his thoughts: to fight with Serbia and even with Russia, if Germany is on our side, with the neutrality of Romania, we can, but with the performance of the latter, forces will not be enough. "I would gladly say that this is not true if it were not true."

On July 8, Konrad was visited by the Austrian envoy in Belgrade, Gisl, who, noting the firm course of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, found the moment for declaring war "brilliant".

"That he is especially "brilliant" cannot be said," replied Konrad, "one must not only set conditions, but also force them to be fulfilled."

Naturally, in the evening of the same day, the Chief of the General Staff went to Berchtold to find out what decision Franz Joseph had made after the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

Berchtold had his assistants gathered when Konrad appeared in his office.

The decision was that Serbia was presented with an ultimatum, which she must fulfill within a period of 24 to 48 hours, otherwise mobilization and war are declared. `

The Minister of Foreign Affairs inquired about Konrad's opinion on what to do if Serbia agreed to all the demands even before mobilization.

"Let's advance," Konrad replied curtly.

"Yes, but if Serbia does nothing," the minister asked in surprise.

"We will occupy Serbia for such a time until we receive military expenses," continued the chief of the general staff, and explained,

that the occupation of the territory is still not the goal of the action, but it is necessary to defeat the Serbian army, but if this fails, due to the withdrawal of the enemy army, then it should be demanded for its demobilization and disarmament.

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With regard to the position of Romania and the possible intervention of Russia, Konrad demanded that it be as soon as possible to find out whether it would be necessary to wage war with Russia. If Russia declares a general mobilization, then the moment will come for Austria to declare war on Russia.

To the question of the chief of staff, when the ultimatum would be presented, the minister answered: "In fourteen days - on July 22. It would be good if you and the Minister of War were on vacation for some time to appear that nothing would happen.

The next day, Konrad asked Franz Josef, the chief of the military office, about this.

Meanwhile, Potiorek sounded the alarm, and in a letter to Konrad dated July 6, he again spoke of the difficult internal situation in Bosnia.

On July 10, Konrad replied to Potiorek with a lengthy letter about the investigation into the assassination, and, among other things, said that "our leading circles" had decided for the time being to postpone "serious diplomatic and military measures" or "completely abandon" them. "It is not in my power to change this wait-and-see tactic, this mode of action presents not only me, but also you with a new grave problem," Konrad complained about the slowness of the Foreign Office. Informing that he sees a way out in the speedy issuance of a "mobilization order", the chief of staff at the end of the letter expressed the hope that the coming days would draw a path on which all dangers would be eliminated, that is, in other words. bring with them the order "about mobilization".

On July 11, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to draw up a note to Serbia, which was to be discussed at the Council of Ministers, to which Berchtold invited the Chief of the General Staff.

The latter, meanwhile, almost daily discussed with the chief of the operational bureau the plan for the war with Serbia, as well as other options, especially in the event of a Russian intervention.

Konrad was serious and thoughtful. The situation in 1914 was difficult for the monarchy. |

"In 1908-1909. there would be a game with open cards, - Konrad told his friend, in 1912-1913. Another game with chances to win, and now it's all-in game.

On July 11 Konrad received permission to leave, and on the 12th he visited Berchtold.

The Minister informed the Chief of Staff that he intended to deliver the note after

Poincaré's departure from Petersburg, that is, July 23rd, her departure will follow on July 25th, and thus the first day of mobilization can be set for July 28th.

Koprad planned to leave on July 14 in order to return on the 22nd. Of course, if the Serbs begin to move troops north, then, in his opinion, the ultimatum should be presented immediately, since it is important for the Austrians not to allow the enemy to impede the crossing of the Danube.

On the same day, the chief of staff, in a letter to the Minister of War, demanded the closure of the Sokol organizations, recognizing them as revolutionary.

On July 14, before leaving for Tyrol, Konrad sent the following letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

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"For me, as the chief of the general staff," Konrad wrote, "it is necessary to know when formulating a decision whether to really count on a war with Serbia or only to reckon with the possibility of this war."

"How this or that diplomatic action will proceed is, of course, beyond my competence, but as you and I have already verbally agreed, when choosing a diplomatic path, it is necessary to avoid everything that could give the enemy time for military subjugation. cooking, and we are late with that.

If the decision to move out is firmly taken, then, in accordance with military interests, it should result in a short-term ultimatum, which, if a refusal follows, should immediately issue an order to mobilize. |

Apparently, the Chief of the General Staff did not yet have firm confidence in Vienna's inflexible decision to wage war.

On July 14, Conrad left for Tyrol, ordering his deputy to submit daily reports to him.

Hbffer's messages came in continuously and contained orientations to the position of Romania and other countries, reported on a conversation with Chernipy, who had arrived from Bucharest, about Tissa's concerns about securing the Romanian border; Finally, Potiorek's letter to Conrad was forwarded. From the words of Czernin, who visited Hbffer, one could conclude that the Romanian king was trying, allegedly, to prevent the war, but the Romanian public opinion was far from in favor of Austria. Regarding the speech against Serbia, Chernin expressed his opinion that it would be desirable to make it before the arrival of Poincaré in St. Petersburg; because he knows the content of the note, such. unacceptable to Serbia.

Conrad now dwells on this in his memoirs as proof that it was not the "military" who wanted the war, but that all circles in Vienna considered it necessary.

On the evening of July 18, Koprad left for Vienna, where he arrived on the morning of the 19th, directly at the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

The Council of Ministers met to discuss "the forthcoming diplomatic



speech against Serbia".

Berchtold opened the meeting by suggesting that a note be delivered to the Serbian government on July 23 at 5 p.m., so that the 48-hour deadline would expire on July 25 at 5 p.m., and the order for mobilization could be given on the night from Saturday to Sunday. According to the minister, it is unlikely that people in St. Petersburg will find out about the handed note even before Poincaré's departure. Diplomatic reasons make it necessary not to postpone the transmission of the note, since even now Berlin is "nervous" and information has penetrated Rome through Vienna's intentions.

The Council acceded to Berchtold's proposal to hand over the note at 5 p.m. on 23 July.

Konrad declared that, for military reasons, it would be very valuable to go through the entire procedure as soon as possible, because recently information has been coming from Serbia about the planned regrouping of Serbian troops from New Serbia to Old Serbia.

The Minister of War, in turn, reported to the Council on the various mobilization measures which he had prepared. In his opinion, everything

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necessary for approval by Franpom-JospffFom will be ready on Wednesday -22 July.

Then, at the suggestion of Tissa, Conrad highlighted the question of mobilization and the number of troops left in Transylvania. The answers of the Chief of Staff satisfied Tissu.

In response to the latter's question about the possibility of the occupation of Wallopa by the Italians, Berchtold expressed sompenpe in such an undertaking by Rome.

Then Tissa again returned to the goals of the war and again emphasized that one should not pursue any conquest plans, but should limit oneself only to the correction of the city, conditioned by military considerations.

Berchtold considered it possible to join Thiese's opinion only with a certain amount of caution. If the war is successful, then he is also against the annexation of Serbia, but he considers it necessary to cut the Serbian lands of Bulgaria, Greece, Albania, and perhaps also Romania, to reduce Serbia so much "so that it is no more dangerous." The situation in the Balkans may change to such an extent that he, as the leader of the foreign policy of the monarchy, must reckon with the possibility that at the end of the war Austria-Venchrya will no longer be able to suffer Kakitkh-lido apneisia if she tries to correct her borders.

Tisza vigorously objected to the passage of such a decision, not only for reasons of foreign policy, but also because in no case would Russia agree to the destruction of Serbia.

The Council of Ministers, at the suggestion of Tiss, decided: "Immediately, with the outbreak of war, declare to foreign states that the monarchy does not consider this war as an aggressive one and leading to the annexation of Serbia. However, naturally, the possibility of a strategically necessary correction of the border is not ruled out, just as

territorial reduction of Serbia in favor of other states, as well as the necessary occupation of a part of Serbian territory.

Having greeted with joy the unanimity of the Council in the discussion of the question raised, Berchtold closed the meeting.

In his memoirs, Konrad confesses that by correcting the gravel he meant the acquisition of Makvi and the surroundings of Belgrade, in order to always have two bridges in hand.

Leaving the meeting, the Chief of Staff shared his thoughts with the Minister of War, saying: "We'll see later. Before the Balkan War, the powers also talked about the preservation of 5(aba5 4a0, but after the war, no one cared about this anymore.

On the same day, Konrad left Vepa, returning again to Tyrol, and on the evening of July 21, Koprak, guarded by his adjutants and relatives, in view of rumors of an assassination attempt on him, again left for Vienna, where he arrived early in the morning on the 22nd.

The time scheduled for the presentation of the note was approaching. However, Vienna considered it poignant to once again believe the time of departure from St. Petersburg to Poincaré and turned to Berlin for this. The latter warily went forward, and on the 22nd Jagow telegraphed: "I asked Count Pourtales about the program of Poincaré's whistle. The Count announces that the President on Thursday evening at

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11 o'clock leaves Kronstadt. This is CET at 9:30 am. If steps are taken in Belgrade tomorrow at 5 o'clock in the afternoon, then they will, therefore, become known in St. Petersburg during the stay of Poincaré.

Chirsky on the next day, conveying Vienna's gratitude for the information, said: "Barop GnZl has been instructed to delay the transmission for an hour." |

We will not cite all the diplomatic correspondence that was conducted during this time. The Vepian diplomats plucked up the courage and decided to make war with Serbia.

The Austrian ambassador Gisl in Belgrade also called for war in his letter dated July 21, in which he indicated that under the threat of an external danger, the intertwining struggle would subside in Serbia, that the delay in presenting the note made it possible for the Serbs to consider this as an act of weakness for Austria-Hungary. Even the leave of the chief of staff and the minister of war in Belgrade is touted as proof of Austria's impotence.

In Berchtold's soul there still existed the hope that Serbia would make concessions. On the 23rd of July, they were instructed to Giza, even in the event of a break in diplomatic relations, which was to follow with an ultimatum not accepted by Serbia, not to consider this a phenomenon of war. This will follow either formally from Vienna or if the Serbs attack the territory of the monarchy.

On July 2, the text of the note was received by Koprak. After reviewing it, ov recognized the note as unacceptable for Serbia, and, consequently, the war was unacceptable.

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By the evening of the 24th, reports began to come in that the Serbs were already partly mobilizing, and on the night of the 25th, Conrad raised a question with the Minister of Foreign Affairs: since Serbia responds to the ultimatum by mobilization, he considers it necessary immediately, i.e. . On July 25, and not on the 26th, give the order to mobilize. Conrad finds the Minister of War and talks to him about the same. The military minister said that at 9:30 in the morning he, along with Berchtold, would be at Frapts-Joseph, where they would discuss Conrad's proposal. At 8 o'clock in the morning, Conrad was again with the military minister, persuading him of the need to give an order on the 25th in order to consider July 28 as the first day of mobilization. Since the question concerns operational considerations, then I am obliged to make proposals, and not others, we must not be one day behind Serbia," the Chief of Staff stated categorically.

At 7:15 pm on July 25, a telegram message was received from the border that at 6:02 pm Serbia had delivered a reply to the ultimatum. Gizi left Belgrade, and a general mobilization was announced in Serbia at 4 p.m.

With Serbia's announcement of a general mobilization, Conrad believed that Austria-Hungary was already at war with Serbia.

At 9:23 p.m. on July 25, Frapts-Joseph signed an order to mobilize against war "B", i.e. against Serbia and Montenegro.

In his memoirs, Conrad tells us at length how the monarchy was "backed against the wall"; what other way out for her, except howl-

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we were not; that politics had put the chief of staff in a difficult position, demanding that he wage war only against Serbia when Russian intervention threatened, followed by a European war; what was not revealed, who was an enemy, who was a friend, for even a friend of the three powers. the union, except for Germany, took an ambiguous position.

The chief of staff believes that diplomacy, thinking of conducting only one war with Serbia, has unexpectedly found itself in a difficult situation. In a word, according to Conrad, at the beginning of the war, diplomatic position was insufficient.

We are obliged to remind the reader that on July 7, in the Council of Ministers, Conrad was asked the question: is it possible to fight with Serbia under conditions and then start a war against Russia, if she were to assume a threatening position. Conrad answers this question in the affirmative. It is true that the chief of staff considered Austria-Hungary unprepared for a European war if Rumania took the side of the opponents, but at the critical moment he, as an expert, did not declare this, but went along with diplomacy, because it was too strong Conrad himself had a desire to deal with Serbia.

In order for the reader of our work to understand the plight of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, we must explain that according to variant "B", i.e., during the war with Serbia and Montenegro, three armies were assigned against them (P, U and UG. If Russia entered the war, then, according to option "R", only U and UG would remain against Serbia and Montenegro

army, and the P army was to be deployed on the Russian front. Thus, it would be more desirable to immediately proceed with the deployment according to the "P" option, rather than involve the Central Army in military operations on the Serbian front. The chief of the general staff provided for: if before the 5th day of mobilization there was a speech by Russia, then it would be painless for the transportation plan to move from option "B" to option "P", i.e. turn the way the echelons And armin from the Serbian Front to Galicia. Otherwise, in order to thwart the transportation plan, the PN army had to first be transported to the south, and then begin its return transfer to Galipia.

So, Vienna brought the matter to mobilization. The next step marked the war, permission for which was given on July 5 from Berlin. If we remember, then about July, Wilhelm, in full agreement with the capillary, did not need to make any military preparations, left all the military leaders on leave and himself went on a pleasure trip to the coast of Norway, leaving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct directly the Austrian Serbian affairs.

Thus, there was a lull along the military line, for, according to Waldersee, "the army was ready."

We heard Tirpitz's regrets that Wilhelm was absent from Berlin at such a tense time, otherwise he would have immediately ended the matter peacefully, since he would have been aware of the events that were taking place.

The admiral did not think that it was Wilhelm who was aware of all the negotiations that were taking place and carried on an uninterrupted exchange with the chancellor and the ministry of foreign affairs.

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The German ambassador in Vienna was reprimanded by Wilhelm for his "moderating" actions.

On July 8, he also reported to Berlin that Berchtold was going to formulate the demands on Serbpi in such a way "so that their acceptance would be ruled out beforehand," and on July 10 he announced the desirability of getting instructions from Berlin on the formulation of these demands.

At the same time, the ambassador wrote that in Vienna it had been decided to proceed with caution, in view of which the chief of staff and the minister of war had gone on vacation.

Wilhelm turned out to be pedantic that in Vienna they could not come to a decision within 14 days, but he found it necessary for the Serbs to put forward decisive demands. "Clean up the Sanjak! Then dump immediately poured! Austria must immediately return the sanjak at all costs in order to prevent the unification of Serbia with Montenegro and the Serbs' access to the sea, "Wilhelm wrote personally in the margins of the Ambassador's report.

As for the departure from Vienna of the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff, Wilhelm's remarks read: "Childishness!! Approximately as during the Silesian wars. I am against military councils and conferences, bearing in mind that the more moderate side always wins. - Frederick the Great.

This aggravated Wilhelm's pressure on Vienna in the sense of accelerating the

inating. He was dissatisfied that the note was not ready by July 19, and that its transmission had to be postponed until Poincaré's departure from Petersburg, i.e. until the 25th. "What a shame!" exclaims the Kaiser.

In Berlin they were afraid that the matter would be smoked out by "diplomatic success", and it can be said that Berchtold and Konrad also greatly feared such an outcome.

The letters of the Vepsian ambassador so far did not say anything about the aims of the war that Austria set for itself. Having given their consent to the war with the "Serbian assassins," Wilhelm and the chancellor did not ask what kind of songs the monarchy set for itself. True, Franz Joseph's letter spoke of the "isolation" and "belittling" of Serbia, but Goyos, who brought the letter, was already talking about the "partition" of this state.

Wilhelm, in fact, was of little interest to this question, for he knew that the war would bring with it a change of borders, and in any case, Austria needed to acquire a Sandjak. On July 95, Wilhelm, reading a telegram from Belgrade dated 2% July regarding the Austrian note, expressed his full approval of its energetic tone. "Bravo! - exclaimed the op, - to confess, such a thing was not expected from the Viennese. At the end of the telegram, Wilhelm added: "What an exaggeration all this so-called Serbian great power turns out to be. This is the case with all Slavic states. Only step harder on the calluses of this bastard!

Reading Chirsky's telegram of July 24 about Berchtold's peaceful conversation with the Russian chargé d'affaires, Wilhelm remarks on July 26: "Quite superfluous. It will give the impression of weakness and seem like an apology to the attitude towards Russia; This behavior is clearly wrong and should be avoided. Austria has a good reason; for this reason, she took such a step, and now, after the fact, it is impossible to put Austria's actions on a 4ia\$1-discussion.

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To Berchtold's statement that "Austria will not demand Serbian territory", that "Austria does not want to cause any regrouping of forces in the Balkans", Wilhelm bursts into abuse. "Donkey! - the Kaiser is indignant. "She must take back the Sanjak, otherwise the Serbs will have access to Adria." Regrouping "will happen by itself and will happen inevitably." "Austria must obtain an advantage over the other small powers in the Balkans at the expense of Russia, otherwise there will be no peace."

Of course, such an energetic barracks tone from the banks of the Spree reached only the Chancellor and the Foreign Office, where it turned into a cultured Sole. language for transmission to Vienna. We know how sensitive the Viennese politicians were to Germany, and we can guarantee that, having heard the true expressions of the ally about themselves, they would immediately reject the "Nibelungen" loyalty and try to get out of the crisis themselves.

Having given permission for the war with Serbia, the German Foreign Office only on the 17th, in the person of Jagov, asked to know about the goals of Vienna,

"For the diplomatic preparation of the conflict with Serbia," he wrote to Chirsky, "it would be important to know from the very beginning what the Austro-Hungarian diplomats' ideas about the future conquest of Serbia were: this issue would have a significant impact on both the behavior

Italy, and public opinion, on the behavior of England. Being sure that Vienna had already developed this question, and pointing out that they did not want to embarrass themselves with the request, Yagov added: "It would only be important for us to be oriented to a certain extent in where this path, perhaps, can lead." |

Above were the judgments and resolutions of the Viennese politicians, who themselves did not know "where this road ... might lead," but firmly grasped that the matter would not end without annexations. Konrad advised Berchtold to answer Berlin: "We ourselves do not know what will happen after the war."

If Wilhelm offered to "step harder on the corns of this bastard," then the Berlin diplomats dressed this in a slightly different form.

On July 18, Jagow wrote to the German ambassador in London: "The more decisively Austria shows itself, the more vigorously we support it, the more likely it is that Russia will remain calm. Of course, things will not go off without some chatter in St. Petersburg, but, in essence, Russia is now unfit for combat. France and England at the present time also do not want war. According to all competent considerations, Russia will become combat-ready in a few years. Then she will crush us with the number of her soldiers, and her Baltic Fleet or her strategic railways will already be built. Our group of powers, meanwhile, is getting weaker. In Russia, they are well aware of this, and therefore for several years they have been striving for absolute peace ... But the government of Russia, still today peace-loving and half-friendly towards the Germans, is becoming weaker, while the mood of Slavic circles is becoming more and more German-hob ... I do I don't want any preventive war. But when a fight comes up, we can't back down."

The last phrases of the letter from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs best of all characterize the mood of Berlin politics: massacres do not stop, but if Russia takes a risk on it, then it cannot be abandoned.

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We heard Wilhelm call the vacation of Conrad and the Austrian Minister of War "childish"; however, at the insistence of the kanpher, both himself and the chief of the German General Staff and the Minister of War had to play the role of "guys", so as not to give the press a reason to make noise that Berlin was putting its hand to Vienna's speech. Bethmann decided to declare that Germany had nothing to do with Austria's steps.

The time was drawing near for the note to be sent to Belgrade, and anxiety began to arise in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Berlin that Wilhelm would not return early from the voyage and thereby disrupt the entire diplomatic maneuver. Indeed, on July 19, Wilhelm gives the order for the return and concentration of the Fleet. Batman sounded the alarm. "Only the intervention of other powers can draw us into conflict," wrote the op on the yacht Hohenpollerp. - It is hardly possible to assume that this will happen immediately, in particular, that England will immediately decide to intervene: Poincaré's voyage itself should delay all decisions ... The English Fleet should, according to reports from the Admiralty Headquarters, disperse on the 27th at their parking lots. The premature return of our Fleet might 'cause general anxiety, especially in Upglia it would seem suspicious."

Nevertheless, on July 25, Wilhelm orders the Fleet to be ready to return, to which Bethmann sends a telegram asking him to cancel the order. Wilhelm is furious. "An outrageous claim!!" his pencil marks. "It never crossed my mind!!! Exclusively based on the reports of my envoy about the mobilization in Belgrade! This may cause the mobilization of Rossip, in any case it will entail the mobilization of Austria. In this case, my land and sea armed forces should be concentrated. And in the Baltic Sea there is not a single ship ... I am usually used to being guided in my military orders not by some Wolff telegram, but by a general position; the civil chancellor ("civilian" underlined by the Kaiser) did not comprehend the latter. IN."

"At the time of the mobilization of Russia, my Fleet should already be in the Baltic," — that was what worried Wilhelm, and he resolutely rejected all the chancellor's ideas about continuing the voyage, returning to Berlin on the 27th.

On July 21, Chirskoi received in Vienna an Austrian Serbvi note to send it to Berlip, which was done, and on the morning of July 22, the note was already in the German Ministry of Post-Affairs. We will not dwell on the striving of German diplomacy to deny the fact that the note was received on the 22nd and not on the 24th; on the fact that Yagov, on the evening of the same 22nd, recognized the note as "quite sharp and over the top"; on the fact that the diplomats of Berlin declared everywhere: "We had no influence on the content of the note and, just as little as other powers, had the opportunity to show our sympathy to it in any way before its publication"; finally, on the fact that on July 27 Yagov declared to the Franpuza ambassador: "I have not yet had time to read the Serbian reply." "They never lie so much as before the war," Bismarck used to say, and this is exactly what Wilhelm's diplomats willingly did.

He gave a pass more interestingly to know the true mood of the latter, about which

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And.

On July 25, the Austrian ambassador Segria added: "Everyone here assumes that a possible negative response from Serbia will immediately be followed by an announcement from our side, accompanied by military operations. Here they see in every delay in the opening of hostilities a great danger of interference by other powers. We are advised in the most urgent way to come out immediately and put the world before Ha! assoshry (accomplishment by Fact)".

We have already heard from the lips of Yagov himself about the position of Rossip, France and Apgaip in the event of an Austro-Serbian war. Let us also refer to the report of the Belgian ambassador from Burlip on July 28, in which he writes: "In Vienna, just as in Berlin, they were convinced that Russia was not in a position to wage a European war, and that they would not dare to get involved in such a terrible adventure, despite the recent exchange of official assurances between the parishioner and Poincaré about the full armament of the army of the dual alliance. The alarming situation in the country's borders, revolutionary intrigues, insufficient armaments, imperfect means of communication - all these circumstances force the Russian government to look helplessly at the execution of Serbia. The same contemptuous attitude was held, if not about the "French army, then, in any case, about the spirit hovering in the government circles of France ... The opinion that Russia has not grown up to a European war dominates not only in the bosom

the Kaiser government, but also among the German industrialists whose specialty was military supplies. Thus, for example, the more competent PZ Krupi Fop-Bolep assured one of my chauffeurs that the Russian artillery was in poor condition, not too fat, while the German artillery was once in a better condition. At the same time, he added: "It would be madness for Rosepi to declare war on Germany under these conditions."

There were, to be sure, warning voices among the German diplomats as well. So, on July 16, Likhnovsky, the ambassador to the Doydop, wrote to Bethman:

"From the point of view of Berchtold, his desire to improve his position, which had been greatly shaken because of the Bucharest peace, was completely hindered and, as a result of the apostasy of Romanianpi, the influx of the moparchy in the Balkans was reduced by using the present, comparatively favorable, opportunity for an armed clash with the Serbs. As is well known, the leading military circles of Austria have long been advancing on strengthening the prestige of the monarchy by means of war. In one case it was Italy, which had to be weaned from its irredentism, in the other case it was Serbia, which by great exploits, in the spirit of Eugepius, had to be forced into obedience and better rights. I, of course, share this point of view of the Austrian statesmen, and in their place, perhaps, I would have already used the Serbian troubles to resolve the South Slavic question in the spirit of the Habsburgs.

However, the first prerequisite for such a policy should be a clear program based on the recognition that the present state and international legal status within the Serbian-Croatian family of peoples is not stable for a long time. A situation in which one part of this patient, torn apart only because of religion, but because of race,

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drive it in

endowing the Austrian state, the Hungarian state with another part, and the third with a dual monarchy, and, finally, with the fourth and fifth, an independent kingdom, cannot hold out for long.

The desire to keep under all conditions the sacred \$(a\$` fio, for reasons of convenience, has repeatedly led, as, for example, during the last Balkan crisis, to the complete collapse of the political house of cards built on these foundations.

First of all, I doubt whether a comprehensive plan could be conceived in Vienna, which would constitute the only basis for a lasting settlement of the South Slavic question. I have a triple ©0103 with Serbia included. Proceeding from my acquaintance with the locals, I can't even imagine that they would be able to carry out such a state-legal reorganization of moparchins. After all, for this, first of all, it would be necessary to overcome the resistance of Hungary.

Therefore, the military command of Serbia would never have had the aim or effect of a satisfactory solution of the extraordinarily difficult South Slavic question. At best, it would have the result that the hard-to-settled Eastern question would again be on the waiting list to give Austria moral satisfaction.



Whether in this case Russia and Rumania will remain passive, leaving Austria a free hand, Your Excellency is in a better position to judge than I am. According to my impressions here, and especially after my private conversations with Gray, I believe that the views I expressed recently in Berlin about Russia's intentions towards you turned out to be correct. Gray assures me that in Russia they don't think about war with us... In Russia, from time to time, a well-known anti-German mood appears spontaneously, as a result of the Slavic national feeling.

But this mood, however, is opposed by a strong Hermapophile party. Neither the Emperor nor any of the influential persons are of an Anti-Germanic disposition... On the contrary, Grach BeepkepdorFh openly admitted that there is a strong Apti-Austrian sentiment in Russia. However, there no one thinks about the seizure of Austrian territories, such as, for example, Galicia.

Whether it will be possible, in such a state of mind, to influence the Russian government so that it keeps itself passive in the Austro-Serbian military clash, I am not in a position to judge. However, I can state with complete categoricity that in the event of a war, it will not be possible to influence local (London - B.Sh.) public opinion in favor of Serbip ...

However, I am far from pandering on the rejection of our alliance or our ally. I consider s0yu3, which has entered the flesh and blood of both states, necessary, and I consider it, already because of the many Germans living in Austria, a natural form of kinship with the Nemp.

I am only interested in whether we should support our alliance or agree to a policy that I consider adventurous, since it will not lead to a radical solution of the problems, or to upp-

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NN Sanitation of the Great Serbian Movement. If the imperial and royal police and the Bospian state authorities led the heir to the throne through the "alley of bombers", then I do not see this as sufficient grounds for us to risk the "notorious Pomeranian grenadier"; such a policy would only increase the Austrian arrogance, which in this case, as the era of Erenthal showed, sets itself the main task of freeing itself, if possible, from under Berlin's tutelage.

However, even if our political behavior were really determined by the view that after delivering the "mortal blow" to the Greater Serbian movement, happy Austria, freed from this concern, would be grateful to us for the assistance rendered, then I would not refrain from the following question: The national movement in Hungary was dispersed after the suppression of the Hungarian one. uprising with the help of Emperor Npkolay after the frequent use of the gallows and the conquest of Hungary at Villagos (under the supreme command of the imperial general Hainau) and did the saving feat of the guy create close and complete trust in the mutual relations between the two states?

Likhnovsky's report is dated July 16, and on the 17th, as we know, Jagow asked Vienna about the songs of the war, i.e., about the plan, the existence of which the German ambassador in London doubted, and, pakopets, on the 18th Jagow answered him: "When a fight comes up, we can't back down."

We will also dwell on Italy, which Berlin hoped to see as an ally. First of all, neither Vienna nor Berlin informed the Roman government about the impending attack against Serbia, since they did not particularly trust this "ally". However, Yagov wrote to Chirsky in Vepu on July 15: "and no matter how, in general, Austrophobic Italian public opinion may be, it has always been Serbian-Philian to the same degree until now. There was no doubt in my mind that in the Austro-Serbian conflict it would definitely take the side of Serbia. Therefore, in my opinion, it is extremely important that Vienna either come to an agreement © by the Roman Cabinet regarding the affairs pursued by her in Serbia and keep him on her side, or, since the conflict itself does not mean any sazaz Zoefegr1 \$, influenced the Roman cabinet in favor of maintaining neutrality. In accordance with its treaties with Austria, Italy has the right to compensation for any change in \$(a15 4io in the Balkans in favor of the Danubian Monarchy... In Italpi, | probably, the only sufficient compensation will be considered only the acquisition of Trentino, about which I will tell you Strictly Confidential.

However, at the end of the letter, Yagov leaves Chirsky, at his discretion, to discuss this issue with Berkhold.

On July 20, Chirsky replied that Berchtold had told him: since Austria does not seek territorial benefits, Italy cannot claim compensation either. If Italy does not sincerely want to go along with Austria, then the latter is not encouraged to do so, and Berchtold "is firmly convinced that Italy, both in military and domestic political turmoil, can hardly think of active intervention."

The German ambassador from Rome reported on July 24 that "in a long

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and a rather stormy conference with Prime Minister Salandra and S. Giuliano, caused by the publication of the Austrian note to Serbia, the German ambassador failed to convince the publicists to remain in the bosom of the alliance. "In my impression," the ambassador wrote, "the only way to keep Italy is to promise her compensation in time." This "impression" of the ambassador resonated with Wilhelm: "After all, even the little thief must always get something." However, when on July 96 the ambassador announced that Italy saw Austria's action against Serbia as a threat to itself, since Austria "may tomorrow act against Italy in the same way"; that "the Minister still does not believe in the Austrian assurances - not to encroach on any Serb territory - the minister still does not believe", that, having not received compensations, Italy will be forced to block Austria's path, - then Wilhelm also admitted that Austrian sacrifice Trentpo in favor of his ally. On the same day, Betman telegraphed to Chirsky: "Even the Chief of the General Staff considers it extremely necessary to maintain the tripartite alliance with Italy. Therefore, the agreements of Vienna and Rome are necessary. Vienna should refrain from agreeing to ambiguous interpretations of the treaty, but should, on the contrary, take its decision in accordance with the seriousness of the situation.

Such was the mood in the political spheres of Berlin on July 26, when the center of gravity of events shifted to this city.

The military group continued to be treated by the concerns of diplomats at that time.

However, on July 25, War Secretary Falkephain had already arrived in Berlin and noted in his diary that everyone, like Austria, would have recognized the Serbian answer as not exhaustive. "They want a large calculation," thought the Prussian military minister.

On July 1, an Austrian military agent wrote to Koprad from Berlip that Moltke had been released by Wilhelm from a trip to the coast of Norway and was currently undergoing treatment with his family at Carlebad, where he would stay until the end of the month if the situation did not change. This is written by a military agent in case Konrad wishes to see the Chief of the German General Staff.

Konrad writes in his memoirs that, not wanting to stir up any rumors, he refused to meet, especially since everything had already been agreed upon according to the plan of the war.

Apparently, around July 10, Germaninus, a military agent, informed from Vienna that Abstro-Venria would come out only after the end of the harvest, that is. at the beginning of August, that the note would be sent to Belgrade only on July 25, and until then no military measures would be taken. On this additional song, Moltke sketched: "If the performance does not follow until July 25, a lot of water will flow in Dupai before moving on to the next one."

Apparently, the Chief of the German General Staff also believed in the firmness of the Viennese politicians, as did Wilhelm. On July 17, in a letter to his wife Moltke, he noted: "As for your trip to Bayreuth, then, judging by the latest information I have, you can safely go there. Until 25 nothing decisive will happen.

Confidence that Hermapia will not get involved in the war does not leave Moltke on July 18, when in a letter to Zepa it falls that her trip to

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Bayreuth does not change, and he is very glad that in August they will heal together, after her return from Bayreuth. On July 19, a little doubt creeps into his August family happiness, and although he still believes in him, he remarks: "How could it not happen otherwise."

However, on July 21, when the time for the presentation of the ultimatum was approaching, the chief of the general staff began to worry about the future. "So, Thursday (July 23 - B.Sh.) should bring a decision. I am beginning to look at these things with a little skepticism," Moltke writes to his wife.

On July 26, Moltier returned to 6 Berlin. Make him speak for himself. In a letter to his wife dated July 26, the chief of staff writes: "Here, at the general headquarters, Waldersee was waiting for me, with whom I had a long conversation. First of all, I want - now 10 o'clock - to go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have a talk with Yagov. The position is still rather unclear. The further turn of events depends solely on the position of Russia, and if she does not take hostile actions against Austrian troops, then the war will be localized. Describing the mapiffestades in front of the Austrian embassy and pointing out that the mood of the press is good, Moltke continues: "You would do well if you returned on Tuesday (July 28 - B.Sh.). Until that day, a very important decision is unlikely to happen. The reader already knows that this day should be the first day of the mobilization of the Austrian

Wepperian Armin on the day of the declaration of war on Austria against Serbia.

It may seem strange that our appeal to the intimate letters of the Chief of the General Staff, but from what has already been said, it is clear that "statesmen", no matter what events were approaching, sometimes first of all took care of their personal affairs, dedicating their wives to official taipas. Rare patches were an exception in this.

We don't know how Moltke's conversation with Jagov ended on July 26, but the history of the world war in the publication of the state archive reports that on the same day Moltke had a conversation with the chancellor, and, despite the incoming reports about Russia's military preparations, both came to the conclusion: "As long as Russia does not take hostile actions, our efforts should be directed towards localizing the conflict", and therefore, on the evening of the same day, the chief of staff told the military minister that he considers "taking any measures 'premature'".

Meanwhile, measures were already taken in Petersburg at that time, which then accelerated the denouement.

We are not going to and cannot, given the size of our work, describe in detail the events on the banks of the Neva that preceded the Second World War.

Our narration will briefly describe these days.

It was noted earlier that the Sarajevo murder, having created a sensation, gradually, under the influence of Vepa's silence, lost its sharpness and life gradually returned to its usual course. Waiting for the arrival of Poipcare. The troops were going through their summer training.

Buchanan testifies: "Several weeks have passed since the assassination of the Erogertzog Prince Ferdinand without any manifestations from the stop. Austria, and there was a case that the opa refused any punitive actions. I even got a vacation and already got tickets for a trip to England."

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So, on the diplomatic Shipka, everything seemed "calm", if only the words of this diplomat are to be believed.

A representative of the Russian General Staff, Dapilov, now writes as follows: "In the first days that elapsed after the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, I was absent from St. Petersburg. The assumption of the possibility of a serious aggravation of the conflict created by the Sarajevo event seemed to us, in Russia, so unlikely that in the middle of July I was sent to the Caucasus, on the next field trip of officers of the General Staff, despite the fact that that in my jurisdiction, as quartermaster general of the general staff, which I took down from 1909, were all questions relating to the defense of the state. Almost at the same time as IPA, Colonel Sholokov, who was directly in charge of operational paperwork on the Western Front, was dismissed on vacation and was at one of the Crimean seaside resorts. Our deputies remained in St. Petersburg. Before leaving for the Caucasus, I turned to the clerk of the general staff with a proposal to cancel my trip in view of the somewhat thickened political situation, but General Yanushkevich did not find sufficient grounds for such a cancellation.

Yes, Sazopov himself, together with his comrade from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was on vacation. Sazonov was to return to the Poincaré passage.

The first more or less real information about the intentions of Austria was received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the person of the head of the Chancellery, Schillippg, on July 16th. The Daily Record of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that on that day at the evening at Countess Kleinmichel's (according to Sukhomlipov, "the gullible public in St. Petersburg believed that Countess Kleinmichel was an agent of Emperor forces of Schillipp, how Russia will respond to the performance of Austria, if the latter decides to do something against the Serbip.

PScholling did not hesitate to reply that Russia would not tolerate Austrian encroachments on the integrity and independence of Serbia. Schillippg confirmed this decision of Russia several times to the Italian ambassador, suggesting that he warn Vienna through Rome about the possible serious consequences of Austrian actions.

Minister of War Sukhomlinov, who was present at this evening, also confirms the above conversation. |

On July 17, the Austrian ambassador to Cheterburg Sapari returned from vacation and wanted to see Sazonov "as soon as possible".

On July 18, "wanting to inform Sazonov as soon as possible of what was going on, goodbye to the minister of England with the English ambassador," Shiyaaling went to the station and on the way told Sazonov both his conversation on the 16th day and the telegram of the Russian ambassador from Vienna.

"The minister was very concerned about these news and agreed with the opinion of Baron Schilling about the need to warn. Austria on Russia's determination not to allow any encroachment on the independence of Serbia under any circumstances.

On the same day, Sazopov received Sapari, and the latter assured "in the most peaceful terms" that Austria had no intentions of

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and Anna streak relations with Serbia, and Sazonov did not have to resort to threats. |

On July 20, Poincaré arrived in St. Petersburg, the purpose of which was to strengthen the European equilibrium. In the spirit of the mouth, according to Poincare himself, his entire stay in St. Petersburg passed. "Sapari," writes Poincaré, behaved with extreme caution. He told me and Viviapi, but in very vague Forms, that his government decided to take steps in Belgrade, the nature of which is not finally determined, and he made it clear to us that Austria held Serbia responsible for the Sarajevo assassination. Poincare, of course, began to point out the need for moderation in the Austrian demands, to which Sapari gave him "bapal assurances about the harmless nature of the Austrian policy." The visit of the Austrian ambassador planted "dreams" in the soul of the French President; "It was necessary to ensure that Russia, which has always been regarded as the patroness of Serbia, does not remain isolated at this critical moment from England and France."

"We had to," says Poincaré, "still recommend to her at the same time

it's time for moderation"; From this we can conclude that Poincaré had a conversation with Sazonov about the possibility of aggravating the Serbo-Austrian conflict, and somehow decisions were made.

The President also received the Serbian Ambassador Spalajkovic. Byukenen says: "While waiting in line for the reception, the Serbian ambassador started a conversation with Ipa. Being very agitated, he drew my attention to the threatening position of Austria and said that Serbia was on the eve of the greatest upheaval in its history. Poincaré, to whom I repeated what I had said to Mne Spalaikovich, mentioned this at the reception of the Austrian ambassador, but did not receive a satisfactory answer.

With a pessimistic soul, the diplomats broke the Kronstadt raid. Poincaré plows that the impressions of the trip "were not particularly optimistic": "We asked ourselves what the silence of Austria meant, but we were far from having a premonition of what was to happen, and we did not think at all to hurry with our return."

However, Poipcare was apparently given support for Sazonov in connection with the Austro-Serbian conflict, for when on July 21 it only became known that an ultimatum had been presented to Serbia, the French ambassador was very optimistic about the situation. "Our situation has never been better," the ambassador said, "because there is complete agreement between us, and this is not just the ambassador's judgment, but we have four very important recent documents that testify to this." These documents meant the speeches of the tsar and Poincare, which they exchanged during their last meeting.

"Whoever will someday be engaged in elucidating the behind-the-scenes history of the origin of the war," writes Sukhomlinov in his "Memoirs", "will have to pay special attention to the days of Poincaré's stay in Petersburg, as well as the subsequent time, approximately from 24 to 28 July. I am firmly convinced that during this time the decision of war or peace took place, and the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich, Poincaré and Sazonov conspired at all costs to paralyze any attempt at a peaceful outcome.

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You .---.-."....".."..

You will certainly receive Sazonov's handout from Poincaré.

On July 23, the first information was received from the Italian embassy about the presentation of an ultimatum by Austria, according to the document, there was no palipo yet, and only Sapari asked Sazonov to pripyat him tomorrow.

Early on the morning of the 24th, confirmation of the Italians' reports arrived from Belgrade.

"By 10 o'clock in the morning, SD Sazopov arrived from Tsarskoye Selo," says Podennye zapis, "to whom Baron Schilling immediately told all of the above. These news made a very heavy impression on the minister, and he immediately said: s'ezo {a slegge epgorveppe" (this is European felt - R. Sh.). He was immediately summoned to the ministry by telechon. the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, in anticipation of which S. D. Sazonov, via telekhov from the office of Baron Schillipp, personally reported to the sovereign emperor about the presentation of an ultimatum by Austria to Serbia. His Majesty Waxikpool: "This is outrageous!" and ordered to keep him informed of the future.

The Austrian ambassador arrived with the text of the vow. Schilling, on behalf. Sazonov, invited the military and naval ministers to the council of ministers: and Minister Fipansov.

Sazonov immediately informed the British ambassador by telehop about what had happened and asked him to come to breakfast at the French ambassador, where he was. the Romanian envoy is also invited. Before and after breakfast. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was negotiating, wishing to enlist the cooperation of both states. The French ambassador assured them of their full support, up to and including the implementation of the union treaty. As for Bukepan, he, in his words, "limited himself to pointing out that the British Government might announce in Berlin and Wepe that since an Austrian attack on Serbia would cause Russia to act, Apglia would not be able to stay away from general war." This did not satisfy Sazonov, - ppsket Bukepen, - who argued that we increase the chances of war by refusing to declare our solidarity with Russia and France.

The former head of the mobilization department of the general staff, Dobrorolsky, writes:

"July 11 (July 24 — B.Sh.) between 11 and 12 o'clock diya (that is, at the time when the diplomatic breakfast was taking place — B.Sh.) the chief of the general staff, General Yanushkevich, called me to the official body - FOPUu and offered to immediately come to his cabinet.

"The situation is very serious," he said at my entrance to him. "Austria presented the Serbian government with an absolutely unacceptable ultimatum, and we cannot remain indifferent. Decided to openly and firmly declare this. Tomorrow there will be a papechagana in Russian Ipvalid, a brief official warning that Russia is following the course of negotiations between the Austro-Wepgers and the Serbian governments with great attention and will not remain calm if the dignity and pomp of the half-blooded Serbian people are in danger. . Are you ready to announce the mobilization of our army?" |

After an affirmative answer, the chief of the general staff told me: "In an hour you will bring me all the calculations on the military readiness of the troops, and this means, in case of necessity, the announcement of a private mobile

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TTT Ya cc OO TTT lizapdia only anti-Austria-Hungary. Therefore, with such a mobilization, nothing should give Germany any reason to see any hostility against her.

I immediately reported on the impermissibility of private mobilization.

General Yanushkevich ordered me to report back to him in detail, as the op ordered, in an hour.

During the second report, the head of military communications, General Ronzhin, was also sent. Quartermaster General Danilov was on a business trip in the Caucasus."

Now, in his article "The Mobilization of the Russian Army in 1914," Dobrorolsky proves "the entire inconsistency of the private mobilization of the army," namely: 1) politically, the opa did not intimidate anyone, 2) "strategically, the opa was simply absurd," because the southern border of the Warsaw district remained mobilized, 3) for the iron

roads for transportation by private mobilization and "were not developed" "on the grounds that the possibility of private mobilization against Austria-Hungary alone" was not foreseen, 4) the strategic concentration of mobilized troops on the border would be even more dangerous: only one concentration plan was developed, changing it led to a delay in combat

readiness.

General Yanushkevich was informed in detail," Dobrorolsky continues, "of all the indicated disadvantages of private mobilization. At the same time, a note was submitted on some necessary measures in connection with the possibility of mobilization, namely: 1) the return of troops from the camps; 2) on early graduation from military schools; 3) declaration of fortresses and some border regions under martial law; 4) the introduction throughout the empire of the provision on the pre-mobilization period.

We draw attention to the fact that all the talk about private mobilization, about the seriousness of the situation and the firm position of Russia, took place even before the meeting of the Council of Ministers.

According to the Podednaya Record, the Council of Ministers was held at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, according to Dobrorolsky - at 5 o'clock. day, in Krasnoye Selo, and Yanushkevich was present. Sukhomlinov in his memoirs does not mention the mouth council and writes: "Not entirely by surprise, but quite unexpectedly, I received an offer to come to the meeting of the Council of Ministers in Krasnoye Selo on July 95 in the midst of the camp gathering." Thus, the first meeting of the council took place, obviously, without the participation of the Minister of War.

"The Council of Ministers approved," says the Record, "the proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1) together with other Powers, to ask Austria to extend the time limit indicated by her for a reply to Serbia in order to give the Powers time to familiarize themselves, in accordance with the proposal of Austria itself, with the danpump of the judicial investigation on the case of the Sarajevo assassination, and 2) to advise Serbia not to bother with the battle with the Austro-Hungarian troops, but, pulling back its armed forces, to turn to the powers with a request to judge the dispute that has arisen. At the same time, it was decided in principle to mobilize four military districts (Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan), as well as both Fleets (Black Sea and Baltic) and to take some other military measures, if circumstances so require. Prp this was

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Attention was drawn to the fact that all military preparations would be clearly directed exclusively to the event of a clash with Austria-Hungary and could not be interpreted as unfriendly actions against Germany.  
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If we compare this preparation with what Yanushkevich said between 11 and 12 o'clock in the afternoon to Dobrorolsky, it becomes clear that all these measures were either actually dictated by Sazonov to Yanushkevich by telephone at 11-12 o'clock in the morning, or, conversely, they were proposed by Yanushkevich ; most likely the first.

Yapushkevich scheduled a meeting of the General Staff Committee for 8 pm.

"Mr. Yanushkevich returned," writes Dobrorolsky, "from Krasnoye Selo and confirmed the inflexibility of the government's decision to answer



to the Austrian ultimatum in a worthy Rossin - the patroness: the Slavs - in a way. All designed measures have been approved. The next day, the return of the regiments of the Guards to their winter quarters and the production of yupkers into ohitzers was already delayed. |

"The meeting of the committee of the general headquarters was devoted to the final revision of the draft regulation on the field command and control of the troops."

"The war was already a foregone conclusion, and the entire stream of telegrams between the governments of Russia and Germany represented only the plot of a historical drama." ,

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After the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Sezonov met with the Serbian ambassador, who was given "advice of the utmost moderation in regard to the answer."

At 7 o'clock, the German Poslapvik Purtales arrived at the Minister, who tried to justify Austria's actions both by the very fact of establishing the guilt of the Serbian government, and by the need to "protect the monarchical principle." Zapis reports that "Sazonov spoke with Count Pourtales in a very firm language and sharply condemned the reception of the Vienna Cabinet." "Those who saw Count Pourtales," Zapis chuckles, "when he left the minister testify that he was very agitated and did not hide the fact that S. D. Sazopov's words and especially his firm determination to rebuff the Austrian demands produced a strong rebuff on the ambassador. impression."

In his pamphlet *Between Peace and War*, Pourtales says that he was surprised to learn from the Austrian ambassador that Sazonov received the message of the ultimatum relatively calmly.

"In contrast to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador," continues Pourtales, "in whose presence the Minister of Foreign Affairs showed calmness, I found Mr. Sazonov in a state of the greatest agitation. His accusations against Austria knew no measure. Sazonov did not agree with the point of view of Berlin, which saw this dispute as a private affair of Austria and Serbia. "The issue, according to the minister, is European. Europe must not allow, and will not allow, that little Serbia falls victim to the greed of the Danube monarch." Sazonov pointed out that Germany should not support Vienna, etc. "I noticed, however, that during our conversation: Sazapov only once flashed the word war on his lips, precisely when op exclaimed that in case if Austria-Hungary "swallows" Serbia,

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Russia will go to war against the Habeburg monarchy. These words led me to the idea that Russia, perhaps, intends only then to turn to arms when it becomes clear that Austria-Hungary is going to make territorial acquisitions at the expense of Serbia.

From a conversation with Sazonov, Pourtales got the impression that "at the meeting of the Council of Ministers just held, it was decided not to retreat in the face of a sharp conflict."

After the German ambassador, Sazonov had a conversation with the Khranpuz ambassador. For dep, telegrams were sent to Belgrade, with instructions not to accept the battle © by the Austrian troops, and a circular telegram to the ambassadors that Austria reported the note only half a day after it was presented to the Serbian

to the Russian government that Petersburg considers it necessary to extend the term of the ultimatum.

On July 25, a meeting of the Council of Ministers was held in Krasnoye Selo under the chairmanship of Nikolai P. "At this meeting," says Podennaya Zapis, "we approved and further developed the resolutions worked out the day before by the Council of Ministers. It was decided not to announce mobilization for the time being, but to take all preparatory measures for its speedy implementation.

"The unfortunate idea of private mobilization was not yet abandoned," writes Dobrorolsky, "it had its adherents, but not among the military department. General Yanushkevich learned, frankly, all the danger of her announcement, but he could not instill the same in his most loyal reports. .

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July 12, 13, and 14 (July 25, 26, and 27—B.S.) were days of yearning for optimists. S. D. Sazonov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also belonged to them at first. Only this optimism can explain that he continued to stand for private mobilization and supported the belief in its salvation - in Petergokh.

The mood there was insane. The consciousness of great responsibility and forebodings caused an internal struggle and understandable hesitation. And now, as a direct result of this mood, salvation is sought in private mobilization against Austria. But for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as for the military, it should have been clear that such a military measure could only serve as another reason for our enemies to become even more audacious: this decision placed the initial operation of our armies in the most unfavorable conditions.

How "optimistic" the council of ministers in Krasnoye Selo was on the 25th, and especially Sazonov, is shown by the description of the meeting of this council given by Minister of War Sukhomlinov, who, of course, cannot be counted among those who want to wage war at all costs.

It was indicated above that Sukhomlinov is still concealing his presence at the meeting on July 24 and writes as follows: "I remember that during my trip to the meeting I did not have any foreboding about the impending catastrophe. I knew the personal peacefulness of the tsar and did not receive any notice about the subject of the upcoming meeting. Therefore, I attached so little importance to the trip to Krasnoye Selo that I went alone, without taking with me either the chief of the general headquarters, or even the duty officer.

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adjutant: the subject of the meeting could be purely military affairs of the St. Petersburg military district, or anything related to camp fees "...

In a word, there was a peak of anxiety, and many of the "highest ranks of the military department" present ... also knew nothing about the subject of the upcoming conference; however, referring to the presence of Sazonov, they expressed assumptions pointing to a semi-optical situation.

"Without any introduction," continues Sukhomlinov, "the sovereign gave the Minister of Foreign Affairs a word that we

half-hour speech outlined the situation created by the Austro-Serbian conflict for Rosspi. What Sazonov reported on was a major accusation against Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. All those present were given the impression that this was a planned challenge, against which the states of the tripartite accord (Echam(e cor@lae), France and England) would rise up together with Russia if the latter tried to prevent violence against the Slavic brother. Sazonov had a strong effect on our military feelings. He announced to us that after all diplomatic means for reaching an agreement had been fruitless, only a military demonstration could be countered with exorbitant demands; he concluded by pointing out that the case had come when Russian diplomacy can, through partial mobilization against Austria, put her dynlomacy in place. Technically, this meant the order for a preparatory period for war. There was no question of the likelihood or even the possibility of war."

Sukhomlinov speaks at length about Nikolai's calmness, not forgetting to add that the day before the tsar had already been built accordingly by his uncle Nikolai Nikolaevich. "In the concluding speech of the sovereign," says Sukhomlinov, "there was the same hope, but he found that the tenger already needed a more or less serious threat. Austria has reached the point where she does not even respond to our diplomatic proposals of peace. Therefore, the guy decided it would be expedient to apply the partial mobilization prepared for this occasion, which for Germany will serve as proof of the absence of our side of hostile actions towards it.

"On this basis, it was decided to preliminarily announce the start of the preparatory period for war from July 13/26. If, after that, there is no improvement in further diplomatic negotiations, then. declare partial mobilization ›.

"My role in this decision," Shiyet in his memoirs, the former Minister of War, "was ... very modest. As a military MP, against such a decision, which was a move on the chessboard of big politics, I had no right to protest, even if he threatened war, because politics did not concern me ... I was a soldier and had to obey, since the army is called for the defense of the fatherland, and not to go into reasoning. They would have the right to accuse me of cowardice if, after having used all the advantages of my high position in the role of Minister of War in the past, I warned against war and, moreover, at a time when all probability and my personal conviction

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were for Russian diplomacy not to retreat before the claims of the Austro-Hungarian, as was the case back in 1909.

Referring to the fact that Sazonov's report made a militant impression, Sukhomlinov points out: "There was no other way out than declaring war, and every word I said against the war would be useless ... the decision was subject to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he demanded a partial mobpliz - cyp. In accordance with this, starting points were outlined, despite the fact that I was opposed to partial mobilization and did not hide this opinion. Mopm business was to prepare armies for Sazonov's chess game, consequently, in this separate issue I had to

to show up."

"It would have been a different matter, I repeat, if in 1914 I had found myself in the position of Roediger in 1909. In 1914, the army was so prepared that it seemed that Russia had the right to calmly accept the export. Russia has never been so well prepared for war as in 1914.

We deliberately made the former Minister of War speak to show his position at the July 25 meeting. As you can see: 1) things were leaning towards war with Austria, because "there was no other way out than declaring war," and the decisions made to declare a pre-mobilization period and private mobilization, if Austria did not make concessions, were only the first steps towards bloody war; 2) the Minister of War, refusing to take part in politics, tacitly agreed to a partial mobility, giving up his conviction about the dangers of such, and even tells us that such a case was foreseen, although Dobrorolsky paam declares the opposite; 3) due to personal motives, the military minister did not take a word against the war, for he himself was sure that Russia would cope with Austria, and the army and even Russia were fighting for the war. That this is so is enough to recall the meeting in the end of 1913, when the same Sukhomlinov, together with the chief of the general staff, vouched for success one on one with Austria.

The minister of foreign affairs was far from "optimistic" and at the council he agitated for the war, pointing out that France and England would support Russia, although he did not have solid data regarding the latter. Germany's position should have been clear to him from the conversation he had with Pourtales the day before, but I think that Sazonov, from the experience of previous years, decided that Berlin would only make a "test of strength" and then surrender, as in the matter of the mission Diman Fop-Sanders. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was no longer afraid of German threats and decided to resort to them against Austria himself.

At the end of the meeting of the Council of Ministers, Sazonov had a conversation with Buchanan, who again spoke only of the mediating role of England and was afraid that Russia's haste with mobilization could only damage the cause, since Germany, not satisfied with its mobilization, would declare war on Russia. Sazonov assured the British ambassador that "Russia will not take any military action unless it is forced to do so," but he kept silent about mobilization. In his own telegram to London, the minister expressed his wish for a "moderate influence on Austria." "In the event of a further aggravation of the situation, we expect," Sazonov wrote, "that England will step up to defend the European balance"; At the same time, Sazonov, in a special telegram, suggested that Serbia apply for the mediation of Apglia.

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Telegrams from London and Paris said that the Austrian ambassadors in these cities did not sign the Austrian note as an ultimatum and that "even in the event of an unsatisfactory answer from the Serbians, hostilities may not yet begin immediately." The Daily Record reads: "Under the influence of such information, among the foreign diplomats in St. Petersburg, especially among the French ambassador and the Romanian message, a more optimistic attitude towards events and hope for a favorable outcome of the crisis are noticeable." The "record" does not add Sazonov to these optimists, which corresponds to the full reality.

Pourtales had the same "optimism", who on July 95 did not see Sazonov, but, based on his observations of the mood in

that, "in any case, at that moment it was not public opinion that pushed the Russian government to a hostile action against Austria-Hungary." "Rather, a small group of limes worked here, trying from the very beginning to aggravate the conflict."

Speaking about the fact that the situation in the camp did not contribute to the adoption of peaceful decisions by Nikolai, Pourtales notes: "Apparently, neither the chairman of the Council of Ministers Goremykin, nor Sazonov used their influence with due energy to get on July 25 the triumph of a policy aimed at preserving mpra".

"Despite the mouth, I do not think that Sazonov wanted war already at this moment. However, he indulged in the fatal illusion that Germany, convinced of Russia's determination this time to go to the last extreme, would leave her allies in the lurch, and thus Russia and the powers of the Triple Entente would win a diplomatic settlement, which in the same time would also have been compensation for the diplomatic defeat she had sung in the Bosnian question in 1909. At the same time, due to his great inexperience, not to say naivety, in matters of military affairs, he did not realize the great danger, which consisted in the fact that, obviously, already on July 25, the military authorities were given very wide powers to the start of military preparations.

German military representatives who returned from the camp near Krasnoe Selo spoke of the return of troops to their garrisons and reported that "The officers of the main headquarters did not at all hide the very serious fears that the state of affairs inspired in them."

So, on July 25, with the announcement of the pre-mobilization period for war, Russia actually entered the path of that. It's possible to say, poignantly, that this does not even mean mobilization, and even more so war, but after all, "beep, when they don't lie so much, as before the war," and, as we will see below, it was impossible to convince anyone with such arguments.

July 26 arrived, when the Russian army was moving from a peaceful position to the pre-mobilization period. We know that this measure has not yet aroused alarm either in Vienna or Berlin, and the butcher of the General Taba of the German army found that no measures should be taken. .

The "day record" of the former Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not give us a description of the events of July 26, urged us to turn to the testimony of eyewitnesses who were closely involved in the case, and therefore rather biased

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in your memories. Today there can be no doubt that the French Ambassador Palaiologos, who was in Russia, wrote "Apocrypha" about his activities. The same character, to one degree or another, distinguishes the memories of other lindens.

According to Pourtales, on the morning of July 26, he had a conversation with Sazonov, which began on the train from Tsarskoye Selo to St. Petersburg and continued at the station. The German ambassador, "to his surprise, our minister is much more peaceful than two days before." "Sazonov scattered before many in assurances about his peaceful way of thinking and indicated that he was ready to discuss any proposal that could lead to peace."

For such "restraint" Sazopov received approval from Palaiologos, and then from Buchanan. The French ambassador advised the minister not to offend Germany, and Buchanan also joined the same, adding that the English government "will use all efforts to prevent war, but for its success it is necessary that Russia resort to mobilization only as the most extreme means." |

Indeed, Sazonov sends telegrams: 1) to Vienna - about the desirability of entering into a "frequent exchange of thoughts for the revision of certain articles and notes"; 2) to Rome - with the indication "that Italy could play a leading role by influencing Austria"; 3) to Bucharest - with the expectation of "the solidarity of Romania with Serbia" and in order to clarify the position of Romania in the event of a conflict; 4) to Berlin with a request that the German government advise Vienna to accept the Russian proposal.

In the evening the German ambassador had a second conversation with Sazonov. The minister of foreign affairs "began by expressing my gratitude," writes Pourtales, "for my advice to him to explain himself openly © Sapari." Pourtales endured the impression that the minister was reassured by the Austrian ambassador's statement that Austria was not pursuing conquest. Sazonov found it desirable to mediate other powers, such as England and Italy. "The mood of the Foreign Minister was so conciliatory that it occurred to me that he had not received news from Paris and London that

and uuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuum basis did not dispose him to hold on to the aggressive tone he had acquired in two days of persd topics.

"In response to this," the ambassador continues, "Sazonov assured me of his ability to guarantee me that no mobilization order had yet been issued ... However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs admitted that some

"My reasoning, apparently, made some impression on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, since at 10 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the Minister of War, at the request of Sazonov, invited the military attache FOP-Eggeling to his place in order, as the Minister himself put it, "to acquaint him with martial law." At the same time, General Sukhomlinov vouched with his word of honor that no order had yet been issued for mobilization, not a single horse had been requisitioned, and one reserve had not been called up under the banner of pp.

So, the diplomacy of the smoke is set up peacefully. The trouble was that Sazonov's "headquarters" was in a hurry and it was difficult for the minister to restrain him, although the German ambassador persistently advised him not to let the general staffs speak. |

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It must be said that any of the authors, participants in the world war, always declares this, but this does not mean that he is not mistaken and, consciously or not, sometimes goes along the wrong road.

"After this meeting on July 25, 26 and 27, I did not see the guy again. What happened in the mouth in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not reach me. I did not receive any information from Sazonov. As a result of rumors spreading in the city about our mobilization, the Counts of Pourtales

sent me a German military agent, Major vFon-Eggeling. I briefed him in detail on the present state of affairs, assuring him that there had been no order for general mobilization and that no preparations had been made on the German border for going on a campaign.

The reader of our work will himself notice how much Sukhomlinov is not accurate in his memoirs. We heard from Pourtales that Sukhomlinov, at Sazonov's request, received Eggeling, but it turns out that the military minister did not speak to Sazonov, while the German attache, uninvited, broke into Sukhomlinov's office.

On July 26, the General Quartermaster of the General Staff, General Danilov, returned to St. Petersburg from a business trip.

"After I got acquainted with the situation and described it as extremely alarming, I immediately sent a telegram to my family," writes Dapizov now, "who was in a village in the Podolsk province, near the Austrian Graeptsy, asking her to return to Petersburg hastily."

These were the first steps of the Russian quartermaster general - as they say, his own shirt is closer to the body.

"In the main department of the general staff, I still found uncertainty in hesitation over the question of whether it is possible to risk a violation of the calculations of the general mobilization. The chief of the general staff, General Yanushkevich, who took office only a few months ago and apparently did not have time to get into the details of the mobilization business and the concentration plan, did not find sufficient grounds to initiate the question of revising the decree on private mobilization. . His closest collaborators, the paprotps, objected to this and pointed out the enormous technical difficulties and dangers that might arise as a result of the intended solution of the problem. I also presented my arguments against the private mobilization project, without limiting these arguments! mobilization considerations, but extending them to the operational side of the issue. The anxious feeling that did not leave me during these painful days gave me reason to persistently ask General Yanushkevich to once again raise the question of our future mobilization, in its entirety, for joint discussion with his closest collaborators.

This meeting took place; besides me, the head of the mobilization department, General Dobrorolsky, and the head of the military outfit, General Ronzhin, also took part in it. As a result of the discussion, General Yanushkevich, apparently imbued with our arguments, expressed his consent to the preparation of two drafts of the highest decree, one of which is for the general, and the other for the private mobilization of the four districts. These projects were

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simultaneously presented to the highest name with a special report, and we had to wait for the final decision of the sovereign.

We have already partly heard Sukhomlinov's arguments about the danger of announcing private mobilization. Elsewhere, he reaffirms that "such a partial mobilization was undesirable for the military department, according to some technical conditions it could cause difficulties and confusion, if it would be necessary to announce a general mobilization after that."



Dapilov repeats the same arguments in favor of a general mobilization that Dobrorolsky made. They boil down to the following: 1) mobilization ideas provided, in case of military complications on the western borders, only one mobilization common to the entire Russian army; 2) the technical difficulty of mobilization in Russia was the low degree of development of the network of means of communication, and therefore we had to reckon with the fact that, in the presence of the conditions that existed in our country, from the general plan that provided for general mobilization and at the same time the turning of the armed forces to the borders, only part of this plan, Rossya risked introducing a fundamental breakdown in the remaining part of such a plan, and especially in the work of the railways; 3) with partial mobilization, the operational plan against Austria in terms of the number of forces deployed was not carried out, because not mobilizing the Warsaw Military District, but in the future its mobilization was in danger.

"An attempt to adapt mobilization calculations to the possibility of carrying out private mobilization," continues Danilov, "we had in mind. It was supposed to be carried out with the subsequent mobilization plan, which at the time of the emergence of political complications was only in the period of development. But this attempt concerned only cases of complications on our secondary borders, mainly Asian ones, when it might be necessary to mobilize only a small number of troops and, moreover, without much strain in terms of their readiness. When the same complications arose on the western timeline, at least at the beginning with only Germany and Austria, each representing a serious enemy separately, the situation did not allow one to limit oneself to private mobilization, not to mention the fact that such production was coupled with technical obstacles and the risk of compromising our military position in the event of further complications.

So the question of general mobilization in Russian military circles was brewing, although the former Minister of War now writes that the behavior of the sovereign "joined the difficulties in waging the war on the economic side": the tsar saw in the Minister of War only a technique that should . to make weapons for war, the choice of the time of application and use of which remained with the king. "At the same time, between July 24 and 30, the decisive word was left to the highest policy alone. This was perfectly clear from the decision reached at the conference on July 25th. Sazonov, a diplomat, and not the minister of war, was given the authority to choose the type of mobilization (partial or general) depending on the circumstances, although from a report to the sovereign. With this, Sukhomlinov explains his "seeming disinterest in what was happening." "As a non-game-

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playing no decisive role," writes Sukhomlipov, "I was therefore annulled."

On July 24, the French ambassador in St. Petersburg promised Sazonov all kinds of support for Russia's demands, up to and including the full fulfillment of his compatriot obligations. Thus, Vienna's calculations related to the transmission of the ultimatum to Serbia after the departure of Poincaré turned out to be groundless. It is true that Russia's diplomatic ties were disrupted to a certain extent by Fraction: Poincaré sailed in the Baltic, while Izvolsky was in St. Petersburg. Therefore, Sazonov's first step, as early as the morning of July 24, was to order Izvolsky, as well as the ambassador in Vienna, "to immediately return to the places of duty."

zheniya". The presence of Izvolsky and Paris was strictly necessary.

Poincaré testifies: "In the suspense in which we were at the moment of our departure from Russia, Viviani could do one thing: in the morning (July 23, even before receiving the news of the presentation of the note in Belgrade - B. Sh.) he telegraphed to Paris that he had reached an agreement with Sazonov to try to prevent Austrian protests against Serbian independence; he asked Dumaine (the ambassador in Vienna - B. Sh.) to make a friendly appeal to Berchtold's moderation, and added that the English ambassador in St. Petersburg hoped that his government would join this step.

"But it was already too late," declares Poincaré, and continues: "On the morning of July 24, we had not yet managed to get out of the Gulf of Finland, when we received by wireless telegram a summary of the Austrian note sent by the Khrappuza ambassador to Russia."

Viviani immediately telegraphed to London and St. Petersburg, which he considered necessary: 1) Serbia to agree to demands that did not threaten its dignity and independence, and ask for an extension of the 24-hour deadline; 2) Austria, Russia and France to support the request of Serbia, and 3) an investigation - to be carried out by a commission from tripartite consent.

On the same day, Poincaré received news from Paris about the visit. Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the German ambassador Shen, who found it necessary to leave Austria and Serbia to resolve the dispute and added that the intervention of other powers could cause "irreparable" consequences. London reported that Gray agreed to ask Germany to influence Vienna, and the ambassador from Berlin reported that Jagow denied prior acquaintance with the note, but approved of it.

On July 23 in Paris, after the handing over of the Austrian note, the diplomatic circles got the impression that "Austria does not regard its statement as an unconditional ultimatum."

On July 24, the German staff did indeed make a statement which: had the character of a threat. |

On July 25, Shen again visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and "assured that his words did not at all have the character of a threat attributed to them," but confirmed what Jagow had said to the French ambassador in Berlin. -

"The fact," says the report of the Russian embassy in Berlin on July 25, "that Shen considered it necessary to take this new step, had a somewhat calming effect in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a sign that Germany is not striving at all costs for war" .

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But newspaper revelations about Shen's first visit "caused a panic in today's stock market." "The absence of the head of state and the head of the government deprives the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the opportunity to speak out definitely against the current events. Public opinion and the press, regardless of the directions of the kraye imp, are indignant. Even Jaurès sharply condemns the Austrian action, which risks causing a general war.

"Throughout this ominous day, on Saturday the 25th July, which we

spent entirely in Stockholm," writes Poincaré, "we were forced to move from one ceremony to another and put on a cheerful face in a very gloomy state of mind."

Here the "heads" of France were more fully oriented in the situation and inquired "what the German emperor was doing in the waters near Bergen." The answer was that at first he was there, and then "departed in an unknown direction."

"But what were we supposed to do? asks Poincaré. "The French government has not called us yet. To go straight back to Paris might agitate public opinion not only in France, but in Europe, and give reason to believe that we believe in the possibility of a general catastrophe. In these forms, it was decided to continue sailing along the previous route: "We were still far from the idea of a European war," Poincaré writes modestly today.

On July 26, Shen again crossed the threshold of the office of the Minister of Justice, who replaced Viviani, and explained that "Austria announced to Russia that she was not looking for territorial acquisitions and did not threaten the integrity of Serbpi." "It is therefore up to Rosspi to prevent the war," Shen said and hoped that France "will use her influence in St. Petersburg in a moderating sense," but at the same time he refuses to do so in Vienna. The Frappusian minister "refused to agree to the German proposal in view of the absence of the chairman of the council."

According to a report to Sazonov of July 26, the French diplomats formed the conviction that the consistent German actions in Paris were aimed at launching France and influencing her 8 Peterduriae. "In the totality of the circumstances and the whole course of action of Germany and Austria, he (representative of the Frappuzian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - L. Sh.) is inclined to think that these powers are striving for a brilliant diplomatic victory, and are not looking for war at any cost. , although, in extreme cases, they will not retreat before her."

This lack of confidence in the intentions of Austria and Germany, and the information received from Germany that some military measures had already been taken there, served as a pretext for embarking on the path of military training in Paris. The official report of the war states that "the great minister Messimi, but telegraph, on the evening of July 95, took the first precautionary measure: the return to their posts of officers of the general staff and corps commanders."

On July 26, these "precautions" were significantly expanded: troop movements were postponed, a ban was issued: vacations for officers and soldiers and commanders were called from vacations, the first warning was given to the railways, units of the border guards were returned to their garrisons,

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UP, XX and XX! corps, an order was given to the military governor of Paris and the corps commanders to partially carry out the mobilization plan, the commander of the XX corps was ordered to form the largest possible cadre of reservists from Tunisian and Algerian riflemen, measures were taken to strengthen censorship.

"On Sunday, July 26, we were sailing on the high seas of the Baltic," writes Poipcaré, "when a radio telegram informed us that the Emperor of Germany

left his cruiser and headed for Kiel. But in our floating dwelling, we got only a muffled rho from the outside. We had no definite instructions either from Petersburg or from Paris; pam became more and more anxious in our loneliness and isolation; and Sunday ended with us, lost between the waves and the sky, having no news from the earth.

Thus sailed the "ark" of France, from which, however, Paris should have received not the "dove of peace" but the "herald of war," which Poincaré appeared upon landing. If it had been in the very first days of the crisis in Paris, there can be no doubt that events would have moved at a more accelerated pace towards the same denouement, towards the war, with which they gradually approached it.

From all of the above, the reader has the impression that the role of England in resolving the crisis was of paramount importance. The middle states hoped that the islands would remain neutral, while Russia and France cherished the hope that Great Britain would act on the heels of the defenders of the "oppressed Slavs".

We heard how restrained Buchanan was in Cheterburg, having received Gray's approval for this. Then, that Sazonov turned to London with an offer from England to act as an intermediary; the same opinion was in the snore-pussy Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The reasons for such restraint lay in the fact that it was difficult to raise public opinion in favor of the war over Serbia, because, as Alikhnovsky wrote to Bethman on July 16, Serbia is a country "not British", but with such states "here (in London - B. Sh.) are generally little known, less is known about them, we have, approximately, an ordinary fourth-grade schoolboy.

Even the interests of Rossip could not push England to war, and Buchanan was well aware of his mouth, who advised Sazonov not to hasten with mobilization, because it was necessary to process the public opinion of Britain. No matter how disposed he was to Russian-English friendship, Gray, however, had to take into account the fact that Russia in England is not very much liked by many.

As we have already pointed out to the race, we cannot set ourselves the task of writing a political history of the days preceding the war. Therefore, our account of events in England will not be lengthy, however interesting it may be.

The Sarajevo assassination alarmed the British government, but they were too distracted by their internal affairs to immediately react sharply to the events developing on the banks of the Danube.

As long as the conflict could be limited within the framework of the dispute between Vienna and Belgrade, London could also be relatively calm.

In his repeated conversations with the German Ambassador in the first half of June, Gray spoke quite definitely about non-intervention.

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into the Austro-Serbian conflict, but at the same time he warned that in the event of an armed action by Vienna, Russian intervention was possible, which he, Gray, would already be warned by trulpo.

With the arrival in St. Petersburg, Poincaré's resolution improved considerably. Anglo-Russian misunderstandings in Persia, and after the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made concessions, on June 20 Gray telegraphed to Buchanap about his joy at this success. It must be said that this strengthened the position of Gray himself in the system of the British Cabinet in the event that, when Russia spoke, England also had to get involved in the war.

`In his memoirs, Churchill testifies that 3/, the members of the cabinet were peacefully disposed and spoke of war only if an attack on Apglia was carried out. And since such a case was unlikely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a very hard time.

Churchill, on the other hand, says that Gray's position was hampered by: 1) the desire to prevent a European war and 2) not to leave France and Russia without support. On the one hand, it was necessary to show Germany that she could meet Apglia among her enemies, and on the other hand, it was necessary not to give special guarantees in helping France and Russia.

On July 22, Likhnovsky reported to Berlin that Gray hoped that Austria would not make demands to Serbia that were incompatible with the independence of a small state, just as "there is a chance that our (German - B.Sh.) influence in Vienna will be able to eliminate the presentation of impracticable Demands" - "Definitely they are counting on the fact that we will not join forces with demands that are clearly aimed at provoking war."

Jagow added to this report that Likhnovsky had been instructed to declare that Germany was not aware of the Austrian demands, which, however, were regarded as an internal affair of the monarchy.

Wilhelm was outraged by the report. He called Gray's position "monstrous British shamelessness", threatened that he "does not intend to joke", and acknowledged Gray's statements "in a purely British way of reasoning", "the condescending-imperious tone of which" he noted indignantly.

On June 24, at the end of a protracted stormy cabinet meeting on the Irish question, Gray read out the Austrian note to Serbia, the content of which clearly spoke of its ultimatum nature and unacceptability for Serbia.

Representatives of the "free hands" policy should have been aware of the upcoming events. On the same day, 2% of June, a report was drawn up in the Foreign Office for Gray, in which the fear was clearly expressed that if France and Russia won without the assistance of England, then they would then be against England, and what then would the position of India be? and the Mediterranean?

"Russia regards," the speaker wrote, "our position on this issue as a touchstone, and it is necessary to be far-sighted so as not to alienate Russia."

We already know that by June 22, on the one hand, Poincare's proposal was received in London by joint efforts to keep the European world

and, on the other hand, Jagow pointed out that the Austro-Serbian conflict is the business of the states just mentioned.

The British Foreign Office clearly understood that the Austrian demands were approved by Berlin and that Germany was striving to isolate Russia from England.

When Buchanan's telegram was received in London on July 24 with the conditions worked out by Sazonov and Chaleolog to keep Vepa from taking active steps, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied it with the following assessment: "The time has come when it is still possible to keep Russia by accepting the Khranpuz proposals. It is clear that France and Russia have decided to pick up the gauntlet he has thrown down. We could also block the Austrian demands, and in this Franipia and Russia are the first wave behind which the whole question will be decided by the tripartite alliance against the tripartite agreement. I think it would be rather clumsy, not to say unsafe, if England tried to oppose what was said or the representations in Petersburg and London obscure it. We have to decide whether Germapieia has decided to go to war or not. It is not excluded that the possibility of compelling Germany to rest in This determination, if it is shown that England in the war will be on the side of France and Russia. I can suggest this step, but without assurance of its success." Then pointing out that the war will not break out because of Serbia alone, and in it Germany is pursuing the achievement of her dominance in Europe, the speaker says: "In this struggle, our iptereses are combined © Frappuzsky and Russian."

On this document, Gray made a note that Churchill promised to mobilize the Fleet within 24 hours, but, in Gray's opinion, "it would be premature now to announce this to Russia and France."

After the publication of the Austrian note, 2% bullet, Likhnovsky reported on his conversation with Grey, in which the minister nevertheless decided to "shake Germany."

"The minister was evidently under the strong impression of the Austrian note. In his opinion, she is superior to anything he has ever seen in this way so far. Gray said that he did not yet have any news from Petersburg and did not know how the matter was treated there. But he doubts very much whether the Russian government will be able to recommend Serbia to accept the Austrian demands unconditionally. After all, a state that would accept something like that crosses itself out of the list of "independent states"...

"In the event of Austria entering Serbian territory, the danger of a European war is imminent. The consequences of such a war of four (Gray specifically emphasized the number four, meaning by this Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France) are completely unforeseeable. Whatever the outcome of this case, one thing is certain, that as a result of it, complete exhaustion and impoverishment will often occur: industry and trade will be destroyed, and the power of capital will be destroyed. The result of the decline in productive activity will be revolutionary movements, as was the case in 1848.

Gray considered the term of the ultimatum short, wished that England, Germany, France and Italy would take upon themselves the mediation between Russia.

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and Austria. "The minister is clearly trying to do everything to prevent a European complication, and cannot hide his deep regret at the defiant top of the Austrian note and the short term."

It is superfluous, of course, to add that Wilhelm recognized Serbia as a "gang of robbers", that "Russia is no better either"; "I will not take part in mediation," Wilhelm declared, "unless Austria definitely me. he will ask for it, which is unlikely. "In matters of life and honor, others are not advised," the Kaiser reads the moral.

Just in case, the English fleet, mobilized for maneuvers, was not disbanded. "In informing the Russian ambassador about this," writes Buchanan, "Grey took care to explain that this was nothing more than a promise of diplomatic support." Hasty work was also going on in the War Department to prepare for the mobilization of ground forces.

While there was still no determination in the entire composition of the British Cabinet to get involved in a war, Gray and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs were clearly aware of the inevitability of the impending struggle and only by skillful moves tried, on the one hand, to prepare the ground within the Cabinet itself for the adoption of a decision. on the other hand, do not take responsibility for the war.

We have traced, perhaps in too much detail, the weeks leading up to the Austrian ultimatum, which entailed, on the one hand, mobilizations in Serbia and Austria, and, on the other hand, the announcement of a pre-mobilization period in Russia.

Of course, all that diplomatic rigmarole, all the lies that pierced through all the statements and sweats of diplomats of various countries, are of little interest, if only they were not indicators of how all states were heading irresistibly towards a European clash. The latter was predetermined by all the contradictions that had accumulated in the mutual relations of the capitalists of various countries. And it was not the Grays who could save capitalism from the destruction of its power, for capitalism, how. the system, itself went to shocks, dragging along representatives of dynasties, diplomats, people who consider war to be their trade, and of them - above all. those who recognized themselves as the "brain of the army."

The next dii were only to reveal what has matured in Europe for many years... |

The "peace" of the bourgeois governments was to be replaced by a fierce war.  
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## CHAPTER 11 AUSTRIA'S WAR WITH SERBIA AND RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Order of placement by day. -97 July: Passage through Austria of the Chief of the Serbian General Staff. —Conrad's conversation with Berchtold on 26 July. - The question of the time of the declaration of war. — On the evening of July 97, Konrad drafts a note to Berchtold for Germany — Arrival of Wilhelm in Berlin on July 27. — Moltke on the political situation. "It is vague and will not be revealed before 14 days." — Moltke's health. "Wilhelm has advice, the Minister of War has not been invited. - Jagow, in a conversation with the English ambassador, determines

their attitude towards Russian mobilization. - Sazonov's instruction to Serbia on moderation. - Evasive response from Romania. — Petersburg does not believe in the territorial disinterest of Austria. - Sazonov's negotiations with the Austrian ambassador and Berchtold's conversation with the Russian ambassador. - Sazonov finds the Serbian answer moderate. - Pourtales at Sazonov with two telegrams from the chancellor. - "Mobilization means war." - Sazonov speaks of the mediation of the powers and tries to create a "golden bridge" for Austria. - "Lady's" talk about Russian military training. — Izvolsky in Narizh. - Attempts by the German Ambassador Shén to separate Russia from France. — The firm determination of Paris and the first military measures of security. — Jagow points out that only the fall of Russia on Austria will cause German intervention. — Poincaré's journey. - 28 July: Berlin instructs Vienna how to respond to the English proposal for mediation. — Bethmann is afraid of the responsibility for the war. Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. - Konrad writes to Berchtold of the need to bring Romania and Bulgaria to the side of the tripartite alliance. — Meeting with Berchtold. - Berchtold's doubts about the possibility for Austria to wage war with Russia at the same time. - Konrad on the need to find out by August 1 the likelihood of war with Russia. — A telegram from Berchtold to Berlin about the need for Germany to speak in St. Petersburg, about private Russian mobilization. - Change of mood in St. Petersburg in connection with the receipt of Austria's declaration of war on Serbia. — Buchanan's advice to Sazonov to refrain from military action against Germany. — Full support for France. - Sazonov's telegram is "the key to the situation in Berlin." — The optimism of Pourtales and his breakfast with Buchanan. - Pourtales' conversation with Sazonov. - "The game of marked cards." - The second meeting of Sazonov with Pourtales. — Wilhelm's first telegram. - Sazonov recognizes direct negotiations with the Austrian ambassador as inappropriate and raises the question of mediation by England. — Sazonov telegraphs announcing private mobilization. - The General Staff has prepared two draft decrees on mobilization. — On the night of July 29, a decree on general mobilization was signed. - "Willy" and "Nicky", their relationship. — Bethmann's confusion. — Wilhelm about the Serbian response. - Occupation of Belgrade as a pledge. — Bethmann on responsibility for the war and his advice to Vienna. — Restraint of England. — In Berlin, an order was given for the return of troops from the camps. — Military measures in France. -29 July: Opening of hostilities on the Serbian border. — Konrad keeps silent about the bombing of Belgrade. - Draft note of Austria to Germany, drawn up by Konrad. — Dragging Germany into the conflict by Konrad. — Romanian neutrality. - A military agent from Zetserburg reports a general Russian mobilization. - Konrad's fears not to be late with mobilization against Russia. — The second telegram from Wilhelm to St. Petersburg and the telegram "Niki". - Pourtales' conversation with Sazonov. - Sazonov declares that the mobilization of the Russian army does not yet mean war. — Distrust of Germany. — Sazonov's explanations

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new goal of Russian mobilization. - The second conversation between Pourtales and Sazonov is an incident. — Conversation between Yanushkevich and a German military agent. — Confirmation from Peterhof of general mobilization. - Meeting with Yanushkevich. - The idea of general mobilization is approved. - Sazonov considers the inevitability of war. - Sukhomlinov's inspirations. — Basili at the Palaiologos. - Dobrorolsky on signing a decree on general mobilization and preparations for its transmission by telegraph. - Characteristics of Sazonov. - "Intimate circle" near Sazonov. - The personality of Yanushkevich. - Cancellation by Nikolai of the general mobilization. — Alerts of the General Staff. - Sukhomlinov's lie. —



The wording of the beginning of the war in Russia is Pourtales' night meeting with Sazonov. Sazonov sketches out a formula for an agreement. "Serbia should not be Bukhara." — Nervous state of Pourtales. - Information in St. Petersburg from abroad. Anxious day in Berlin. — The "idiocy" of Nika's sentences. - Wilhelm's distrust of Petersburg. — His malice towards London. — Gray's statements to Likhnowsky about the position of England. - "Give Pharisee!! Filthy merchant bastard." — Bethman loses heart. — His dissatisfaction with Vienna. — Bethmann doesn't want to trail behind Vienna. - A meeting with Wilhelm and his dissatisfaction with the chancellor. - Bethmann is trying to ensure the neutrality of England. - Yagov's conversation with the Russian ambassador and Yagov's horror. — Kautsky against the General Staff. — Expose Moltke. - It is important to quickly find out the likelihood of a war with Russia and France. — Moltke on the culture-tragery of Germanpi. — Moltke does not insist on declaring a situation threatening war. — Falkenhayn on his role and mobilization. — A firm position in Paris. The return of Poincaré. — Council of Ministers and note to England on mediation. - The appearance of Shen. - Night meeting of the Council of Ministers and France's response to St. Petersburg. Gray's seriousness. - July 30: Sazonov's anxiety and his morning conversation with Krivoshein. — Meeting at the General Staff. — Nikolai will be stubborn about the announcement of a general mobilization. - Prayers of Yanushkevich. "He threatens to break his telephon. — Danilov attacks Basili. — Krivoshein's failure and Donon's breakfast. - Sazonov in Peterhof and the decree on general mobilization. "Now you can break the phone." — Announcement of the general Russian mobilization. - The "Markov" telegram and the role. - Yagov recognized the Sazonov Formula as unacceptable. - An instruction from Paris on the secrecy of military preparations. — Wilhelm about Russia and England. — His projects to raise the Mohammedan world. — Bethmann instructs Vienna to accept England's mediation. — Moltke says to the Austrian military agent: "We should not declare wars on Russia, but we should wait for her attack." — Newspapers about the German mobilization. — Moltke for the war. — His restraint for the sake of diplomacy. — Morning reception at Conrad's. — Konrad is concerned about Russian mobilization. — His draft note to Russia. — Conrad against English mediation. - Report from Franz Josef on the aims of the war. - Decision to announce general mobilization on August 1, the first day is August 4. - Konrad telegrams Moltke: "We will not declare war on Russia and we will not start it." — Council of Ministers in Paris. — Military measures of France. — Instructions to the French Ambassador in London. London is silent.

An exposition of the events of the last days of the European world will be offered to the attention of the reader of our work in the same order in which we conducted the exposition of the chapter just completed. However, in view of the parastapy of events by day and in order to establish a mutual connection between them, we find it more convenient to move more often from one capital to another, and therefore we will tell the story by day.

JULY 27

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We left Vepa on July 26, when the order to mobilize the army against Serbia was signed in it with the decrepit hand of Franz Jospf, a hand that, without contemplating, signed the act that marked the beginning of the disintegration of the moparchy.

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On this day, passing through Austria-Hungary, returning from the resort,

Chief of the Serbian General Staff Putnik. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought about detaining their future enemy, but Konrad resolutely rebelled against such a petty enterprise, and the head of the Serbian general staff calmly walked towards the Serbian armies, which were already taking shape in their composition.

Namie noted that the meetings of the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff with Berchtold or his subordinates during this time were not only daily, several times a day.

After dinner on July 26, Konrad went to Berchtold's, where he found the German ambassador. The conversation, of course, touched upon the assessment of the position of the various states on the Austro-Serbian question. The available information about the beginning of the Russian mobilization was taken by Konrad into doubt, but he did not deny that some military measures were being carried out by Russia, and instead asked Berchtold to keep him constantly informed about developments in Russia. As for Italy, which, as a result of the speech of Austria, did not consider itself obligated to fulfill the treaty, the chief of staff "feared" that this was already the influence of Cadorna (the new chief of the Italian general staff - B. Sh.), who portrayed Konrad "FrankofPhil".

Left alone, Berchtold asked Konrad: "We must convey the declaration of war to Serbia as soon as possible in order to put an end to dissent in the mouth. When is it desirable for you to declare war?"

"Then, when we could start operations," answered the chief of staff, "around August 12."

"It is difficult for such a long period of time to maintain diplomatic otpopochivaniya. In addition, it is not known whether battles will already take place on the border," thought Berchtold.

The chief of staff believed that in the latter case, the war would become a Fact and its announcement would come of itself, but if it could be delayed diplomatically, then that would be good; if not, then declare war at least now.

At the end of the conversation, Koprada expressed his wish: to keep Montenegro from speaking out as far as possible, not to set Bulgaria against Romania, and, most importantly, to clarify Rosspi's position as soon as possible - it would be desirable to achieve this before August 4-5.

"It is unlikely to happen," the minister replied.

We noted why Konrad set such a deadline: the government and the army to Galicia or to the Serbian Front were connected with him.

On July 27, the official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Goyos, again appeared at Konrad's with a pellue to ask him when it would be desirable to declare war on Serbia, to which the chief of staff gave a definite answer: depending on diplomatic considerations.

At 8 o'clock in the evening, Konrad, having arrived at Berchtold's, received an orientation about what was happening in Russia. On July 26, a military agent from St. Petersburg reported on the issuance of an order to mobilize four districts (Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa and Moscow) with the call of spares and on preparations for the mobilization of St. Petersburg, Vilna and, possibly, Kazan, but without calling up spares. Reporting on the events of July 26 in Krasnoye Selo,

7 The brain of the army. Book. 3.-97

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the military agent, however, hesitated to give a definite conclusion about the aggression

strong intentions of Russia.

After reviewing the report, the minister asked the head of the headquarters: what should be done?

Konrad polalalal that Germany should be followed by a statement of its support for Austria and sending 6 notes to Peterdur. The content of the latter is approximately as follows:

"We are aware that Russia is mobilizing the Kiev, Odessa and Moscow military districts; we see in the mouth a direct threat to Austria-Hungary as well. therefore, if this mobilization is carried out, Germany immediately. will announce mobilization against Russia.

Conrad found it necessary to find out in Berlin whether Germany would agree to the announcement of a general mobilization - then Austria could announce the same - but in general, it is necessary to establish clearly Berlin's position in this conflict. The same is desirable for Romania.

Today, in his memoirs, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff writes that he did not give such advice to Berchtold because of military considerations alone, but he was guided by a sincere desire to keep Russia from interfering. Of course, one can not believe in such desires of Konrad, but that he tried with all his fibers to deal with Serbia in a situation where no one interfered with this, there is no doubt about it.

walks. So, Berlin was put forward on the stage, where, moreover, on July 27 he arrived.

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On the morning of this date, the Chief of the German General Staff spent a long time in conversation with the Chancellor, returning from whom and scribbling. passing a letter to his wife, was supposed to go to the palace in an hour, where Wilhelm was expected by 3 o'clock in the afternoon. "The situation is very vague," wrote Moltke up to this hour. "It will not clear up quickly even before 14 days. one can hardly know or say anything definite," Moltke continued, advising his wife to calmly remain until the end in Bayreuth and Fr. than not to care. "Yesterday I had a completely different day than in Carlebad, but I feel good and fresh."

There is no doubt that Bethmann's chief of staff was informed of the Russian mobilization, as Pourtales reported about it and, in general, about everything that happened in Petersburg. However, since information about the mobilization concerned the districts bordering Austria, Moltke found no reason to sound the alarm and even postponed the arrival of his wife in Berlin. The fourteen-day deadline set by the Chief of Staff for a decision is striking, but if we remember that Konrad postponed the start of operations against Serbia on August 12, then the calendar that openly informed Moltke to his friend of life will become clear to us. True, Austria-Hungary did not yet declare war on Serbia, but such a war had already been decided in Berlin, at least by the chief of staff, and it was only necessary to wait for the start of the victorious Austrian operations,

to put an end to any doubts about the outcome of the conflict.

We will also pay attention to the state of health of Moltke, who considers it good. Many researchers find that the Ger-

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of the Mansk General Staff, who failed in the first operation, was very ill even before the start of the war, without completing his treatment in Karlsbad. Moltke himself says otherwise. It can, of course, be assumed that such cheerfulness was caused, on the one hand, by a temporary improvement in Moltke's state of health after the resort, and on the other, by a desire not to upset his wife.

According to Yagovo, on July 97 the Serbian ambassador handed him the response of the Serbian government to the Vienna note.

Immediately upon Wilhelm's return, he held a council, which was attended by the Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the Cabinet, the Minister of War was not invited. Falkenhain found out, among other things, as Zweil writes, that it was decided to uphold the occupied position at all costs. But these were still rumors, but meanwhile the Minister of War faced reality: the troops were still in the camps. Falkenhayn entered with the idea that it was necessary to put up guards for the railroads, as this was caused by the threat to them, and ordered the purchase of grain in the areas where the armies were concentrated. Tirpitz assures us that "even in June 1914 a mass of grain bread was exported to France," and thus the order of the Minister of War must be recognized as quite timely.

Apparently, after this same council, in the palace, Jagow had a conversation with the English ambassador about information about the Russian mobilization. Yagov says that he was told to Goshen: "If Russia mobilizes only in the south, then we will not announce mobilization, but if the mobilization is carried out by her in the north, then Germany will be forced to respond in the same way, since you cannot let yourself be caught off guard."

Thus, the day of July 27, 6 Berlin passed under the sign that Russia would not risk starting a general European war, and if it takes measures of readiness, then they are not yet an indicator of its aspirations for war. Pourtales, if we remember, by the evening of the 26th found Sazonov quite peacefully disposed, there was a calm mood in Petersburg, and the highest officer circles were inclined towards peace. In Berlin, they believed that everything was going well so far, and Austria would be able to deal with Serbia alone.

July 27 in the states of the opposite camp was the day of receiving the Serbian response to the Austrian ultimatum and responding to this response.

In Peterdurai on that day, even before the Serbian response was received, a telegram from Nicholas was sent to Serbia with the answer: "Do everything possible to find a way out that, without damaging the dignity of Serbia, would make it possible to prevent the horrors of war." But the telegram at the same time said: "If, contrary to our sincere desire, we did not succeed, your highness can be sure that Russia will by no means remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia."

At the same time, Montenegro was given instructions to "adhere to the same waiting and conciliatory policy", it must "conform its policy with the Serbian one in the common cause for them."

At the same time, courtship continued for a rich bride, in whose position Romania found herself. The Romanian envoy gave on July 27

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an evasive answer about the position of Romania and explained that Bucharest had received Austrian assurances that, if Serbian territory were occupied, it would be in the form of a temporary measure. To this, Schilling, known to us, as the Daily Record says, said: "Such a statement has the least value in the mouth of Austria, which, using the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, has shown the whole world, as it understands the temporary occupation of foreign lands." Thus, the belief in the territorial disinterest of Austria in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not fade and, as we know, not without reason. The most important trump card that Vienna diplomacy wanted to play fell out of its hands. Schilling turned to the honesty of the Romanian ambassador, recalling his words about the common interests of Romania and Serbia. The ambassador did not deny them, but wished that there would be no war, because it "would put Romania in a particularly difficult situation."

We left Sazonov leading direct negotiations with the Austrian ambassador, and the minister, apparently, was confident of success, since he answered Gray's proposal to convene a conference of 4 ambassadors in London: "If our direct explanations with the Vienna cabinet had not improved, I am ready to accept the English proposal. To this, Sazonov added: "A moderating effect in St. Petersburg is not impossible, since we are going to meet all the acceptable requirements of Austria."

It is difficult to say on what basis Sazonov built the success of his negotiations with Austria, and, perhaps, he simply wanted to show that Vienna did not want to go peacefully, for already on July 26, the charge d'affaires in Vienna reported on his conversation on July 25 with Berchtold, from which one could see that Vienna bit the bit. The minister of the monarchy spoke of the need to suppress Serbian propaganda, that the Danubian monarchy "should show our great power." Berchtold explained: "The existence of Austria-Hungary is necessary for the European balance, I think that statesmen in Russia are also convinced of this. They cannot wish the collapse of Austria-Hungary and in the interests of preserving the monarchical principle. "So the words," the attorney reported, "in the mouth of Berchtold, who is generally not inclined to reasoning of a political and philosophical nature, reflect the deep conviction, if not of himself, then of those persons who are responsible for the decision taken by Austria." In Vienna, according to the attorney, "the undoubted determination of the government to bring the execution of Serbia to the end" dominates.

As for the Serbian response, Sazonov found it "exceeding all our expectations with its moderation."

Thus, it was hardly possible for Sazonov to directly negotiate with Vienna without influencing her through Berlin, which, as we know, was not inclined to this.

The representative of the latter, Pourtales, notes in his memoirs: "At first it seemed that the day of July 27 brought with it a further weakening

tense situation." The ambassador saw the reasons for this in Germany's statement that it had no influence on Vienna, and "in the most conciliatory mood of Sazonov, as on the eve."

In the afternoon, Pourtales had a peaceful conversation with the minister about two telegrams from the chancellor, of which the first indicated that since Austria

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does not seek territorial acquisitions, then "the maintenance of European peace depends entirely on Russia." Germany," the telegram said, "relying on the peacefulness of Russia and our primordial good neighborly relations with her, believes that she will not take steps that could pose a serious threat to European peace."

"The second telegram," continues Pourtales, "being in connection with the previous one, noted that the preparatory military measures of Russia directed against us should force us to take countermeasures, which should lead to the mobilization of the army. Mobilization already means war. Since we know France's obligations towards Russia, our mobilization must be directed at the same time against Russia and against France. We cannot admit that it was the intention of Russia to provoke such a European war." The ambassador allowed Russia to "take a wait-and-see position" as a guarantee. against the aggressive plans of Austria.

"Sazonov ... declared that they (both telegrams - B. Sh.) make an excellent impression on him." The minister assured Pourtales that "in his precautionary attitude towards Austria-Hungary he will go to the extreme and will exhaust all means capable of resolving the present crisis by peaceful means"; that "the moment has come for an exchange of views between the powers to find means with a pell to build Austria-Hungary" a golden bridge; that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is very far from intending to expose Austria. humiliation." Even when the German ambassador attacked Serbia with accusations and found it "necessary to seriously teach Serbia a lesson," the minister "only weakly protested against this criticism."

We have already heard that people in St. Petersburg did not believe in the sincerity of Austria's statements about territorial disinterest in a foreign department; that Sazonov rejected the mediation of 4 states between Russia and Austria. Therefore, we leave it to the reader to judge how sincere the statements of the Russian minister were to the German ambassador.

"As regards," the latter continues, "the imperial chancellor's serious warnings about Russian armaments, the Minister of Foreign Affairs referred to statements made the day before by Sukhomlinov to Eggeling. I replied that all that remained for me was to once again urge the minister to take him close to heart. the day before, the considerations I developed regarding military measures.

However, according to Pourtales, "during the same day, news came in that were incapable of supporting an optimistic view of the situation." Pourtales' wife visited "a lady she knew," who reported that in Tsarskoye Selo all night long carts with ammunition and guns were going to the station. Checks through the consular organizations of this information left no doubt that very significant milking operations were in full swing. Maybe Sukhomlinov was For-

He is very right, assuring with his word of honor that no order for mobilization has yet been issued from the Russian side. Nevertheless, military measures of a preparatory nature, which developed at an accelerated pace, were of the kind that take place in our country only after the issuance of an order to mobilize.

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Sukhomlinov, in his memoirs, indicates that units of the Petersburg garrison did indeed roll out 0603, which "gave rise to rumors about the Guards going on a campaign." According to the personal recollections of the author of this work, in the cavalry division, in whose headquarters the author served before the war, which was 12 versts from the border (German and Austrian), it was on this day, July 27, at the initiative of the division itself, that the order was given about full mobilization. Such was the confidence in the inevitability of war that the frontier division wanted to put itself on alert as soon as possible. There is no doubt that in the Petersburg District the measures taken in the preliminary period for the war went far beyond the scope of ordinary measures, approaching in their nature mobilization.

It has been pointed out above that Sazonov rejected Gray's offer to mediate with London until an agreement was reached.

Izvolsky arrived in Paris that day. Needless to say, the ambassador craved revenge on Vienna, which made him, a former minister, be "the Napoleon who began his career at Waterloo"; besides, his career after and now was under the threat of resigning and looking for a place in the bank - the usual haunt of diplomats who have left the stage. Things needed to be fixed.

Vienna, according to Izvolsky's report, was engaged in deceit, delaying the Franpouz telegrams: "here (in Paris - 6. Sh.) there is no doubt about the deliberate delay on the Austrian telegraph."

Shen again visited the Foreign Office twice that day, declaring that since Austria was not seeking territorial gains, it therefore depended on "Russia to prevent the war," and with the proposal of France and Germany, in full solidarity, maintain peace and "influence Rosspyu in a moderating sense." "According to the Minister of Justice, the above speeches of Germany," Izvolsky added to Sazonov, "have an undoubted effect of dividing Russia and France, luring the French government onto the path of representation in St. Petersburg and thereby compromising unity in our eyes, and in the event of war to throw the responsibility for it not on Germany, allegedly striving with all her might to keep the peace, but on Russia and France. Minister Francin declined to answer. "In general, I was amazed here," continues Izvolsky, "as far as the minister. Justice and its staff fully understand the situation and are imbued with a firm and calm determination to give us full support and avoid the slightest appearance of disagreement with us.

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The "firm determination" of the French government was reinforced by the corresponding development of military measures: in the afternoon a telegraphic order was given to the military governor of Paris and the commanders of the corps on the introduction of martial law; frontier corps and the military governor of Paris were ordered to return to their units all those

on vacation, and in Morocco it is indicated that in the event of a war on the continent, only significant silts will remain in Africa. On the night of the 28th, information about Germany's military measures prompted the order to return vacation pay to be extended to all other corps.

So, for Paris, you could be calm.

On the same day, the Austrian ambassador in Paris stated that Serbia's response

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recognized in Vienna as unsatisfactory and that tomorrow, Tuesday, Austria will take "energetic action" to force Serbia to give her proper guarantees. The ambassador did not exactly explain these "actions", but "it could be either an ultimatum, or a declaration of war, or crossing the Serbian border." So Izvolsky informed v. Petersburg 27 more

July.

Izvolsky's telegram of the same date about Berlin said that "to his (the French ambassador—B.Sh.)'s question how Germany would react to the partial mobilization of Russia, Jagow replied that such a mobilization would not cause mobilization on the part of Germany, but what if Russia attacks Austria, Germany will respond with a Russian attack.

Thus, summing up the day of Russian-German relations, it can be established that Sazonov could have formed the conviction that Berlin would have nothing even against "partial mobilization" and "waiting" against Austria, as long as there was a "general" mobilization and Russia's declaration of war on Austria. How the minister regarded the position of Berlin, we will hear a little later.

Izvolsky introduced us to what was happening in Paris, and we will add his orientation by reporting only what happened on the "battleship "Yogapse" ("France" - B. Sh.), which was carrying the head of the republic - Poincaré.

"On Monday, July 27, from the very morning we received news," writes Poincare, "that the German squadron, following the example of the emperor, left the North Sea. At the same time, radio messages from Paris informed us of a somewhat impatient expectation of our return. Abel Ferry informed us ... that public opinion and the press reproach us for continuing the journey, despite the increasing seriousness of the situation. "We did not consider it possible to remain deaf to the mouth call." Indeed, Poincare and his companions hastened to Paris.

Poincaré's orientation boiled down to the following: "Jagoff pretends that he does not believe in the possibility of a general conflict in view of the performance of Austria. There is a real explosion of chauvinism in Berlin... Cambon believes that at the first military measures on the part of Russia, Germany will immediately respond and, apparently, will not wait for pretexts to attack us. Vienna is stubborn. Gray proposes four-power mediation between Russia and Austria. |

"Several hours later," writes Poincaré, "we intercepted a new message by wireless telegraph," which spoke of the arrival of the Serbian response with a delay of 24 hours, of the departure of the Austrian ambassador from Belgrade, of Shen's visits, about which the reader is already aware . The answer to the German ambassador was that "the position of Russia should be considered



moderate, that she has not done anything to cast doubt on her peacefulness, and that France agrees with her in striving to find a way to a peaceful solution to the conflict. "It seems to us that Germany should act as a conciliator in Vienna and the result of these speeches should be the prevention of military measures for the occupation of Serbia." The German staff rejected this.

"These telegrams came to us in fits and starts and often presented great difficulties in deciphering," the president notes.

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So, the day of July 27 did not advance a peaceful resolution of the conflict, on the contrary, the future enemies remained on comma positions, leading a "diplomatic rigmarole", and at that time military preparations were underway in Serbia, Austria and Russia and shawls ..

JULY 28TH

If we recall, on July 25, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, Sagani, reported to Vienna: "Everyone here assumes that a possible negative response from Serbia will immediately be followed by a declaration of war on our part, accompanied by military operations ... We are advised in the most urgent way immediately come out and put the world before - {ai assotr® (completed hakt - B. Sh.).

The only thing that changed in the situation during that time was that Rossil began some kind of military preparations, which could not yet be considered as a direct threat of a European war, and England offered mediation.

On July 27, Sagani reported to Berchtold: "Yagov strictly confidentially very decisively told me that, perhaps, in the next few days, the German government will bring to the attention of Your Excellency the proposal, the mediation of England. The German government categorically declares that it does not in any way agree with these proposals, moreover, it is resolutely against taking them into account and passes them on only to satisfy the request of England.

However, Berlin did not want to break with England, and on July 27 Sagani wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Vienna: "The German government attaches the greatest importance to ensuring that England does not go along with Russia and France at the moment," - therefore, the ambassador advises to avoid all that, which could break good relations between Berlin and London. Germany is compelled to accept Gray's proposal for transfer to Vienna, and in the latter it must meet "the most attentive reception."

Similar instructions on the same 27th were given by the chancellor to the German ambassador Chirsky: "After," Bethmann wrote, "as we have already rejected one English proposal for a conference, it is impossible for us to reject 4 [- type! (in advance) and this English initiative. As a result of your refusal to act as a mediator, the world would have made us responsible for the universal conflagration and would have portrayed us as past instigators of war. This would put us in an impossible position in our own country, where we must pretend to be compelled to fight. Our position is all the more difficult since Serbia has apparently made big concessions. Therefore, we cannot dismiss the mediator roles and must, given

the constant influence of London and Narizh on St. Petersburg, to put the English proposal up for discussion.

In London, Bethmann reported: "We immediately undertook mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey."

Thus, these new instructions from Berlin did not change the earlier data of July 25 on the immediate declaration of war by Austria against Serbia and only explained that it was necessary, they say, to transmit the English proposal, in respect of which the German government was "resolutely against".

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Already on July 27, Berchtold reported to Frand-Joseph the draft declaration of war against Serbia, and at 11 am on July 28 it was transmitted by open telegram via Bucharest to Belgrade, because the direct wire between Vienna and Belgrade was interrupted. At 4 p.m. the declaration of war was published in the Viennese press. Berlin's wishes were fulfilled.

On the morning of July 28, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, following his custom of recording conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent the latter a letter in which he developed in detail: the political justifications for enlisting the monarchy of Romania and Bulgaria. We will not repeat them here, because we have brought them more than once. sooner.

"Germany, Austria-Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria," according to Konrad, "as a central European union, would have the opportunity to resist any complications in the east or west."

"Italy could join him or not; the first would have been due to her enmity with France in North Achrica and the Mediterranean."

"With all these political justifications," he wrote at the end of the letter. chief of staff—I mean only military requirements (which, as it is now clear, are becoming decisive); otherwise, I wouldn't have come in with my policy proposals."

A report from a military agent from St. Petersburg on July 27 said that the Russian General Staff was convinced that a clash with Austria was inevitable, and perhaps even a European war. Military measures were taken, but not against Germany. As some officers of the general staff told the Turkish military agent, it is still possible to avoid it. war, because operations had not yet begun.

From the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Goyos told Konrad that the announcement was signed and that a new telegram from St. Petersburg speaks of the word of honor given by Sukhomlinov to the German military agent that mobilization has not yet begun and such will follow only when the Austrian troops cross the Serbian border. |

Conrad replied that he had proposed the day before to compel Germany to send sweat to Russia, and the Rumanian king should do the same. obliging him to declare in St. Petersburg that, in the event of war, Romania would fight on the side of the tripartite alliance.

From 4:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., the initial ipad stayed at Berchtold, where the Minister of War, Buryan, Shturk, Forgach, and Makkpo were.

Conrad presented Berchtold with a draft order for the mobilization of the entire Fleet.

The minister raised the question of great importance: is it possible to fight with Russia if Serbia sends 400,000 men. There are no words that such a question seemed belated to Conrad, and he gave the answer that it was necessary to find out before August 1 whether Austria-Hungary would be forced into war with Russia, because if this was not established, then all shipments would be sent to the Serbian front Russia is mobilizing—then Germany must act, and there will be nothing left for the Dupai monarchy but to declare mobilization against Russia at the same time.

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The Minister expressed the desirability of Germany not presenting an ultimatum to Russia, because Germany must avoid this, p. to which Conrad also agreed, finding it possible to convey it in the form of a letter from the emperor to Kozo. Similar, in his opinion, should be an appeal to Romania.

The result of these negotiations was a telegram to the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, sent by Berchtold at 10 pm on July 28.

The telegram began with the indication that, although mobilization had not been announced in Russia, it would happen if the Austrian troops crossed the Serbian grapi.

“Under such circumstances, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff considers it essential to bring immediate clarity to the situation, so that the monarchy with the main forces can turn against Serbia, or those should be thrown against Russia. The whole plan of the campaign against Serbia depends on the solution of this question.

“If Rosepa mobilizes the indicated military districts (four - B. Sh.), then, given the great importance of gaining time, it would be inevitable immediately, in accordance with the general situation, for Austria-Hungary and Germany to take far-reaching measures.”

“The considerations of Baron Conrad seem to Count Berchtold to be very weighty, and therefore he considers it necessary to enter with a proposal to the Berlin cabinet: will he not draw the attention of Russia in a friendly form to the fact that the mobilization of the named districts creates a threat to Austria-Hungary, and therefore, if such follows, then both the monarchy and the German Empire will be forced to respond with far-reaching military countermeasures.

"In order to facilitate Russia's way out of the situation, it seems more correct to the Vienna Cabinet if such a step is taken first by Germany alone, but the Vienna Cabinet is, of course, ready at once to repeat this idea on its part."

“In such a case, an intelligible tone seems to Berchtold to be the most effective means to prove to Russia the full gravity of the possible consequences.”

Subsequently, the note considered it useful that the same pressure be applied to Russia from Bucharest either by a note to Petersburg, or by a secret telegram from King Charles to Nicholas, or by an open confirmation of

Romania's loyalty to the tripartite alliance.

"This clarification of the situation, in order for the popo to reach the singing, must follow no later than August 1."

In his memoirs, Koprad points to the mouth note as evidence of Vienna's desire to avoid a world war.

If Sazonov was going to build a "golden bridge" for Austria, then the latter a day later designed a similar structure for Russia.

One thing is clear, that Vienna stood firm in its decision to deal with Serbia alone, and when the threat of even a partial modification of Russia arose, Berchtold, fully agreeing with the views of the chief of staff, decided to draw Berlin into the conflict in order to save the monarchy. The latter, as we heard earlier, saw a threat in the general mobilization

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Russia, and now an ally, forced to change its view, spreading fears to private mobilization. We ask the reader to remember the time limit for Berlin's speech, shortened by Konrad from August 4 to August 1, which Vienna puts forward because of considerations of a purely military nature, which we will not repeat. Finally, we heard how the chief of staff of the Mopvarkhiya even sketched out the approximate text of a note for Berlin. In a word, military considerations in this case prevailed in the development of events.

Let's leave Vienna and move on to St. Petersburg, where we were anxiously awaiting further steps by Austria-Hungary on the Serbian front. According to information received at Vienna on 1 August, the declaration of war was transmitted to the Serbian government at 1:20 pm on 28 July.

Until that time, in fact, nothing could change the mood of St. Petersburg.

"On Tuesday, July 15/28," writes Sukhomlinov, "I made my next report at Peterhof. By the calm, or rather indifference, with which the sovereign listened to current affairs, one could think that there was nothing threatening the peaceful life of Russia. I was surprised by the dryness and restraint of his high-handedness during my report; I didn't know how to explain it."

The second half of the day changed the situation dramatically. |

"After noon in St. Petersburg, news was received that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia; it caused a lot of anxiety," Pourtales notes.

"July 28," recalls Buchanan, "circumstances decisively changed for the worse... Nevertheless, I once again emphasized to him (Sazochov—B. Sh.) the need to refrain from military measures that would could be interpreted as a challenge to Hermapia.

"I repeated the content of this conversation: to a French colleague, meeting him in the hall waiting for an appointment, and asking him to speak in the same spirit, I said that the situation had become critical. Russia is very serious and will never allow Austria to attack Serbia. But if Russia is forced into war, it is very important that Germany does not have a reason

present it as an attacker. For although English public opinion is convinced that Germany bears all responsibility for the war, it will never justify our participation in it.

Whether the French ambassador spoke "in the same vein" we do not know, but the Daily Record notes this day that the French crook, on behalf of his government, declared to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France's complete readiness to fulfill, if will need, "their allied obligations."

Even before receiving the news of the declaration of war against Serbia, Sazonov seemed ambiguous to Berlin's position. In his telegram to London and Narizh dated July 28, he says: "From conversations with the German ambassador, I get the impression that Germany rather favors Austrian reconciliation. The Berlin cabinet, which could have stopped the entire development of the crisis, is apparently not exerting any influence on its ally. The local ambassador finds Serbin's answer unsatisfactory. I consider this state of affairs in Germany very alarming, and I believe that Apglia

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could better than other powers take steps in Berlin for the appropriate impact. Undoubtedly, the key to the situation is in Berlin.

According to Buchanan, "the German ambassador in St. Petersburg was under the impression all the time that Russian society was not very excited about the Austro-Serbian conflict and that there was only a small clique of chauvinists. I tried to make it sharp." "July 28," writes Buchanan, "he had breakfast at my embassy, and I took the opportunity to open his eyes to the growing danger of the situation." Despite the evidence of the British ambassador, cited in support of the peace-loving policy of Russia, Pourtales stubbornly defended his view that "Austria should severely punish Serbia, and Russia should remain calm. and stick to the passive role of a disinterested spectator. He agreed that if she announced the proposed mobilization, the European world would be in danger. already declared war on Serbia. I cannot, he objected, discuss the act of Austria. In a word, his position was not designed to smooth out friction!

Pointing out that Austria did not declare war within two days after the expiration of the ultimatum, Pourtales says: "In the leading circles of St. new action against Serbia.

"Sazonov's mood," continues the ambassador, "suddenly changed completely again. After half a day, I found him in the greatest excitement, and our conversation led us to a sharp stupor. The Minister of Foreign Affairs immediately greeted me with the words that now he sees through our insidious policy; From now on, there is not the slightest doubt for him that Germany knew exactly the plans of Austria-Hungary, and that it was a game of marked cards between German diplomacy and the Vienna Cabinet. From the sidelines: Pourtales poured more and more evidence that Berlin had not received a note or Vienna's further plans, and then the conversation was over.

Returning to the embassy, Pourtales found out about the arrest of a wireless telegram on a German steamer in St. Petersburg and immediately went to Neratov to protest, and then, telling him about the conversation with Sazonov, emphasized: at least me! the slightest step of precaution, then, of course, I will immediately come to him to continue our exchange of thoughts.

"On my return to the embassy, I already found an invitation by telephone from Mr. Sazonov to come to him at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately. The minister, meeting me there, threw himself on my neck and asked me to excuse him for allowing himself to get excited. After that, I stated that I consider the incident settled and will not bring it to the attention. my government."

The story of the German ambassador vividly emphasizes to us that the "trial of strength" no longer frightened the Russian minister, as it had in former years. Now he was ready to accuse, and it must be said not without reason, of cheating the diplomatic cabinets of the Middle Powers.

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Diplomats again began to chew on Serbia's response note. Sazonov argued the need for Berlin mediation, but Pourtales rejected this, because, as Buchanan says, "his position was not designed to smooth out friction."

"Then I mentioned," writes the ambassador, "O recently reached me "information regarding further Russian military measures, which, without any doubt, were tantamount to mobilization and went far beyond what the Minister of War allowed in a conversation with German military attaché. This is apparently due to the fact that "subordinate military authorities in their orders went further than was known and desirable in St. Petersburg."

"In any case, I meant again and in the most serious way to warn against such measures and draw attention to the fact that if Russia continues its armaments, this must necessarily lead to war."

By evening Pourtales received n instructions from Berlin. One telegram from Bethmann contained gratitude to Sazonov for his conciliatory course of action. The second, received at night, spoke of Bethmann's efforts "to induce the Vienna Cabinet to a frank explanation with St. Petersburg." The declaration of war, according to Bethmann, did not change anything in this respect. Finally, Wilhelm's telegram came to Nicholas, the essence of which was that "His Majesty (Wilhelm - B.Sh.) will use all his influence to induce Austria-Hungary to try to come to a frank and satisfactory agreement © Russia ".

All this was belated, because on the same July 28, Sazonov telegraphed a blast: "Due to the declaration of war by Austria against Serbia, my immediate explanations with the Austrian ambassador are inappropriate. The speedy mediation of England and the suspension of Austrian military operations against Serbia are necessary. Otherwise, mediation will serve only as a pretext for delaying the solution of the issue and will enable Austria to completely crush Serbia in the meantime.

These apprehensions of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs led to the decision, strictly speaking, inevitable, after the transition to the preparatory period for war, to the announcement of mobilization.

What were the circumstances of the adoption of this decision, The Daily Record does not tell us anything, but only cites Sazonov's telegram dated July 28 to the Russian ambassador in Berlin, in a copy sent to ambassadors in other states, which contained the following: "As a result of the announcement by Austria war against Serbia, tomorrow mobilization will be announced in the Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan districts. Bringing this to the attention of the German government, confirm that Russia has no offensive intentions against Germany. Our ambassador in Vienna has not yet been recalled from his post." By another telegram, the minister invited all ambassadors to inform the respective governments first.

Thus, a partial mobilization was announced, which had already been envisaged on July 24 at the Council of Ministers and which should not have caused concern to Germany, even in the opinion of Jagov himself. True, Vienna even more considered this step of Russian diplomacy. .

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Sukhomlinov speaks of the same partial mobilization. According to him. words: "On the same day, July 15/28, after I returned to Petersburg (from Peterhof - B. Sh.), in the afternoon, General Yanushkevich reported to me about the greatest behavior of the mobile he received from Sazonov - lyse the Kiev, Moscow, Kazan and Odessa districts. The reason for this, allegedly, was a telegram from the Russian ambassador in Vienna about the announcement by Austria of a general mobilization.

If we recall, both Danilov and Dobrorolsky all the time proved the inconsistency of partial mobilization and the need for a general one. To judge this, a meeting was held at the General Staff and a report was made to Nicholas with arguments in favor of a general mobilization. We do not know the day on which this meeting took place - we can only presumably put it on July 28th.

Dobrorolsky notes this Fact in this way: "July 15 (July 28, N.S. — B. Sh.) is the day the Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia — Sazonov: his optimism immediately leaves, he is imbued with the idea of the inevitability of a common war and points out to Yanushkevich about the need no longer delay. with the mobilization of our army. Moreover, in the presentation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs about mobilization, according to Yanushkevich, it was clear now. wonder why it wasn't started earlier."

"On the evening of the 15th, two royal decrees are prepared for signature - one. for general, the other for private mobilization.

Who reported these decrees to Nikolai is unknown, but only, according to Dobrorolsky, "on the morning of July 16, General Yanushkevich handed me for execution a decree on general mobilization signed by the emperor, where July 17 was appointed as the first day of mobilization." |

Danilov testifies: "On the morning of July 29, to the head of the mobilization department. The highest department, signed by the sovereign, returned the highest decree on the general mobilization of the army, the beginning of which is appointed to be considered 12 o'clock at night on July 30.

So, the Fact remains the Fact: on July 29, Nicholas raised a decree on the general mobilization of the army.

It has been stated above that Sazonov gave Yanushkevich the order to announce private mobilization, about which the chief of staff reported to Sukhomlinov. Sazonov himself informed all states about the announcement of private mobilization. In fact, a decree on general mobilization was signed. Meanwhile, the same Sazonov must have known that the announcement of a general mobilization would be considered by Germany as a pretext for war. A veil of obscurity still hangs over the history of the decree's signature. Two assumptions can be made: or the chief of the general staff, without informing him, either the minister of foreign affairs, or the military one, submitted his report with drafts of two decrees and achieved general mobilization, or, if, according to Dobrorolsky, Sazonov on July 28 considered a general war, then the decree on general mobilization corresponded to his views and desires. The first assumption suggests that the Russian General Staff, having been instructed to avoid excessive military readiness on the borders with Germany, wanted to carry out the taipo. general mobilization, misleading the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who informed even the allied states about private mobilization. Second

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the assumption allows us to say that, accusing Berlin and Veva on that day of playing with marked cards, Sazonov, in the depths of his soul, found this technique quite good and he himself played a game with similar cards.

One way or another, but on the night of July 29, a decree was signed that would be considered by Berlin as a pretext for war, and, in any case, the one who put his name, Nikolai Romanov, went to it. Berlin 6 Peterdureya: they did not take it and decided to insure themselves against attack, deliberately caused the latter.

To explain the appearance of the decree on general mobilization, we will stop: attention to the relationship between "Willy" and "Nicky".

The more intelligent, mobile, impudent, noisy Wilhelm crushed with his authority the limited, stupid and weak-willed Nikolai Romanov. According to eyewitnesses, in the presence of Wilhelm, Nikolai shied away even in Russian conditions, not to mention those cases when dates took place in Berlin or other cities of Germany. On these occasions he was usually silent and Wilhelm was noisy. But such submission to the authority of the German Emperor Nicholas was only a visible and definite form of maneuver. April 14, 1913 about the upcoming meeting. with Wilhelm, Nicholas told Buchanan that "during this visit, as before in such cases, Emperor Wilhelm will no doubt annoy him with all kinds of questions and suggestions. He was going to listen patiently to whatever the German Emperor had to say without answering what he considered the safest course of action. About what Nicholas: the loss of confidence in Germany in general, says Buchanan, describing his own. conversation with Nikolai on April 3, 1913. The reason for such wariness and even hostility of Nicholas I towards Wilhelm must be sought in the consequences of the treaty concluded in Biorca, when Nicholas had to, at the insistence. his ministers, to annul this treaty in secret, to endure the humiliation of surrendering to the persuasion of his "subjects", and because of whom, because of Wilhelm! Dull, but at the same time cruel, Nikolai Romanov.



not accustomed to forgive personal insults, although it would be: and Wilhelm. Fear again. being deceived by the German emperor always worried him, and it was enough just to prove it, as it was possible to get any signature of Nikolai Romanov with confidence. In addition, the conceited Alexandra also did not like the patronage of Wilhelm, which sometimes overflowed, and she was by no means inclined to keep her husband in obedience to the gallant Kaiser.

If on July 28 Sazonov came to the conclusion that Berlin was playing with marked cards, and the chief of the general staff argued that Germany would attack anyway, even in the event of a war only with Austria, then such arguments, when supplied with lofty phrases about the great person "the patron of all Slavs", which was the Russian emperor, was quite enough; so that a decree signed by Nicholas appeared on the general mobilization.

It only remains for us to briefly acquaint you with the orientation that was obtained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from other states.

The chargé d'affaires from Berlin reported that the text of the Serbian response note, "see-

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who do not want to give him a place in their columns in the minds of that "sobering impression" that he would have made in German reading circles. |

Izvol'sky from Paris reported on the visit of the German ambassador to the minister of toast twice a day and his proposal to Paris to put pressure on St. Petersburg, which he received a categorical refusal. At the same time, the Russian ambassador reported that the branches of Russian banks in Paris were experiencing a crisis due to "the cessation of loans ... French banks and the complete absence of currency transactions on both the St. Petersburg and Paris stock exchanges." "In order to avoid the most undesirable consequences of our credit, in view of the danger that our banks in Paris will have to stop paying, the Ambassador finds it necessary to draw the attention of the Ministry of Finance to this."

The barometer - in the face of the stock exchange - went down, foreshadowing a storm ...

The latter was supposed, according to Sazonov, to come from Berlin, where there was, "mostly, the key to the situation."

The "key of the situation" until July 98 was in the hands of Bethmann, who tried to "save the world", but his actions were "belated and half-hearted", as Tirpitz thinks about it.

"On the morning of July 98, the head of the naval office, Hon-Mulder, visited me," the admiral informs us, "and spoke with horror about Betman, how he recognized him in these last days. He considered it necessary to replace the kanzer, and to put Gpntse in Yagov's place."

Tirpitz is convinced that "immediately upon his return to Berlin, the Kaiser went into a feverish activity in the preservation of peace."

After reading the response of the Serbian government to the Austrian note, Wilhelm found that this was "a brilliant achievement for a period of no more than 48 hours!" "This is more than what you could expect! Dalya Vienna, obviously, a great moral success, but because of this, any basis for war disappears,

Gisl should have stayed calm in Belgrade! Foreseeing this, I would never have issued an order to mobilize."

Finding that "by and large the demands of the Danubian moparchy have been fulfilled" and "there is no more reason for war", in a letter to the chancellor Wilhelm found it prudent that "these beautiful promises should become reality", "that Austria, with the aim of to force promises to be fulfilled, occupied something as a pledge (Belgrade) and held it until ... the promises were actually carried out. "This is also necessary in order to give for the third time the army mobilized in vain an outward satisfaction of honor, to create for it the appearance of success in front of foreign countries and to realize that it has at least been on foreign soil. Otherwise, with the cancellation of the military campaign, a bad 'disturbance against the dynasty, which could become extremely serious,' could be exclaimed.

Outlining these considerations, Wilhelm proposed to the "civilian" chancellor, if he agreed with him, to submit to him a draft note to Vienna.

If Petersburg, for the "saving of the world," considered it a necessary condition that not a single soldier of the monarchy crossed the Serbian border, then Wilhelm, "developing feverish activity in order to preserve

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Mpra, considered it necessary to occupy Belgrade in order to satisfy the "military honor" of the Austro-Hungarian army. It was difficult with such desires to save the world!

The Chancellor, indeed, on that day gave "advice for moderation" to Vienna, but rather peculiar.

Finding that the response of Serbia "allows us to state such far-reaching acquiescence of Serbia to Austrian demands that in the event of an absolutely intransigent position of the Austro-Hungarian government, one should reckon with the gradual turn against it of public opinion throughout Europe," the chancellor wrote about the difficult situation of Germany, which for such a long time before the start of the Austrian operations (August 12) will be constantly attacked with the proposal of various conferences and mediations. As a result of the firmness of the German government in the position taken, it may turn out that "even in the eyes of the German people, it will be branded guilty for the world war." "And on such a fundament it is impossible to start a successful war on three Fronts. It is an urgent need that the responsibility for the possible spread of the conclave to powers not directly interested should fall, with all the cloaks, on Russia.

Bethmann suggested that Austria: repeat its assurances that it is not seeking territorial acquisitions in Serbia, but only wishes, in the form of a guarantee, to occupy Belgrade and some other points. Kanpler, however, advised the Ambassador "to avoid the impression that we wish to hold Austria"—the whole point is to find a "way out" "without causing a world war". "However, if the last (world war — B.Sh.) eventually became inevitable, then it would be necessary, as far as possible, to improve for us the conditions under which it should be waged."

Such were the measures taken to "save the world" in Berlin, which, like Sazonov, tried to build a "golden bridge" for Austria, but only the foundations for the latter were conceived differently on the banks of the Neva and the Spree.

We already know that on the same day Wilhelm himself wrote a telegram to Nika, and the latter sent a telegram to Wilhelm.

In Paris, the German ambassador actively tried to convince France of the need to put pressure on Russia, and from England, Wilhelm's brother wrote about his conversation with King George, who this time "was very serious, reasoned and showed the most serious and sincere desire to prevent a possible world fire. - Apparently, such a mood was not usual for the bearer of the crown of England. The king spoke of the mediation of the four powers in order to "localize the war between Austria and Serbia", believed that Germany would join this, and regarding England he said verbatim the following: "We will make every effort not to be involved in the war, and remain neutral. "I am convinced," wrote Prince Henry, "that these words were spoken in earnest, as well as that England will remain neutral." So far, there have been no disappointments with London, and it was possible to "step more boldly on the calluses of this bastard" - Serbia.

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The report of the General Staff, issued after 0400 hours, established the armaments of Russia that had begun: apparently, the partial mobilization of the four southern districts, as well as some preparations on the German frontier, which could be explained by the likelihood of declaring a preparatory period for war throughout territory of Russia. In France, troops were returning from camps, and guards were posted at the most important railway installations.

In his book on Falkengine, Zweil writes that on July 28, the Minister of War proposed to the Canpler to return military units from the camps to the garrisons, but at first, in the presence of Yagov and his assistant Zimmermann, it was rejected. Only with a joint report by Wilhelm Falkenhain with diplomats was it decided to return the troops from the camps .. Wilhelm was against the war so much that he was even ready to leave Austria.

However, the documents cited by us speak of a different "peacefulness" of Germany, which on July 28 did not at all consider the world battle unbelievable.

Paris, supporting Gray's proposal for mediation and refusing to put pressure on Petersburg, was waiting for Poincare's return. The Egapse was moving at full speed towards the French shores, because the next day, according to the Austrian ambassador, Austria was to take decisive measures against Serbia. "I fully approve of the answer you gave to Shen," Viviani went over the radio to Paris. - The position you have taken speaks for itself; in search of ways for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, we fully agree with Russia, which is not responsible for the present situation and has not yet resorted to a single measure that could arouse the slightest suspicion. The "Egaps" did not yet know that on that day in Russia a decision was made on the general mobilization of the army, which, no doubt, was already "a measure that could arouse suspicion".

If in Paris they were not yet thinking about a general mobilization, then the "precautionary measures" were constantly expanding. On the morning of July 28, it was ordered to return to the swap garrisons all parts of the frontier corps, and in the afternoon the military governor of Paris was ordered to take measures to protect the institutions; frontier corps to monitor granipium; proposed maneuvers were postponed; The Minister of War proposed to the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs to establish a permanent night and day watch in the telegraph offices of the border departments. Svedepiy from Germany spoke about the beginning of the call-up of reserve troops, the approach to the border of troops and the ongoing arming of border fortresses.

We heard the thoughtful conversations of George from London, who repeated, no doubt, the words of Gray himself. Applia still had no hope of containing the potential fire.

The British ambassador in Paris writes in his diary that day that, according to Izvolsky, war is inevitable unless England declares itself in solidarity with France and Russia, or, to put it more simply, with Russia.

We have already heard with what attention the English cabinet listened to the Austrian note read by Gray on July 24 to Serbia.

Although the text of the note spoke of its unacceptability for the Serbs, but

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However, most of the members of the cabinet still hoped to localize the conflict, and Gray came forward with a proposal for the conference of the ambassadors.

The English Fleet was mobilized, and on the 26th Churchill suggested to Gray that he openly declare the readiness of the English Fleet. However, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, although recognizing the situation as serious, rejected this, pointing out that such a statement must be made decisively and at the last moment, so that it would have an effect on other states of Europe.

On the 27th, the cabinet discussed the external situation, which was then repeated every day or even twice a day.

After the ministerial meeting, Churchill sent an order to the commanders of the squadrons about the need to be ready for the opening of hostilities.

On the same day, while talking with the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in London, Gray nevertheless considered it necessary to point out to him that if the war between Austria and Serbia broke out, then with Russia's neutrality, he could not add anything to this. But if Russia steps up, then all sorts of possibilities are likely. As a symptom of the tense situation, Gray pointed to the English fleet concentrated at Portsmouth. "We didn't call in special reservists," Gray said, "but. after they are collected, at the moment we cannot send them home." In his report to Berchtold, the Austrian ambassador adds that Gray was worried, but not agitated, as Likhnovsky had told him.

London was still waiting for the development of events; according to Gray, he still considered it necessary to use partly the advice of the Minister of the Navy - to frighten them with the readiness of the English Navy.

JULY 29

On that day, hostilities had already begun on the Serbian border, further complicating the negotiations.

According to Konrad, information was received in Vienna on July 29 that the railway bridge on the Zemlin-Belgrade line had been blown up and the Serbs had fired on an Austro-Hungarian steamer. This is where the head of the general township headquarters cuts off the description of the clashes on the Serbian border, keeping silent about the Belrad bombardier, which, as we will see below, was used by diplomats of the opposite side as proof of Austria's aggressiveness.

Berchtold shared with the chief of staff that, according to the information of the German ambassador, the Russian ambassador in Vienna, Shebeko, informed the latter about the ongoing mobilization of four military districts, since Russia was forced to protect its honor, as a great power, to pripyat the necessary and related measures.

Conrad, having weighed the situation, advised to send a note to the German government to Berlin with the following content:

"We found out that Russia is really mobilizing four military districts - Kiev, Odessa, Kazan and Moscow. We have asked Russia what this measure means and, in turn, have stated that we will not stop in our actions against Serbia. For Germany, it is reported that in case Russian mobilization follows. In fact, we are forced to immediately mobilize the remnants of our army and we expect

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a similar statement by Germany in St. Petersburg and Paris; the mobilization of Russia against Austria facilitates the mobilization of Germany against Russia.

Such proposals were made by the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff in response to those conciliatory telegrams sent from Berlin to Ben by the Chancellor. Conrad did not think to persuade Berchtold to make any concessions, but, on the contrary, pursued the goal of drawing Germany into the conflict as well.

The minister asked: where, in fact, is Turkey's assistance desirable - in Asia or in Europe? Konrad patiently explained that, of course, in the Balkans, where the Turks with their 150,000 people could bind Greece if the enemy acted hostilely, and 100,000 could be thrown to the aid of Bulgaria. The information of a military agent from Constantinople indicated that in a short time the Turks could put up from four to five well-armed corps, although these data must still be considered rather optimistic.  
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Italy was still mysteriously silent, but the Italian Ministry of War was waiting for the order to concentrate: the 1st squadron - in Brindisi for an operation in the Adriatic Sea together with the Austrian army and the 9th squadron - in Gaeta and La Spezia against the French.

On the evening of that day, an official of Berchtold Macchio appeared in Conrad's office with unpleasant news. Czernin reported from Bucharest that the Romanian king had declared complete neutrality under all circumstances and that

joint actions of the Romanian army with the armies of the tripartite alliance cannot be calculated. |

"It was hard news," Konrad writes in his memoirs.

Another trouble was also reported by a military agent from Montenegro: on July 28, the Chernozor army began mobilization.

In the evening, at about 10 o'clock, a report came from a military agent from St. Petersburg, which spoke of Sazonov's statement to the German ambassador about private mobilization in the event that Austrian troops crossed the Serbian border. Sazonov motivates the need for this by the mobilization of eight corps by Austria, which is too many against Serbia. "The General Staff," wrote the agent, "hides the fact that the order for general mobilization was given and speaks only of preparations against the monarchy, like the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which is contradicted by incoming information from all parts of the state."

Now Konrad in his memoirs proves the groundlessness of Russia's fears, since against twelve Serbian and four Montenegrin divisions, each with a strength of 16 battalions, twenty-three divisions were mobilized by Austria, but with a strength of 12 to 14 battalions, i.e. The forces were almost equal. In addition, the corps on the Russian border (T, X and X1) did not mobilize at all.

We do not think of entering into a polemic with the Habsburg chief of staff who has gone to the grave and we believe that if Austria was firmly determined to fight Serbia, then she could put up superior forces against her. The essence was not in the eight buildings on which Sazonov played, which, apparently, Konrad did not understand even before his death.

In the future, he dedicates us to his experiences, as the chief of staff, over whom the threat of an imminent attack by Russia hangs. It is forbidden

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it was to give her free access to the monarchy, and therefore it was necessary not to be late with her own modification.

These circumstances "primarily responded to military considerations; they put pressure especially on me, as the chief of the general staff, responsible for the course of operations.

"Every day was of great importance, every delay could lead to the fact that the forces concentrating in Galicia could be attacked by the Russians before the end of their concentration" (Austrian - B. Sh ...

"Preventing this was my first duty."

Such were the thoughts, the heavy thoughts of the chief of staff on the banks of the Danube.

The fear of being late in the deployment of armies on the Russian front led irresistibly to the general mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army.

The same fear for the loss of time in combat readiness embraced St. Petersburg.

We know that on the night of July 929, a telegram sent from Berlin to St. Petersburg a telegram from Wilhelm to Nicholas, in which the Kaiser said: "I learned with deep regret about the impression made in your country by Austria's action against Serbia." Stigmatizing the Serbs with the name "murderers," Wilhelm wrote: "No doubt you will agree with me that our common interests, yours and mine, as well as the interests of other rulers, make us insist that all leaders morally responsible for this cruel murder deserved punishment." "Politics plays no role in the mouth," "Willy" assured. Believing that it was difficult for 'Nicky' to resist the 'power of public opinion', the 'sincere and devoted friend and cousin' spoke of 'using all his influence in order to force the Austrians to act openly, so that there would be an opportunity to come to an agreement satisfying both sides. agreement with Russia.

"At this especially serious moment, I resort to your help," another wire tapped out at the same time, but not from Berlin to St. Petersburg, but on the contrary, from the latter to Berlin, transmitting a telegram to Wilhelm from Nikolai, who was glad for the return of Wilhelm ". "A shameful war was declared on a weak country. The indignation in Russia, which I fully share, is immeasurable. I foresee that very soon, yielding to the pressure being put on me, I will be forced to take extreme measures that will lead to war. In an effort to avert such a disaster as a European war, I implore you, in the name of our old friendship, to do everything possible to prevent your allies from going too far. -

The day of July 29 passed in lively conversations between Sazonov and the German

ambassador. The Day Record says that Pourtales was received by Sazanov at 11

hours of the morning, with the ambassador declaring "that Germany is willing to continue her attempts to persuade the Vienna Cabinet to make concessions, but requested that this be kept in strict confidence, since the disclosure of such intentions of the German government might give the impression that the views of Austria and Germany in the present case do not quite agree. In addition, the ambassador insistently requested that premature mobilization should not create obstacles for Germany to exercise the desired influence on Vienna.

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According to Nurtales, Sazonov doubted Vienna's desire to negotiate with St. Petersburg, in addition, Sazonov pointed out that "Austria issued an order to mobilize eight corps, which should be considered directed in part against Russia."

"For this reason, Russia," the minister continued, "sees itself compelled to also mobilize its troops on the Austro-Hungarian border. A corresponding order will be given even during the present day.

"I immediately raised very serious objections to this measure," writes Pourtales, "after which the Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to me that in Russia the mobilized Russian army could, in case of need, even stand with a gun at its feet for whole weeks. Russia wants to avoid war as far as possible."

The ambassador was not satisfied with this and pointed out: "Let the Minister of Foreign Affairs remember that the high military command of Russia's possible adversaries will henceforth insist on taking measures against the mobilization of the Russian army. In this way, everything will become inevitable."

Subsequently, Sazonov assured that "not the slightest military measure was taken against Germany from the Russian side," and Pourtales, drawing attention to the existence of an allied treaty between Germany and Austria, stipulated that "I do not at all intend to combine any threat with this instruction."

The results of the conversation can be reduced to: 1) Sazonov's warning to the ambassador about the impending announcement of private mobilization, when the order for general mobilization had already been signed, and assurances that the Russian army could "at least for whole weeks stand with a gun at its feet"; 2) the vague, if not false, assurances of Pourtales about the impact on Vienna and the threat - even in the case of private mobilization, to respond with the mobilization of the German army, as well as a reminder of the existence of the Austro-German treaty, i.e., a direct threat of war, if Russia announce one to Austria. Apparently, the advice of the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff found a response in Berlin.

According to the German military representative under Nicholas, in palace circles "war was considered almost inevitable from now on."

We will now give the word "Daily Record".

"After the ambassador's departure, the aforementioned statement was discussed by the minister with A. A. Neratov, barons Schilling and Prince Trubetskoy. At the same time, the question was raised whether Germany really intended to exert a serious influence in Vienna, or whether the message entrusted to Count Pourtales was calculated only to lull our attention, if possible, to delay the mobilization of the Russian army and the time for appropriate preparations. The general impression was that, even if one admits the sincerity of the German government in this case, one still has to doubt the achievability of practical results in this way, since if Austria has already gone so far without assistance, or at least indulgence of Germany, it must be assumed that the influence of the latter in Vienna has fallen greatly, and therefore at this moment the German government will hardly be able to achieve much.

Sazonov did not think of keeping the conversations with Pourtales and the circular telegraph to all ambassadors secret, bringing its content to the appropriate level.

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governments, reported on a conversation with the German ambassador and emphasized that "our military measures are not directed against Germany and do not prejudice offensive actions against Austria. Our military measures are explained by the mobilization of Austria.

However, before this telegram, the wire reported from Sazonov to Bucharest: "The purpose of our possible action against Austria is to prevent the defeat of Serbia. We do not exclude the possibility of benefits for Romania if she takes part in the war against Austria.

That such a thing was firmly decided in St. Petersburg does not need to be reminded once again. Petersburg was now more interesting



the question of Germany's intervention rather than settling with Austria.

"At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the German ambassador again came to the minister," says the Podennaya Record, "and read him a telegram from the imperial chancellor, which said that if Russia continued its military preparations, even if not starting to mobilize, Germany would consider forced to mobilize, in which case an immediate attack will follow from her side. SD Sazonov sharply replied to this message: "Now I no longer have any doubts about the true reasons for the Austrian intractability." Grah Pourtales jumped up from his seat and also exclaimed sharply: "I protest with all my might, Mr. Minister, against this insulting assertion." The minister dryly objected that Germany had an opportunity to prove in practice the fallacy of his proposal. The interlocutors parted very coldly,

It cannot be denied that both the chancellor's telegram and the ambassador already spoke the language of Konrad.

Pourtales says that Sazonov summoned him "about noon" and informed him of the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to negotiate with Petersburg. In the minister's opinion, the British mediation proposal should be referred to. Pourtales, in response, pointed out Berlin's ignorance of this and, turning the conversation to Russian mobilization, said that "if Sazonov really seriously wants a peaceful resolution of the conflict, then, in his opinion, he made a fatal mistake by not interfering with mobilization." "Then the Minister of Foreign Affairs," continues Pourtales, "again confirmed to me that the immediate publication of the mobilization order would be forthcoming." The Daily Record says nothing about this second conversation between the Ambassador and the Minister; Pourtales refers it to the time interval between 7 p.m.

Purgales testifies that he received a telegram from the Kandyer with the following content: "I ask you to point out to Mr. Sazonov in the most serious way the fact that the further development of mobilization measures on the part of Russia would force us to carry out mobilization and that after that it is unlikely there would still be the possibility of averting the outbreak of a European war."

Pourtales speaks of his reading the telegram to Sazonov and adding on his own behalf "a request to see in this message not a threat, but a friendly warning." The ambassador, who advised the minister not to let the general staffs speak, was unknowingly acting on orders from the chief of the Austrian general staff. Tzurtales does not speak of a serious

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a break with the minister, but only hicks: "Sazonov received my message with visible inner excitement and limited himself only to the answer that he would report it to his august sovereign."

To put an end to the German side, we must talk about Yanushkevich's conversation with a German military agent, which, according to Pourtales, took place "by the evening of the same day." Yanushkevich assured, on behalf of the Minister of War, "that the situation remained entirely the same as his minister described two days ago." Yanushkevich offered to issue "a written confirmation of the correctness of his statement" and gave his word of honor that "nowhere else, until 3 o'clock in the afternoon,

mobilization has taken place. "Generach cannot vouch for the future, but in any case he can confirm in the most energetic way that it is undesirable for His Majesty to mobilize on the frontiers facing the German border." Yanushkevich reported that "he had just had an audience with the tsar." |

The assessment of the chief of staff's statement by the military agent was that he "had to consider this conversation an attempt to mislead us about the extent of the measures taken so far."

According to Pourtales, "these outpourings really should have given the impression of inspiring little confidence in themselves."

As mentioned above, the "Daily Record" refers Sazonov's second conversation with the German ambassador to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, not calling him the second one.

"Shortly after the departure of the German ambassador," continues Zapis, "the telechon called the minister's office in the presence of A. A. Neratov and Baron Shikhlipg: the sovereign emperor personally informed S. D. Sazonov that he had just received from the emperor Wilhelm telegram with a convincing request not to bring matters to war. Sazonov reported that Pourtales' statements were at odds with Wilhelm's wishes, which is why Nikolai decided to "immediately" telegraph to Berlin "in order to get an explanation for the indicated contradiction".

"His Majesty," says Podennaya Zapis, "allowed SD Sazonov to speak without delay with the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff on the question of our mobilization."

We provide the word "Records":

"By that time, news had been received of the beginning of the bombardment of Belgrade by the Austrians.

This meeting between the three named persons took place soon after in the office of Lieutenant General Yanushkevich. Quartermaster General Danilov, General Monkevitz, and Assistant Chief of the Chancellery of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. A. Bazili, were in the next room to immediately carry out orders that might follow, depending on the decision that followed. The latter was expected by everyone, not without anxiety, since everyone knew how important it was for our combat readiness whether only partial mobilization would be carried out, or general mobilization at once, since in the first case, the implementation of partial mobilization would inevitably impede the transition to a general one later. if there were any need for it.

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After a comprehensive discussion of the situation, both ministers and the chief of the general staff came to the conclusion that, in view of the low probability of avoiding a war with Germany, it was necessary to prepare in every possible way for such a war in time, and therefore it was impossible to risk delaying the general mobilization later by carrying out the current mobilization private. The conclusion of the meeting was immediately reported by telechon to the emperor, who agreed to issue the relevant orders. The news of this was greeted with delight by a close circle of leaders who were

dedicated to the business. Telegrams were immediately sent to Paris and London to warn the governments of the decision.

At the same time, the imperial ambassador in Paris was instructed to convey to the French government gratitude for the statement made the day before by the guardian ambassador. The imperial ambassador in London was instructed to address the British government with an urgent appeal: "without wasting time", to join Russia and France in order to prevent the disruption of the European balance."

Such is the course of events in the presentation of the Daily Record.

It was hardly possible, of course, after this conference to speak of "the interference of the disturbed European equilibrium," for the telegram to London and Paris read verbatim: "The German ambassador announced Germany's decision to mobilize if Russia does not stop armaments. It remains for us to speed up our armaments and reckon with the inevitability of war."

The participants in this meeting remain silent.

Sukhomlinov, in his memoirs, says absolutely nothing not only about him, but also about the whole day, grieving only that, "thanks to the exceptional influence on the sovereign, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the chief of the general staff had direct access to the tsar." "In exactly the same way," writes Sukhomlinov, "the Minister of Foreign Affairs slept with the Chief of the General Staff without my knowledge." "I don't take part in diplomatic matters... If now it turns out that besides me, the chief of the general staff was going to set in motion a general mobilization instead of a partial one, then this is news to me, a circumstance that was skillfully hidden at the time. Yanushkevich was a smart and prudent person, it was not possible to independently decide on such a criminal case. could. There is no doubt that he was led by a person who had such an exceptional influence on the sovereign that Yanushkevich did not risk anything.

"In the past, it turns out," continues Sukhomlinov, "that on July 29, instead of a decided partial mobilization, they almost announced a general one. Behind my back, they apparently tried to get permission from the sovereign to announce a general mobilization. Apparently, Nikolai Nikolaevich forced the sovereign consent to it."

How much the Minister of War himself participated in this "criminal deed" is evident from the Day Record, and, of course, it is hard to believe that without his knowledge on the evening of the 28th, Yanushkevich presented two draft orders for mobilization.

Yanushkevich has long been dead. The "close circle of people" also does not want to spread their "enthusiasm". One of its members, Danilov, speaks only indignantly about the perfidy of Pourtales and Wilhelm, without adding

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not a word about their "alarm" and "delight" at the decision of the council to carry out a general mobilization. He only dedicates the passage that Basilio in the evening was instructed to bring to the attention of Chaleologos about the decision taken to announce a general mobilization, and indicates what difficulties Basilio encountered in his mission, for Palaiologos would have reported immediately to Paris, without waiting for the morning of July 30, when "The order for the general mobilization of the army was to become

publicly known." "Until that time," writes Danilov, "it seemed desirable, of course, to keep it a secret from our Western neighbors. Meanwhile, our ministry knew for certain that the French cipher was quite easy to decipher, and thus the content of the Palaiologos telegram, which was to be sent on a general basis through Berlin, was in danger of becoming the property of our opponents. Basili asked the Tsaleolog to send a telegram in Russian cipher, to which he received consent, but the sending of the dispatch did not take place, "as a result of a radical change that occurred that evening in the decision of the sovereign."

That's Danilov's whole story about July 29 - as you can see, "the day passed quite calmly."

If we recall, Danilov and Dobrorolsky agree that on the morning of July 29, the signed decree on general mobilization returned, which ended up in the bowels of the general staff. If Yanushkevich is to be believed in his statement to the German military agent in his report to Nikolai on July 29, then, apparently, the decree was the result of this report.

However, the General Staff apparently decided to keep this "criminal affair" secret not only from the Minister of War (which is doubtful), but also from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, after 3 p.m., asked permission to talk about mobilization with the military authorities, and from "A close circle of limes" was concerned about whether a decision would be made about private or general mobilization. One of the members of this circle, Danilov, who was aware that on the morning of July 29 the order for "general" mobilization had already been signed, did not try to reassure his classmates. It is rather unclear and vague why Sazonov had to convene a meeting on the announcement of a general mobilization, when the decree on such had already been signed? This can be explained by one thing, that until the morning of July 30, the Russian General Staff wanted to keep the order secret not only from the "Western neighbors", but also from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and various "close" circles. And only a meeting with Yanushkevich revealed a "general" mobilization, and, according to the Daily Record, Nikolai was apparently asked to confirm the signature he had already given.

What was the fate of the signed decree on general mobilization?

We cannot deny the reader the pleasure of listening to the "odyssey" of this document from the words of the participant himself.

"On the morning of July 16 (July 29 — B.Sh.)," Dobrorolsky plows, "General Yanushkevich handed me for execution a signed ... decree on general mobilization, where the first "mobilization day" was July 17 (30:—B. Sh.). The decree must be sent for promulgation to the ruling senate, but earlier it was necessary to be together with it at the ministers of military, naval and internal affairs for them to sign a telegram, which

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I aiianina: rai, according to the law behind their signatures, was announced to the commanders of the troops, governors-general and governors about mobilization.

I well remember these visits of ministers. Sukhomlinov was generally very restrained during all these fateful days, as if deliberately from his heels, the first role in the military department passed to Yanushkevich ... Sukhomlinov clearly understood that Russia was being drawn into an unbearable struggle, and now he seemed to want to be forgotten just a few months ago on his

initiative, a blatant article written in Birzhevy Vedomosti about our readiness: "Russia does not want war, but is not afraid of it either." In these serious days, it seemed that he deliberately gave the conductor's baton to the chief of the general staff, who in a few days was to become the chief of staff of the supreme commander ...

When I came to the Naval Minister, Admiral Grigorovich, he did not want to believe that I had brought him telegram 0b of the general mobilization to sign. "What, a war with Germany? Our fleet is not in a position to compete with the German one," the minister said. "Kronstadt will not protect the capital from bombardment." He called Sukhomlinov on the ministerial telephone and asked him to confirm the need for his signature. And, having received an affirmative answer (and now Sukhomlinov declares his complete non-participation in the "criminal case" [!!! - B. Sh.]), he attached his signature with a heavy feeling.

On Yelagin Island, in the office of the Minister of the Interior, Maklakov, a mock atmosphere hovered in his office. Just opposite the writing table at which the minister was sitting, by the opposite wall, on a narrow table covered with a white shroud, there were several large images, in front of which a lamp was glowing and several wax pepper candles were burning. He immediately spoke of the revolutionaries, who, according to his competent information, were looking forward to the war in order to finish the work that had been done in the last Japanese war. "War among us, in the depths of the people, cannot be popular, and the ideas of the revolution are more understandable to the people than the victory over the Germans. But you can't get away from fate .... and, signing himself with the sign of the cross, the minister signed the telegram ...

Now it was necessary to go to the main telegram, writes Dobrolsky, and put the historic telegram into circulation. (We omit all the machinations that preceded this solemn meeting—B. Sh.)... But at this moment, at 91/, in the evening, General Yanushkevich invites me to the telephone and orders to delay the telegram..." About the details of this speech will be below.

For the time being, we will leave the disappointed inspirer of the general mobilization of Russia, Dobrolsky, on the central telegram of St. Petersburg, which stopped the transmission of the telegram.

Although in the introduction in the first book of our work we stated that we were resigning ourselves from the task of describing the Russian general staff, but, unfortunately, we were to restrain this. We can't be sure and we must say a few words about the "0 balance of forces" that existed in the days of the war in St. Petersburg, that is, mainly, relations between diplomacy and the general staff. |

Above, we gave a description of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sazonov, as a man of European fold, with a "ryparsky way of thinking

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and actions, but with a bias, as Yagov assesses, a napionalistic one, which made it possible to gain sympathy from the majority of the State Duma.

Of course, one cannot suspect the former Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, of sympathy for Sazonov, who gives a characterization of Sazonov that may be to some extent biased, but at the same time true; we have to listen to it.

Speaking about his isolation (imaginary - B. Sh.) until August 9 and that Sazonov acted on the orders of Nikolai Nikolaevich, Sukhomlinov writes:

"Without serious experience in the diplomatic field, Sazonov, although an educated, intelligent and above average person, was still in the hands of such collaborators, Kaisraf Tatishchev, who had significantly more experience.

At meetings of the Council of Ministers, Sazonov ardently defended the ideas introduced by his department; he usually did not take part in the discussion of questions of other departments.

I never had any misunderstandings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Our strictly correct relations were limited exclusively to relations arising from our official position.

The nature of our official relations was also reflected in private ones. We did not have any strong points of contact, since I did not have any excess of feelings for diplomacy, and Sazonov was not interested in military issues either. His landing plans on the Bosphorus testified to how little he understood about military affairs.

There are no words that the "former" person is not far from the truth: the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, quite vaguely understood the conditions for waging war; as an easily receptive person, he reveled in his success over Germany in January 1914 and looked at the political situation more through the eyes of his "intimate circle" than he personally cordoned it off.

We once heard that most of the chiefs of general staffs had an "intimate, close circle" of employees, among which various issues were resolved. The presence of such an "intimate circle" of unspoken and irresponsible advisers was also in the institution near the Pevchesky Bridge. We heard how the message of the 06th General Mobilization brought joy to the "close circle" of secondary characters in history, who were the inspirers of their high bosses. It is hardly necessary to prove that various Schillings, Basilis, Trubetskoys, etc., energetic young people, who, by the way, are irresponsible for anything, cut down the forest in the heat of the moment, not thinking about those shishshepkas that will fly on the plains of Europe. The desire to "play a role", to be "participants" in the great events of world history - overwhelmed these young people. In the old days, the "mad" Greek Herostratus burned the temple of Diana. And it must be said that the role of such "arsonists" smiled very much at bureaucratic diplomats in uniforms embroidered with gold, but with one condition: they handed over the torch, which was supposed to light the world fire, into the hands of ... Sazonov, with full hope, that "the little one will not give out." From what we have said so far, it is clear that this "little one" really evoked only "the joy of a close circle", which was not mistaken in its calculations.

As for the orientation of this "close" circle of "diplomats in the military

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position of Russia, then it, however, rested more on the anchors of the maritime department than the land department. Therefore, we consider Sukhomlinov right when he refuses Sazonov knowledge of military affairs. Russian diplomacy found support, and rather energetic support, in maritime circles -

the desire to capture the Bosphorus united these two departments, as a common crime binds the leaders who participated in it. It is easy to see that this is so if we recall the whole story connected with the operation in the straits of the Black Sea. Of course, it will seem strange how suddenly the Minister of Marine with "a heavy feeling attached his signature" to the telegram about the general mobilization. Please do not forget that there was a general staff in the naval department, which was developing "borderless" plans for various landing operations: both in Boskhor and in Pomerania, not daring only for those ... at the North Pole. The "adventuristic" strategy, according to the venerable Leer's classification, was characteristic of this institution of the naval department and, above all, of its and the second operational department, one of the most active members of the "close circle" of persons of a secondary nature, who sent the Russian diplomatic ship into the cyclone of the world howl of war. Such is the instructive history of various "intimate circles".

In his memoirs, the former Minister of War tries to portray himself as a "loner", who, for a number of reasons, was "restrained" in his days. preceding the World War.

These reasons, according to Sukhomlinov, were: 1) in his isolation from Nikolai by Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich; 2) in the same isolation on the part of Sazonov, who, like the Grand Duke, was convinced that Sukhomlinov had "substantial arguments for upholding the preservation of peace in that summer of 1914"; 3) in the conviction that the Russian army is ready for war, and therefore the well-known article about this in Birzhevy Vedomosti corresponded completely to reality, being printed on the proposal of the sovereign and approved by him; 4) in the actions of the chief of the general staff over the head of the minister of war, and the first "did not give the slightest hope of the possibility of maintaining peace", having the support of the Grand Duke behind him.

It has been shown above that the "isolation" of the Minister of War was by no means as "strict" as Sukhomlinov tries to describe it, but, on the other hand, there is no doubt that in these days the voice of the Chief of the General Staff, by nature rather "quiet "and" insinuating, "acquired decisive importance.

Sukhomlinov' speaks of Yanushkevich as a "smart and cautious" person who "could not decide on his own to undertake such a criminal act (the announcement of a general mobilization without the knowledge of the Minister of War—B. Sh.) could not." "There is no doubt that he was led by a person who had such influence on the sovereign that Yanushkevich did not risk anything."

"In those fateful days, Yanushkevich," Sukhomlinov says elsewhere, "was the person through whose hands orders regarding the army were openly passed. His role, however, was false and unenviable. He was on a leash with Nikolai Nikolaevich and behind the scenes - the Grand Duke himself, perhaps both Montenegrin women, who held the leashes in their hands. I could not take on this role... |

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... Yanushkevich, the conniving confidant of the Grand Duke, acted on the directives of the latter. To what extent this happened at that time, I could not verify this. Therefore, I did not know that the general subordinate to me was daily with the sovereign and behind my back

made reports, while I found it established that the chief of the general staff could only be allowed to report in the presence of the Minister of War, ”

If we assume that Sukhomlinov now biasedly judges his former chief of the general staff, then much earlier his Dobrorolsky wrote about Yanushkevich as follows: During constant visits to his office, he usually had to be caught © by the receiver of one of the three telephones - either the courtier, connecting him with the royal residence of Alexander, or a special ministerial, with which he connected with the ministers, or, finally, the city. His usually restrained expression of a lip in the mouth caused an anxious mood, and his pallor and large bags under his eyes testified to the sleepless nights he spent at work. Even 4 months ago, in the modest role of the academy's executioner, could he have imagined that a heavy responsibility for the general mobilization of the Russian army would fall on his shoulders.

Indeed, in the new role it was impossible to recognize the modest and tedious professor of military administration, which, according to the personal recollections of the author of this work, Yanushkevich was. Secretive, self-possessed, with a share of flattery, who made a successful career by his marriage to an ugly person, but who had weight in St. , - Yanushkevich, pious by nature, was that type of Jesuit in the uniform of the general staff, which were not few in the Russian and allied Khranpuz headquarters. If in the field of strategy Yanushkevich was not strong, as evidenced by all his closest associates, then in the art of gliding silently and obsequiously. on the court parquet, in the ability to say only pleasant things, of course, it was impossible to refuse him. In a word, “in those days” Yanushkevich was “his own” person at court, while Sukhomlinov, with a clearly German orientation, inspired distrust in himself. The well-known fame about the former Minister of War, as a supporter of Berlin, if not more, was taking shape. long before his famous trial...

Such was the “correlation” in the diplomatic and military worlds on the banks of the Neva, in neighboring buildings, united by an arch, which in these days was a symbol of the connection between politics and strategy, as military science says.

So, on the morning of July 29, Nikolai Romanov signed a decree on general mobilization, after 3 pm he confirmed it once again in a conversation with Sazonov. Around the same time, Wilhelm's first techgram was received, to which, after negotiations with Sazonov, Nikolai sent a second telegram with a request about the discrepancy between the statements of Wilhelm and the German one. ambassador and a proposal to refer the entire Austro-Serbian conflict to the Hague Tribunal. |

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At 9:40 p.m. on July 29, Wilhelm's reply to the first telegram was delivered to Petergokh (his second telegram is B.Sh.), in which the Kaiser “shared the desire to preserve the peace,” but considered Austria's performance not as a “shameful war” , but “as a desire to have a full guarantee that the Serbian promises will be translated into real Facts”. Wilhelm assured of his desire to be an intermediary between



Vienna and St. Petersburg and found it "quite possible for Russia to remain only a spectator of the Austro-Serbian conflict and not involve Europe in the most terrible war that she had ever seen"... "Military preparations on the part of Russia... would hasten the catastrophe."

"This response telegram from Emperor Wilhelm prompted the sovereign to cancel the decision on general mobilization," reads the postscript in pencil on the telegram made at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Having received 'Willy's' telegram, 'Niki' hesitated: it was embarrassing to respond to a proposal of mediation with a general mobilization, embarrassing in front of the same Frenchmen and the British. "Here the last Romanov," writes M. Pokrovsky, "turned out to be more tactful than his servants."

As to how the telegram was stopped by an order from Peterhof, the sources cited by us differ in their testimonies. Wilhelm's telegram arrived at 9:40; Meantime, Dobrorolsky cheats that at "9!/" in the evening" Yanushkevich called him on the telephone and ordered him to delay the transmission of the telegram. An inconsistency in a few minutes does not play a role, but one thing is clear that the chief of the general staff received Tomanov's request to stop the announcement of the general modification before everyone else.

Sukhomlinov writes:

"At about midnight from 16/29 to 17/30 July, the Sovereign Emperor called me to the telehop from Peterhof, as a result of a telegram he received from Emperor Wilhelm ... , struck. Behind the scenes there had to be someone with whom the sovereign consulted and whose advice Nicholas II, however, doubted the correctness of. If he had an independent decision to fulfill the desire of Wilhelm, he should have given a direct order about this - to cancel the mobilization.

But the sovereign did not dare to take such a step, in my opinion, because it did not correspond to the views of his confidential adviser. This situation "between the rock and the anvil" made him make a middle decision: "can't you stop?" |

On the Telephone, however, I had to report that mobilization is not a mechanism that, like a wheelchair, could be suspended at will and then moved forward again. As for the abolition of partial mobilization, if just such a command had followed, I, for my part, considered it my duty to report that after that it would take a long time to restore the normal starting position for a new mobilization of the four southern districts.

In view of the importance of the issue, I asked the sovereign to demand another report on this subject from the Chief of the General Staff. This is where our conversation ended.

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Some time later, General Yanushkevich called me and reported on the conversation with the sovereign, and his answer coincided with what I reported to the sovereign.

And since neither Yanushkevich nor I, therefore, received orders to stop our partial mobilization, we had no right to make any orders ... Apart from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikolai I obviously could not decide to cancel his order.

Sukhomlinov did not say a single word about the fact that Nikolai ordered the cancellation of the general mobilization and that he, the Minister of War, "at about 11 o'clock in the evening informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs by telephon that he had received the highest order to cancel the general mobilization" - as about This is what the Daily Record says.

The cancellation of the general mobilization took place immediately upon receipt of the telegram, and at 11 o'clock Nikolai was negotiating by telephone with the minister of war and the chief of the general staff, not only about the cancellation of the general one. but n private mobilization.

In his memoirs, Buchanan reports that "Nicholas called one after another the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff to the telechon and canceled the general mobilization." "But the mobilization has already begun and stopping it, as both generals objected, would unsettle the entire war machine. The king, however, continued to insist. But, despite his categorical order, the military authorities continued the general mobilization without his knowledge.

Considering himself "among those limes who are credited with active participation in the outbreak of a world war", Sukhomlinov categorically rejects such fictions of the British ambassador, and we must really note that the military authorities continued mobilization, but only "private".

Danilov testifies that "somewhat later than the dispatch of the telegram, Emperor Nicholas ordered to stop all orders for the production of general mobilization and to replace it with private mobilization only in four military districts ... About any additional negotiations between the sovereign emperor, Minister of War and Chief of the General Staff on the night of July 29-30, I did not hear anything at that time, and if these negotiations really took place, then the content of the latter, apparently, remained a secret of the talking lindens.

Let us return to Dobrorolsky, who immediately took all the prints of telegram 0b of general mobilization from the machines.

"A telegram about private mobilization addressed to the commanders ... was sent much later, around midnight from July 16 to 17" (July 29 to 30 - B.Sh.).

"I returned to the office of the chief of the general staff," writes Dobrorolsky, "and could not help but hide all the bitterness from the change that had taken place. It was obvious that the whole burden of subsequent misunderstandings and confusion - for the certainty of the general mobilization in a few days was clear - would fall on us - on the General Staff.

"Yanushkevich conveyed the words of His Majesty that the Sovereign Emperor assumes all responsibility for announcing private mobilization:

representatives of the military department did everything they could to ensure that there was a general mobilization, but he decided not to do this.

Indeed, on July 29, two lines - diplomatic and military - came to a definite conclusion about the inevitability of war with Germany, and therefore about the need to announce a general mobilization. The dynastic line hesitated, convinced by the two previously indicated of the correctness of their arguments, but then gave the order to stop the telegram on general mobilization, not daring, however, to cancel the private one, which, in any case, she thought about. True, private mobilization on that day by Germany was also considered, according to Vienna's interpretations, as a pretext for war.

We have repeatedly heard Sazonov's assertions that a mobilized Russian army can stand for whole weeks with a gun at its feet, which was disputed by the German ambassador, who saw nothing other than war in bringing the Russian army into such a state.

Let's refrain for now from expressing our personal views, but let's turn to the Facts. At the beginning of 1913, the General Staff firmly established and instructed the troops to carry out that mobilization against Germany and the Abstrim was at the same time a declaration of war on these states. However, at the beginning of 1914, this formula was rejected and it was definitely established that the announcement of mobilization against Germany and Austria is not yet a declaration of war on them, which should be considered either the receipt of a telegram from St. Petersburg declaring war or the fact of crossing the border by an enemy armed team.

Thus, sincerely or not, the Russian General Staff dissociated the mobilization from the declaration of war, believing that the million-strong Russian army could indeed stand quietly on the border for weeks. It goes without saying that such a situation was very beneficial for the Russian army, which was late in mobilization and concentration, but only ... will the enemy give it the opportunity to carry it out? Old Moltke taught that one should always take into account the will of the enemy in the most favorable conditions for him, that is, for the enemy. But the latest Russian formulation of the declaration of war was just wrong in this, but on the other hand it gave advantages in another - in responsibility for the war, which could be shifted to the enemy.

The night passed uneasily for the diplomats. The Daily Record tells us that "At about 1 o'clock in the morning the German Ambassador urged the Minister by telephone to receive him immediately." "Sazonov, who had already gone to bed, got out of bed and received the ambassador, who asked if we could not be satisfied with the promise of Austria not to violate the integrity of Serbia. The minister replied that this was not enough, and at the ambassador's convincing request, he worked out and handed over to Count Pourtales the text of a hormul, which indicated the conditions under which Russia would agree to stop its weapons.

The German ambassador paints this meeting in a different light. "That same night," Pourtales writes, "Sazonov once again invited me to come with him, by telephon, around midnight." Pourtales thus places the initiative of the meeting on the minister.

"I found the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a state of calmer than a few minutes before. We started a conversation that lasted an hour and a half.

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According to the ambassador, Sazonov again proposed a "conference of four", convincing that "it is enough for the German emperor to say only one word, and they will listen to him in Vienna."

Pourtales rejected all Sazonov's arguments, based on the fact that: 1) Austria declared its territorial disinterest, and 2) Vepa would not listen and it was impossible to put pressure on the "great" power.

Even Sazonov's exclamation: "Serbia should not be Bukhara" remained unanswered. "I have kept," Pourtales writes, "my point of view, for sure, . about leaving Austria-Hungary alone now to settle their scores with Serbia; when peace is concluded, there is always time to return to the question of the preservation of Serbian sovereignty."

"Then," the ambassador continues, "I turned the conversation back into Russian: mobilization, which, as I noted, completely pushes the Austro-Serbian conflict into the background, since at the present time we are facing a linden with the danger of a pan-European fire" .

Sazonov gave one answer: "Russia should not leave Serbia in trouble ... There can be no question of canceling the decree on the mobilization of the Russian army, which, de, is only a consequence of the Austro-Hungarian mobilization." In the end of the conversation, Pourtales "emphasized once again that the imperial chancellor's warning was friendly, and by no means was. threat." In a word, the German ambassador repeated, like an echo, the advice of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff.

Pourtales did not say a single word about the text of the agreement formula, which Sazonov handed over to him. According to Portules, it turns out that Sazonov calmly went to sleep after talking with him.

However, the "Daily Record" testifies otherwise: "The third meeting" of the German ambassador (but on our account the fourth - B. Sh.) with the minister - 2 o'clock in the morning. Deeply moved and agitated by the inevitability of a European war, Count Pourtales asked the minister to formulate some proposal that he could telegraph to his government. The minister worked out and handed over to the ambassador the following. Formula: "If Austria, recognizing that its conflict with Serbia has taken on the character of a matter of all-European significance, declares its readiness to exclude from its ultimatum points that violate the principle of Serbian sovereignty, Russia undertakes to cease all its military

cooking."

In the memoirs of the German ambassador there is no indication of a new meeting. nor to the specified formula. Pourtales speaks of receiving it from the minister on the morning of July 30 at a rendezvous, which we will discuss below.

So, the "Daily Record" persistently depicts the nervous state of Pourtales and Sazonov's "night calmness". Izvolsky reported from Paris that "the firm position occupied by the French press continues", that "the president was convinced of the firm and at the same time calm formation of public opinion, which is fully aware of the true meaning of the events taking place." "Even a significant part of the radical socialists is imbued with the same spirit. The attempts of anti-militarist demonstrations by the revolutionary party are attached serious importance by the government and intend to take against

them drastic measures,

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Te OY "the mood of the military circles and the highest command staff is very high."

"Now Viviani," Izvolsky reported, "confirmed to me that the government's determination to act in complete unity with us is supported by the widest circles and parties, including the radical socialists: which have just brought him a resolution on unconditional confidence and patriotic the mood of the group." The German ambassador was told that: "France sincerely desires peace, but at the same time she has decided to act in complete unity with her allies and friends." To be on the safe side, "Viviani tonight forbade a planned meeting of revolutionaries against the war."

Above, we reported Sazonov's pie telegram about the "inevitability of war." When sent to Izvolsky, it was accompanied by: 1) an expression of gratitude to the French government for the "allied support of France" and 2) a wish for the speedy accession of England to France and Russia.

For Paris, Sazonov was calm. London did not respond to the proposal to take the initiative in reconciliation.

Things were worse with Berlin. Returning there that day, Ambassador Sverbeev, who immediately had a meeting with Yagov, reported by telegraph that Yagov told him: "We are forced to announce mobilization against Russia; then one will follow against Frandia"; when all the great powers are under arms, war seems inevitable to Jagov. Despite the ambassador's arguments that the Russian mobilization was directed against Austria, Jagov replied: "All the same, the measures taken by Russia on the German border make Germany also think about its defense." There was little hope.

During the night, a more detailed report of the Russian ambassador in Berlin about his conversation on July 29 with Yagov came, which we will discuss below.

The clouds were gathering over the Neva. Diplomats and the general staff, distressed by the combinations of Peterhof, did not sleep well: the air was saturated with electricity.

On the bersgs of the Spres, in Berlin, the day of July 29 also passed uneasily. It was, of course, not a matter of Russia and France, which could not intimidate the "brave cowards" in helmets—the question was exacerbated by the unclear position of England. |

Any proposals of "Nika" 06 addressed to the Hague Tribunal were recognized by Wilhelm as "idiocy". "The only concern that haunts me, after reading the response of the Serbs," Wilhelm wrote, "is the fear that Austria would not take on "the heavy responsibility of being guilty in the European conflict."

Nicholas's first telegram impressed Wilhelm as a "recognition of his (Nicholas) own weakness" and an attempt to shift the responsibility to the German emperor. "The telegram contains a hidden threat and a request, similar to an order - to straighten up an ally." "We'll see how my telegram will work," Wilhelm was sure of his still continuing influence on Nicholas and believed that the latter,

"instead of setting an ultimatum demand to stop the ally... it would be better to turn to Franco-Josich and negotiate with him"...

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On the evening of July 29, Bethmann gave already definite instructions to Pourtales that "the idea of the Hague Conference will also be excluded in this case."

Seeing in the mobilization of Russia, if not a direct threat to himself, then certainly to Austria, Wilhelm loses confidence in Pika, he begins to feel that Cheterburg is "swindling" him, that he has been "bypassed", etc. If we recall, that in relations between Nicholas and Wilhelm there was already some kind of reticence, now with Wilhelm it is already turning into anger against the "idiot" who is getting out of subordination, rushing about with the Hague Tribunal instead of polite and complete submission to Berlin. Petersburg's ally, France, was absolutely not terrible for Germany.

However, Wilhelm's anger reaches its climax when, on the same day, according to Likhnovsky's report, he has to get acquainted with the position of England,

Likhnovsky reported that Gray invited him to his place. "The minister was completely calm, but very serious, and met me with the words that the situation was getting worse." Again suggesting that the four of us mediate and deeming it "absolutely necessary if a European catastrophe is not to be caused", the Minister stated: Austria and Russia. "But if we and France were involved in the war," wrote Likhnovsky, "then things would immediately take a different turn, and the British government would consider itself, perhaps, forced to make hasty decisions. When war breaks out, it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen. Gray, according to him, is far from any desire to threaten - he only wanted to warn me from disappointment, and himself from reproach for insincerity, and therefore chose the Form of a private exchange of opinions.

Gray promised, if Austria accepted the mediation, "to help her obtain every possible satisfaction." In his opinion, "Austria can achieve guarantees for the future without a war, which puts the European world in question."

Wilhelm's indignation with England, and in particular with Gray, was so great that the Kaiser did not skimp on expressions excluded from the diplomatic lexicon: "vile Pharisee!", "vile son of a bitch!" - rained down on the head of the British minister, who allowed himself to be "serious". "England opens her cards," writes an excited Wilhelm, "at the moment when it seems to her that we are driven into a dead end and are in a hopeless situation. The vile merchant bastard tried to deceive us with banquets and speeches. "England alone is responsible for war and peace, and certainly not us! This should be publicly established."

Seeing from Gray's words that England would stand aside in the event of a conflict only between Austria and Russia, that England's desire was directed to the Germans leaving Austria, Wilhelm exclaimed: "Unheard of vulgarity and diabolical Pharisaism - but purely in English! »

Germany's faith in English neutrality had been undermined, but not yet completely. Wilhelm threatened that "with such scoundrels I will never conclude an agreement on the Fleet."

In a word, the dynastic line in Berlin was straightforward

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in his outward expression, and Wilhelm continued to play the "brave coward."

For this, the diplomats showed more anxiety and hesitation than in former days.

Due to the size of our work, we cannot go into a detailed account of the diplomatic correspondence and conversations of the month that took place in Berlin.

The "civilian chancellor" already on the morning of the day, according to Tirpitz, "completely lost heart." Bethmann saw that, having decided on July 5 to enable Austria to punish Serbia by force of arms and thinking to do this outside the European conflict, the German policy of "trial of strength" did not succeed and threatened to draw Germany into a European war. It was necessary to immediately correct the situation that had arisen, namely: to maintain the neutrality of England, to force Austria to make concessions and to keep Italy in the alliance.

On July 29, Bethmann wrote to the German ambassador in Vienna, "I am following with growing anxiety the behavior of the Vienna government and its controversial speeches before various governments. In St. Petersburg, it declares its territorial disinterest. It leaves us in complete ambiguity about its program. From Rome he gets off with nothing saying huzzas on the issue of compensation. In London, Count Mensdorf gives Bulgaria and Albania part of Serbia, contrary to the solemn declarations of Vienna in St. Petersburg. In view of these contradictions, I must conclude that the revelation of the graha of Goios reported in telegram No. 83 was obviously intended for simpletons. The Austrian government seems to be contemplating a plan which it considers expedient to hide from us, in the hope of securing German support, just in case, and fearing to lose it in the event of an open recognition of the danger.

Reporting this to the ambassador, Bethmann wrote: "I only ask Berchtold to indicate that he should take measures against the existing distrust of the assurances he gave to the powers about the inviolability of Serbia."

In the Potsdam Palace, the chancellor openly spoke out: "I had absolutely no idea what the Austrians wanted. After all, the Serbs agreed to everything, except for some trifles. Since July 5, the Austrians have said nothing about their intentions.

"Is it not expedient to send another telegram to Vienna," Bethmann wrote to Jagow the same day, "with a categorical statement that we are not at all satisfied with the way Vienna has resolved the issue of compensation with Rome."

"If Vienna, on the eve of a possible European fire, threatens its

behavior to split the tripartite alliance, then this circumstance threatens to break up the entire alliance as a whole, "Frightened Bethman. "We, as allies, cannot support a double-dealing policy."

"I consider such a telegram necessary, otherwise we can no longer mediate in St. Petersburg and will be forced to trail behind Vepa. I do not in any way agree to the latter, even at the risk of being accused of compromise.

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If we recall, then Vienna also did not want to "lag behind" Berlin and did not want to accept Bethman's circular for execution, but, on the contrary, passed the chief of the general staff's circular to the latter. According to German sources, we cannot say how the latter were perceived by Bethmann, but that Pourtales, like an echo, repeats Konrad's advice, in this

there is no doubt.

The day, as we shall see later, brought with it an aggravation of the situation, and at 2:55 a.m., and then at 3:00 a.m., two telegrams from Bethmann followed to Vienna, in which he again insisted on Vepa's concessions.

"If Austria rejects all mediation, then we, therefore,

we are standing in front of the fire," Bethman wrote. "In this case, England will come out against us, Italy and Rumania will, in all likelihood, not be with us, "Political and we will remain together against the powers ..." "The prestige of Austria, the military honor of her army and her rights - four great reasonable demands on Serbia could be sufficiently satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or some other points ... Considering these circumstances, we are compelled to persistently and firmly recommend the Vepian cabinet to decide to accept mediation on the indicated honorary conditions. Responsibility for consequences that might otherwise arise would be extremely heavy both for Austria and for us."

Considering "refusal of any exchange of opinions with Cheterburg" as a "fatal mistake", since "he is directly provoking the military intervention of other powers, in avoiding which Austria-Hungary is interested in the first place", Bethmann "with all resoluteness and seriousness" proposed to indicate Berchtold: "Despite the fact that we are ready to fulfill our allied duty, we are forced, however, to reject Vepa's frivolous involvement in the world fire, which does not pay any attention to our advice. On the Italian question, Vepa also seems to disregard our advice.

We know very well that it was not so easy to persuade the black-and-yellow diplomats to heed the advice; Opps were not at all afraid of a European war, for they understood very well that the main role in it would belong to Germany, and not to Austria, in all cases Serbia and Russia were dangerous enemies, with whom Vienna first of all took into account.

Tirpitz tells the pamas that on July 29 Wilhelm invited the military commanders to his place "to inform them of his negotiations with the Kappler, who had completely lost heart."

"On doubts about his policy of the first weeks of July, which should



were to appear at the canpler, we did not suspect anything at that time. We only looked with horror at what was happening before our eyes, just like the Kaiser, who spoke without hesitation about the inadequacy of the Chandler to his purpose, as he often did before, however, expressed the opinion that he cannot now part with this man, for he enjoys the confidence of Europe. The Kaiser reported that the Chancellor had proposed, in order to achieve the neutrality of England, to sacrifice our Fleet in a special agreement, which he, the Kaiser, however, rejected.

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Wilhelm's rather original speech against his "civilian" chancellor shows us: 1) that Europe had no confidence in Wilhelm himself; 2) that Wilhelm sought to flirt with the military line, blaming all the troubles on Bethmann; 3) that the chancellor "fell in spirit", to which the military party took "with horror", and 4) that in search of the neutrality of England, Bethmann was ready to make concessions in the treaty on the Navy.

In a conversation with the English ambassador in Berlin on the same day, the chancellor assured the London cabinet that Germany had no desire for territorial expansion at the expense of France, that it respected the neutrality of Holland and Belgium, but only relatively, depending on the development of operations. tions in France. Wanting to achieve the neutrality of London in this situation, Bethman proposed to conclude "a general agreement on neutrality for the future, the details of which at this moment would be premature to discuss." It is true that Bethmann intended to reply to the general treaty of neutrality with an "agreement on the question of the Navy," but then this was crossed out, apparently at the insistence of Wilhelm, who "never" wanted to conclude a "treaty on the Navy" with such scoundrels.

It is known that Gray rejected the vague promises of the German chancellor, apparently also believing that "with such bastards" it is not worth concluding a "treaty on the Navy."

On the same day, at about 5 p.m., Jagov met with the Russian ambassador, who, after any proof that the Austrian ultimatum was unacceptable to Serbia, came to the following conclusion: "Germany, which knew this ultimatum and knew that we cannot allow Serbia to be crushed or weakened, to be able to approve it; apparently, she also has nothing against the war. Jagow replied that "the affairs of Serbia do not concern Russia at all", that Germany had found Gray's offer of mediation inappropriate.

"Jagov was brought a piece of paper," writes the Russian ambassador to Sazonov, "which he was horrified and handed over to me, asking if the news he was saying was true: it was about our mobilization against Austria-Hungary, about which I was authorized to inform him. Sverbeev confirmed the mobilization, pointing out that "this measure is not in the nature of a hostile attitude towards Germany" and referring to the fact that Austria itself is making major military preparations on the Russian border.

"Rejecting these preparations, Jagow told me that after our mobilization against Austria-Hungary, Hermapius was also forced to mobilize, that, consequently, nothing more could be done, and that from that moment diplomat must give the floor to the guns."

The conversation ended with mutual reproaches about the

prepared at the borders.

"Horrors" were approaching the Berlin diplomats, whose actions and speeches were already becoming less confident.

On the other hand, the strength of 6 military Yorusakh increased. Kautsky writes: "Along with the diplomats, the General Staff officers have now received the word, while the civil chaplain has taken a turn in favor of peace. The goal of the General Staff was not to prevent the war, which they considered inevitable, but, on the contrary, to win the war. But the chances of winning became even stronger.

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the more sudden an attack is, the less time is left for the enemy to gather his forces.

"As early as July 29," continues Kautsky, "there is evidence of interference in the politics of the German General Staff. On that day, the General Staff sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a report not about the military, but about the political situation: it was not the business of the Staff to explain it to the Reich Chancellor.

This document should attract our close attention.

The document is entitled: "Toward an assessment of the political situation" and is dated 28 July; it was apparently composed by Moltke in the evening of that date and sent to the Canpler the next day.

"It is indisputable that any state of Europe," Moltke begins his report, "would have treated the conflict between Austria and Serbia not only as a purely human interest, if it had not been introduced into it the danger of a general political complication, which is already threatening world war. For more than five years, Serbia has been the cause of European complications, a heavy burden hanging over the political and economic life of peoples. With a patience bordering on weakness, Austria has up to the present endured constant provocations aimed at the political undermining of its state stability on the part of a people who have gone from paricide in their own country to paricide among their neighbors. It was only after the last nightmarish crime that Austria resorted to the last resort to burn out with a red-hot iron the abscess that threatened to poison the body of Europe forever. It was to be expected that all of Europe would be grateful to her for this. All Europe would breathe a sigh of relief if the violator of her peace were properly punished and thus calm and order were restored in the Balkans. But Russia took the side of the criminal country. Just in view of this, the Austro-Serbian conflict has turned into a thundercloud that threatens to burst over Europe every minute.

Austria declared to the European cabinets that she was not pursuing territorial acquisitions at the expense of Serbia, much less infringing on the independence of this state, but was striving only to force the restless neighbor to accept conditions that would ensure a joint future life, and that Serbia, as experience shows, fulfilled the solemn assurances given by her.

The Austro-Serbian conflict is purely local, in which, one might say, no one in Europe is interested and which would by no means be a threat.

sting the world in Europe if Russia had not intervened. This is a circumstance, and gave it a sharpened character.

Austria mobilized against Serbia only part of its armed forces - eight corps. Forces: — Sufficient for carrying out a punitive expedition. On the contrary, Russia has taken all preparatory measures to mobilize in the shortest possible time the corps of the military districts of Kiev, Odessa and Moscow, twelve corps in total, and is extending these measures also to the north, on the German frontier and in the Baltic Sea. Russia has announced that it will mobilize if Austria invades Serbia, as it cannot afford to be defeated

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Serbian by Austria, although the latter announced that she did not think so.

"What should be the consequences?" asks the Chief of the German General Staff.

"Austria is confronted with the Fact, when invading Serbia, to take into account not only the Serbian army, but also the Russian one, and thus it is not in a position to wage a war against Serbia without securing itself against a Russian attack. In other words, it is compelled to mobilize the other half of its armed forces as well, because it is impossible to take advantage of this or that mood of Russia, which is ready for war. From the moment when Austria announces general mobilization, an armed clash between her and Russia will become inevitable. However, this represents *sazaz goefetiv* for Germany. Only a miracle could have prevented war. If Germany does not wish to break her word and allow her ally to be crushed by the Russians, then, for her part, she must also mobilize. This will lead to the mobilization of the rest of Russia's military districts. In this case, Russia will declare that it has been attacked by Germany and thereby achieve the support of France, . which is bound by treaty to take part in the war if its ally, Russia, is attacked. Thus, a purely defensive alliance, as the Franco-Russian agreement, which was concluded with the aim of counteracting the offensive plans of Germany, is regarded. brings discord among the European civilized states.

There is no doubt that the situation is very successfully staged by Russia. With Russia's continuing assurances that it is not yet "mobilizing", but has only taken measures "just in case", that it "has not yet called up a single reservist", it has increased its combat readiness to such an extent that, if indeed mobilization is announced, then in a few days it can be ready for the offensive. Thus, Austria is placed in a difficult position, and responsibility for the war falls on her, while Austria herself is forced to protect herself from Russia. The latter will say: "You are Austria, mobilized against us, you. want to fight © us.

Russia assures that she does not want to do anything against Germany, but it is quite clear that Germany cannot remain neutral when her ally clashes with Russia. Germany will be forced to mobilize, and again Russia will declare to the whole world: "I did not want war, but Germany caused it." Such must be the course of events, unless a miracle happens to prevent at the last moment a war that will shatter the culture of almost all of Europe for decades.

Germany does not wish to cause this terrible war. However, the German government knows that if it did not want to come to the aid of its ally at the moment when his fate is being decided, then this would fatally violate the deeply rooted feelings of allied loyalty, one of the most beautiful features of the German soul - and therefore would go against all the feelings of his people.

Francia is also reportedly making preparations for a possible mobilization. It is clear that Russia and France go hand in hand in their activities.

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Consequently, Germany, if a clash between Austria and Russia becomes inevitable, will mobilize and be ready to take on two fronts. For the military measures proposed by the Pami, if necessary, it is extremely important to find out as soon as possible exactly whether Russia and France intend to go to war with Germany. The sooner the preparations of our neighbors move forward, the sooner they will be able to complete their mobilizations. The martial law becomes from day to day more and more unfavorable because of this and can lead us to fatal consequences if our supposed opponents continue to prepare in complete calm.

"Pay attention to that tone!" writes Kautsky in his book World War II.

"The General Staff by no means informs the government," he continues, "of all preparations for mobilization in the event that the government issues a corresponding order, but op, without hesitation, commands: Germany will mobilize as soon as a clash between Austria and Russia becomes inevitable. . At the same time, he declares with the same categoricalness that this clash can only be averted by a miracle."

"However, mobilization, according to the principles of the German General Staff, means war. Consequently, the General Staff is already proclaiming a war "on two Fronts" and is demanding an early attack, since "the military situation is becoming more and more unfavorable for us from day to day."

"Such is the meaning," concludes Kautsky, "of this appeal of the General Staff to the Reichskapiller: in it, the highest military instation claims to take into their own hands the right to decide foreign policy and lead to a military phase connection precisely at the moment when civil power is beginning to yield, to concede and take at least one small step towards MPR.

Kautsky thinks that "it was not the business of the headquarters to explain it [the political situation] to the Reichsgentler, after all."

We have cited Moltke's exposition in the original, since this document serves as a great argument for the opponents of the General Staff. We will not yet make a final judgment as to whether the Chief of the General Staff had the right to present such a document to the Chancellor. It is important for us that Moltke saw the salvation from armed clashes in one thing - in a miracle, abruptly changing his recent optimism to gloomy pictures of the destruction of European culture. It is known that miracles are the work of hands

human, but for the mystic in the general staff muphir, who was the nephew of the "great" uncle, there was only one way out - in Nicholas the Wonderworker.

Thus, we must state that on the evening of July 28, the German General Staff no longer saw ways that could lead to a peaceful outcome of the outbreak of conflict. For him, it was only important to establish whether Russia and France wanted war, an indication of which should be the announcement of a general mobilization by these states or by one of them. Moltke's picture of events is by no means a prophecy, it is quite natural. We know from what he said that Moltke firmly believed in the coming world war; that the alliance << with Austria he considered inviolable; that the pachalpic of the headquarters was waiting for a collision

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the relationship between the Slavs and Germanism and cared about only one thing—shifting the responsibility for this onto the enemy. But now it was a turn, and, it must be said, this upset Moltke.

Being out of work, in November 1914, the former chief of the general staff reminisced about the days that had just passed and left us a documentary record of his thoughts. We will not dwell on them in detail, but only note the more essential. Moltke says that the European war has long hung like a sword of Damocles and was by no means unexpected. It was obvious that the Entente struggle was coming as a triple alliance. The situation for the middle powers was not favorable: Italy violated her allied word by setting an example unheard of in history. There was much likelihood that Angliel would oppose Germany, and it was a great mistake for the Berlin cabinet to harbor hopes for the petrachity of that state.

In a word, it was necessary to prepare for the war and diplomatically. "The highest art of diplomacy," writes Moltke, "in my opinion, 'is not to keep the peace under any circumstances, but to ensure that the political situation for the state is such that it could go to war under favorable circumstances. . This is the merit of Bismarck. The German General Staff and the Military Ministry were fully aware of this and in 1912 made a proposal to strengthen the army. |

Considering that Germany was obligated to support Austria, the Chief of Staff comes to the conclusion that a world war is necessary in historical development, before the law of which states are mere individuals. Further developing the theory of the "cultural mission" of the German people in history, Moltke comes to certain conclusions that Germany, having entered the war, is fulfilling her cultural task. Further development of culture is possible only through Germany, which did not want war and is not looking for any conquests in it. The war is imposed on Germany, which is fighting for its national existence. Imbued with such lofty ideas, the German people are invincible.

Of course, today it may be funny to read such babble, but it is typical for the construction of the leader of the German General Lotab, who, according to YoVautsky, set the tone for Berlin's foreign policy as well.

We do not dwell on Moltke's evidence of all the loyalty of the Danubian ally: in conflict, because, it seems to us, that he himself is in

he did not believe it, but wrote only in order not to tell everyone the already known truth. Or rather, he lied to himself.

According to him, the situation worsened every day. The Minister of War urged the Chancellor to declare a situation "threatening war", but Bethmann rejected this, and even Moltke found it sufficient to confine himself to the military protection of the most important installations on the railways. Even Wilhelm did not heed the report of the Minister of War, and Falkenstein notes in his diary that on this day the Kaiser is still striving for peace. Falkenhain thinks that if Moltke had been more insistent, already on the 29th a "war situation" would have been declared, which would automatically

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would have ruled out all the various mobilization measures, which, of course, were difficult to keep secret.

On the evening of July 29, the chancellor held a conference with Moltke, Jagow and Falkengine on the topic that it is not necessary to chi, in the event that Russia announces a private mobilization of the four districts, Germany should also mobilize. This. the proposal, according to Falkepgain, met with a "restrained", "very restrained" (underlined twice in the diary of the Minister of War) objection: the chief of the general staff, because he believed that, in view of Sazopov's statement to Nurtales, that Russia's announcement of mobilization does not yet mean war, the moment has not yet come for the fulfillment of allied obligations. regarding Austria. However, one had to be prepared for this, but be careful not to arouse Apglia's public opinion against oneself. According to Kappler, it was by no means necessary to take the lead in the war, as this would push England into the camp of enemies. Falkenhayn was skeptical about the position of the islands, and the statements of Sazonov and Sukhomlinov, known to us, considered "a direct lie." "I, however," writes Falkegain, "did not object to the chancellor, because the direction of politics was not part of my duties, and I could not give advice until military interests were significantly affected. So far, there was no reason to talk about mobilization just because she was two or three days late. against the Austrian and Russian, since it could be carried out faster than the latter. If a decision had to be made, then so be it. declare today a situation "threatening war."

Thus, the description of events introduces a rather serious correction into Kautsky's reasoning about the role of the General Staff in Berlin. The latter was so far "restrained", "very restrained" with the — announcement of mobilization, but rather the Minister of War hastened the adoption of preliminary measures, the implementation of which, in essence, meant war. It's quite understandable. for mobilization was in the hands of the Ministry of War, which it was desirable to carry out a number of measures that would facilitate the transition of the army to. martial law.

However, already on that day, July 29, we can note that from the war. with Russia and France in Berlin they did not refuse, and the whole question boiled down: only to keep England and not give reason to consider Germany. the culprit of the European war.

The chief of the German General Staff hesitated: on the one hand ... the desire to relieve himself of responsibility for the war made him wait, and on the other hand, military assumptions required a quick decision on mobilization

stationing, concentrating and transferring the war to the territory of the opposite peak. History: wars of the State Archives says that a quick clarification of the situation was necessary to capture Luxembourg, where, according to the plan, it should be. the landing of the German troops, and then n in order to give no opportunity. the Russians to warn Germany to mobilize. Moltke himself, in his memoirs, confirms the view firmly established in the General Staff. on the need to transfer the war to enemy territory as soon as possible.

Thus, on July 29, the demands of the policy were taken into account by the General Staff, however, as long as they did not threaten military interests.

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From Izvolsky's reports cited above, we already know that the "firm situation" continued in Paris that day. "As for solidarity with us," the ambassador wrote, "this issue is not even subject to detailed discussions, as it is completely obvious. All journalists express themselves in this sense, [including such great personalities of the most diverse parties as Pichon, Clemenceau and even Jaurès, and the initiator of 'anti-militarism, Gerve'.

On this day, "Noah's ark" - "Egapse" - landed Poincaré and Viviani, who were met by the Minister of War with demonstrations befitting like Flucii, the assembled crowd of "sympathizers", according to Izvolsky's definition.

After an orientation on current events, a council of ministers was convened, as a result of which Viviani telegraphed to London about the desirability of England's prompt proposal for mediation in Berlin, which was to be supported in London and by the Russian government.

At 51/5 o'clock in the afternoon, Shen appeared at Viviapi's to inquire about the military precautions being taken by the Republic, indicating, for his part, that Germany, too, would be forced to take such measures. The French minister replied that "Frapia sincerely desires peace, but at the same time she has decided to act in complete unity with her allies and friends", and that he, Baron Shen, "could make sure that this determination meets the liveliest sympathy of the country.

Prior to this conversation, however, at 1 pm a radiotelegram about the organization of reconnaissance was transmitted to the border fortresses; then the fortresses and frontier corps were instructed to post military guards to military establishments and fortifications; organized air defense; an order was given to all avant-garde units to begin carrying out the engineering work envisaged by the war plan.

If we recall, after the meeting of Sazonov, Sukhomlinov and Yanushkevich, towards evening the following telegram was sent to Paris: "The German chtsol told me today about the decision of his government to mobilize its forces if Russia does not stop its military preparations. Meanwhile, we began to accept them only as a result of the mobilization of eight corps in Austria that had already taken place and the obvious unwillingness of the latter to agree to any way of peaceful settlement of its dispute with Serbia. Since we cannot fulfill the desires of Germany, all that remains for us is to speed up our armaments and reckon with the probable inevitability of war. Kindly warn the French

government and at the same time express our sincere gratitude to him for the statement made to me on his behalf by the French Ambassador that we can fully count on the allied support of France. Under the current circumstances, this statement is of particular value to us. It would be highly desirable that England, without wasting time, join France and Russia, since only in this way will she be able to prevent a dangerous violation of the European balance.

"Having received a telegram to my mouth (Sazonov - B. Sh.), I," writes Izvolsky, "immediately, i.e. at 3 o'clock (at night), reported its contents to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Count Ignatiev, on my instructions, did the same in general -

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to the Minister of War. At the Elysee Palace, a meeting immediately took place between the President of the Republic, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Messimy (Minister of War - B.Sh.), at the end of which a telegram was sent to Paleokhogu approximately as follows ... Later Izvolsky transmits the text telegram, which stated that "the government of France is ready to fulfill all the obligations imposed by the union," but what. "At the moment, when negotiations are underway between the less interested Powers, the situation requires that measures be taken to protect! and caution, Russia did not do anything that could serve as a pretext for Germany to the full or partial mobilization of her forces. At the same time, Izvolsky reported that the French Ambassador in M Lopdon, along with the message of this telegram, was ordered to immediately talk to Gray. "meaning the definition of a common line of conduct, along which France and England, by virtue of the agreement existing between them, will have to act when the moment of tension comes."

So the diplomats on the banks of the Seine did not have to close their eyes either.

As for the islands, Gray, as we know, began to speak seriously to Likhnovsky. The English ambassador in Paris on that day Recorded in his diary: "Today's information is less favorable ... than yesterday ... The Russian, French and Italian governments declared, . that only we, we alone, can prevent the war, namely, if we declare support for Russia and France, then! Germany will immediately put pressure on Austria.

Already from the way Wilhelm reacted to the Lichnowsky report, it is clear that the hopes of London to shake Berlin in its position were useless..

In a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, Gray insisted that if Esai Vienna would not make concessions, then it would be difficult to prevent a European one. war. "Grey was pessimistic," the ambassador reported. "Segodia, Petersburg is still talking to Berlin, but what will happen tomorrow?" Gray said. Grey's closest aide, Tyrell, was more specific, stating that "if the essential interests of France are affected. or her independence, then no English government will be able to prevent England from taking the side of France.

And indeed, on the same day, July 29, Churchill received from the Cabinet the authority to declare a "state of war" for the Navy, with everyone. the ensuing consequences.



30 JULY

All our previous narrative began with a description of the events that took place in Vienna, since there was the root of everything. But now. the center of gravity of the question of peace and war shifted from Vienna to Petersburg and Berlin. Vienna .... did its job. Russian imperialism appeared on the scene, having decided to stop its firm position in the conflict and not to give up its positions under the threat of Berlin.

As stated above, on the night of July 30, Sazonov, upset by the cancellation of the general mobilization by order from Peterhof, spent in conversations with the German ambassador, passing him the Formula, the adoption of which by Germany could ensure a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

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Purtazles transfers his last conversation with Sazonov in his memoirs to the morning of July 30th. It must be said that the participants in the beginning of the world war get confused in dates, sometimes intentionally, and sometimes simply due to weakness of memory, considering that such, indeed, quite often. changed them. According to the German ambassador, having accepted the Russian minister's written formulation, he expressed doubt that it would hardly be accepted by Austria, but still Pourtales gave the impression that "it did not contain a demand for the immediate termination of the EU by Austria-Hungary." - military expedition against Serbia. "When I was transmitting the Sazonov Formula," writes Pourtales, "by telegram to Berlin, I drew attention to this point." In other words, the situation was not yet unacceptable to the dates of Berlin.

But Sazonov himself did not think so, The Day Record says: "At ten o'clock in the morning the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke on the telephone with the Minister of Agriculture, and both were very alarmed by the subsequent cancellation of the general mobilization, fully aware that this decision threatened to put Russia in an extremely dangerous situation in the event of an aggravation of relations with Germany. S. D. Sazonov advised A. V. Krivoshein to ask for a reception from the sovereign in order to convey to his vekhlichestvo the fears caused by the aforementioned cancellation.

Sazonov's anxiety made him rush to the General Staff.

"At about 11 o'clock in the morning, the Minister of Foreign Affairs again met with the Minister of War at the Chief of the General Staff," says Podennov.  
zappy."

Sukhomlinov is completely silent about this meeting. He's writing: "On the morning of July 17/30, I asked permission to come with a report to His Majesty, but received no answer. Was the sovereign so busy that at such a critical moment he could not receive the minister of war with a report?

Danilov refers this meeting to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, which we will talk about a little later; it is completely incomprehensible to us how a former quartermaster general can confuse morning with afternoon.

Let us turn to the description of the events given by the Daily Record. It reads: "The news received during the night further strengthened everyone's conviction (everyone — the military and foreign ministers and the chief of the general

ral headquarters - B. Sh.) about the urgent need, without wasting time, to prepare for a serious war. Accordingly, the ministers and the chief. headquarters, as before, adhered to the opinion expressed by them the day before, about the need to resort to general mobilization. Adjutant General Sukhomlinov and General Yanushkevich again tried to convince the sovereign by telephone to return to yesterday's decision and allow him to proceed with general mobilization. His Majesty vehemently rejected this request, and finally briefly announced that he was ending the conversation. General Yanushkevich, who at that moment was holding a telephone receiver in his hands, only had time to report that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was right there in his office and asked permission to say a few words to the sovereign. There was some silence, after which the sovereign agreed to listen to the minister. SD Sazonov asked His Majesty to receive him on the same day for an urgent report on the general political situation. After a pause, Mrs.

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Dar asked: "Does it matter to you if I receive you at the same time as Tatishchev at 3 o'clock, since I don't have a single minute of free time today?" The minister thanked the sovereign and said that he would arrive at the indicated hour.

"Chief of Staff," continues Podennaya Zapiska, "fervently imploring S. D. Sazonov by all means to convince the sovereign to agree to a general mobilization in view of the extreme danger for us to be unprepared for war < Hermapia, if circumstances required us to make a decision measures after the success of the general mobilization would be compromised by the preliminary production of the partial mobilization. General Yanushkevich asked the minister that, if he succeeded in persuading the sovereign, he would immediately report this to him, Yanushkevich, by telephone in order to take immediate appropriate measures, since it would be necessary, first of all, as soon as possible, to turn the already begun partial mobilization into general and replace the orders already sent out with new ones. "After that," Yanushkevich said, "I'll leave, break my phone, and generally take all measures so that I can't be found in any way to give opposite orders in the sense of a new cancellation of the general 'mobilization'."

"On his return to the ministry, S. D. Sazonov had a meeting with Fran-. puzsky ambassador.

Such is the history of the meeting at the General Staff as presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That it is close to the truth is confirmed by the testimony of Dobrorolsky. It is quite understandable that Yanushkevich was worried about the quick release of new orders on general mobilization, and therefore Dobrorolsky says: "On the morning of July 17 (30 B.S.), at about 11 o'clock, General Yanushkevich called me by telephon and said: "There are hope for a rectification of the situation, be ready to come to me with all documents, immediately on my call, in the afternoon.

Dobrorolsky explains: "Yanushkevich persuaded Sazonov to present the sovereign with all the danger politically, in the sense of violating allied obligations to France, the production of private mobilization, which will allow Wilhelm to wrest consent to neutrality from the French government, and when we get stuck with our private mobilization, he will declare war on us and use our unpreparedness in an extremely beneficial way "for himself." Apparently, these arguments were communicated by the chief

Dobrorolsky's headquarters also by telephon.

As is clear from Dobrorolsky's testimony, his speaking time completely coincides with that noted in the Day Record.

Therefore, Danikhov's story about the meeting of two ministers and the chief of staff, which took place at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, is strange. We would not have stopped at this narrative if it had not been very characteristic of the events taking place at that time.

"About 3 pm on July 30," writes Danilov, "an emergency meeting was convened in the General Staff building, in which the Minister of War, General Sukhomlinov, Minister of Foreign Affairs S. D. Sazonov, and Chief of the General Staff, General Yanushkevich, took part. During the meeting, which did not last long, I had the opportunity to

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and about and iaainnia to talk in detail with N. A. Bazili, being in the next room. I unfolded in detail before my interlocutor, who enjoyed great personal confidence in S. D. Sazonov, a picture of the dire consequences that could be created as a result of the private mobilization that was being carried out, at the same time I pointed out to him that there was still time to move on to general mobilization relatively painlessly. . But decisions must be made quickly, if possible not later than tomorrow, otherwise private mobilization will go full speed ahead, and the transition from it to general mobilization may lead to great confusion. It seemed to me that, as a result of our conversation, N. A. Bazili was imbued with my arguments.

I did not know the decisions reached by the conference; the participants silently and concentratedly dispersed without sharing their impressions. But already in the evening of July 30, undoubtedly in connection with all the newly received data, a new, and this time final, highest order was issued to carry out a general mobilization of all the armed forces of the empire. The beginning of this mobilization was fixed at midnight on July 31st.

From this story, we are interested in the behind-the-scenes side, the work of "intimate" circles. The representative of the General Staff inspired the idea of the need for general mobilization to one of the members of the "intimate" circle of Sazonov, N. A. Bazili, who was "imbued with arguments." Apparently, Dapphlov was not privy to the fact that Sazonov, who had absolutely no need for "arguments," and the usefulness of this military measure, was primarily concerned about the end of the general mobilization.

Danilov attributes the announcement of the general mobilization to "newly obtained data", but we will listen to evidence 06 of this Daily Record.

This document introduces us again to the "intimate" story, and even with a "separate office".

About 12 noon Krivosheyn. informed Sazonov that Petergokh had refused to receive him and that he wanted to see Sazonov even before he left for Petergokh. "It was decided to have breakfast together at Donon's (a fashionable restaurant - B. TsG.), where at 121 o'clock, in a private office, Krivosheyn and Sazonov met together with Baron Shikhling."

"The mood was rather subdued," says Zapis, "and the conversation almost exclusively concerned the need to insist on an early

general mobilization in view of the inevitability of war with Germany, which is becoming more and more clear to everyone. Krivoshein expressed the hope that S. D. Sazonov would be able to convince the sovereign, because, otherwise, according to him, we would go to a sure disaster.

At 2 o'clock the minister, together with Tatishchev, left for Peterhof, where they were immediately received by Nikolai.

"For almost a whole hour," says Zapis, "the minister argued that the war had become inevitable, since everything shows that Germany decided to bring things to a collision ... In this situation, it remains only to do everything that is necessary in order to meet the war fully armed and in the most advantageous situation for us. Therefore it is better, without fear of causing war by our preparations for it, to carefully attend to

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ii Bob iiiinni last, rather than for fear of giving a casus belli to being taken by surprise."

However, these arguments were not convincing for Nikolai, who, according to Zapiska, "I clearly understood" that the general mobilization "could speed up. denouement in an undesirable sense. The document tells us about "that extraordinary irritability" with which Nikolai spoke to his slanderers, declaring to them "sharply": "I will decide."

"Finally," continues the Podepnaya Record, "the sovereign agreed that under the current circumstances it would be most dangerous not to prepare in time for the apparently inevitable war, and therefore gave his permission to proceed immediately to general mobilization."

"Sazonov asked the highest permission to immediately transfer 06. this by telephone to the chief of the general staff and, having received such, hurried to the lower floor of the palace to the telephon. Having conveyed the highest order to General Yanushkevich, who had been waiting impatiently for it, the minister, referring to the morning conversation, added: "Now you can break the telephone."

It remains a mystery whether the Chief of Staff punched the phone with the intent to break it. But for us it is not interesting.

According to our calculations, Nikolai agreed to the announcement of mobilization. given about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. M. Pokrovsky in the preface to Kautsky's book. believes that "Sazonov persuaded Nikolai © two to three." We must make an amendment here, but instead: "Daytime Record" says that Sazonov went to Peterhof at 9 o'clock in the afternoon, to which it was necessary to drive 40 minutes and thus, in our opinion, Sazonov persuaded Nikolai from three "to four o'clock in the afternoon . Buchanan, describing this day, also confuses the dates, reporting that Sazonov's visit to Peterhof took place "on the morning of the 30th", after the minister's arguments, according to the English ambassador, "at 4 o'clock on the same day, his majesty ordered that the necessary orders be transmitted to the military minister phone." It turns out that it was as if Sazonov had been persuading Nikolai all day long, which clearly could not be; but that the date of the decision of the general mobilization - 4 p.m. - is close to the truth, there is no doubt about this.

Meanwhile, Dobrorolsky ascribes this to a much more recent period, when Sazonov "in a depressed mood" was having breakfast "in a separate office."

"About 1 o'clock in the afternoon," writes the former head of the mobilization department,

Sazonov calls Yanushkevich on the phone and says that the sovereign called for morals, in connection with the latest information from Berlin, to announce a general mobilization of the entire army and fleet. "Apot\$, {aEs y0\$ og4ez, pop sbobga] her enzi{e... 415para155e2 poig (still Pa Jopgpse. (So, give your orders, general, and then...: disappear for the whole day)" "Yanushkevich immediately after this," Dobrorolsky continues, "summoned me to his place and initiated me into this conversation."

We cited the testimonies of three participants, and all three witnesses disagree on the definition of time: either the clock cannon from the Peter and Paul Fortress stopped firing and the chronometers of diplomats and the general headquarters began to show the same time, or ... - the thought involuntarily creeps in, - did not give Did Sazonov give Yanushkevich permission to carry out the general mobilization even from the restaurant? It must be said that the latest version would be

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received with great pleasure in Berlin, if it had under it base.

Former Russian Minister of War Sukhomlinov, who largely used Dobrorolsky's article on Russian mobilization in his memoirs, writes: "Between one and two in the afternoon, General Yanushkevich reported to me by telehop that Sazonov had given him the highest order to announce a general mobilization of the Army and Navy ". Sukhomlppov explains that "such a decision followed as a result of the latest information received from Berlin." "Yanushkevich reported to Mpa about this no later than 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and a telegram could have been received from our ambassador Sverbeev on the evening of July 17/30."

Let us leave for the time being the treatment of the question of the "information received from Berlin" which served as a pretext for the announcement of mobilization, and let us follow Dobrolsky, who was obliged to put the order into effect. about mobilization.

"It was necessary," he writes, "to visit three ministers again to sign a telegram establishing the beginning of the general mobilization on July 18th. Yesterday's telegram was, of course, not valid.

"At that time, an emergency meeting of the council of bishops was taking place in the Mariinsky Palace, chaired by Goremykin. 'Yapushkevich was also heading there. He invited me to go with him and, since all the ministers were there, during the break of the meeting, it was possible to immediately obtain the necessary signatures. And so it was done. The telegram was ready. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, I took her on telegrams ...

At 6 p.m. all the Apparatus were ready to receive the mobplification telegram. I entered the hall. Some kind of solemn silence wafted from the telegraphers and telegraphers ...

At 6 o'clock and a few minutes in the evening, in the midst of the complete silence of the control room, the telegraph machines immediately began to rumble ... This was the initial moment of a great era ...

If we count according to the Daily Record that Yanushkevich received the order at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, then until 5 o'clock in the afternoon, i.e. in an hour, of course, Dobrorolsky could assemble the subdivisions of three ministers under the circumstances in which this took place. Thus, Dobrorolsky's testimony does not refute

dates of the time of the Daily Record.

So, at "6 hours and a few minutes of the evening" the general mobilization of the Russian army was announced, with the clear consciousness of all those giving and transmitting this order that he would inevitably lead the war. 6 Peterdureya went to her.

According to the testimonies of all participants, Nikolai Romanov was prompted to give the order for general mobilization by the latest information received from Berlin. It is interesting to establish the essence of this information.

In his telegram dated July 30, Nicholas addressed Wilhelm "as an intermediary in order to preserve peace." There was no reply to the telegram until 2 o'clock in the afternoon. From the night of July 30 until the evening, that is, when the decision to mobilize had already been made, the German ambassador did not see Sazonov. According to Pourtales, the German general Khslus, who was under Nicholas, sent a report "in the afternoon" in which he noted "the mood

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unconditionally peaceful" "in club circles". The general wrote: "There is hope for an agreement between Germany and Russia... As regards mobilization, the higher ohiders said in the club that, bearing in mind the vast distances, there was no way to delay it. Moreover, in Russia it is still very far from the beginning of mobilization to the beginning of the war; therefore, there is always time for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. "In the same way," Pourtales writes, "General Von Helius reported on his telegram that, with the exception of some demonstrations, everything is calm in Petersburg."

Telegram number 142 from the Russian ambassador in Berlin, announcing that "an order has just been given to mobilize the German armies and fleet", according to the "Record" was sent from Berlin at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and could only be received at about no. According to Pokrovsky, she came "only at 4 o'clock". Sukhomlinov points out that this information was received on the evening of July 17/30. Thus, it is possible that at the end of Sazopov's report, Nikolai Roth had a telegram already in Peterhof, solving the doubts of Nikolai Romanov. But this remains only a guess, because if the telegram went from Berlin to St. Petersburg for 2 hours, then, according to Fokrovsky, "when the telegram arrived from Berlin, the telegrams about the mobilization of the Zetels were already in Russia."

The Day Record notes the dates of telegrams glorified by Sverbeev with a refutation of the news of mobilization in Berlin "3 hours 10 minutes, 3 hours 15 minutes", and it is characteristic that on all these three telegrams under the dates put in pencil: "2 hours 30 minutes", "2 hours 40 minutes" and "9 hours 45 minutes" - so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to expedite the departure, and consequently, the receipt of documents in St. Petersburg.

The explanation of this whole "mystery" is given in his book by Danilov, who writes:

"The next day, July 30, brought very disturbing news, which gave the impression of a bombshell: at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, an emergency leaflet of the official GoKalapsescheg was issued in Berlin announcing the announcement of mobilization in Germany. Markov, correspondent of the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency in Burlip, immediately telegraphed to his agency in St. Petersburg, and the agency urgently transmitted this message of great importance to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs by telegram. Somewhat later, the content of this "mar-

Kovskaya" telegram, as it was later called, was confirmed by a telegram from our ambassador in Berlin, Sverbeev."

It can be assumed that at the report Sazonov was operating with THIS "Markovian" tech-gram, frightening Nikolai Romapov with the threat of the fall of Germany. It was shameful, of course, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to include in Podennaya Zapps the receipt of the "Markov" news, and therefore it modestly kept silent about its excitement at the "exploded bomb" - the "Markov" duck. It is possible that at the end of the report the "newspaper duck" was confirmed by another "diplomatic duck", but one way or another, the mood of anxiety in St. Petersburg parastallo and finally resulted in a decision on general mobilization.

So, the decision on general mobilization, after an hour's effort, Sazonov was wrested from the dynastic line, and after 11/ hours, i.e. at 5:00

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aaa 50 minutes in the afternoon, Wilhelm's telegram was received in St. Petersburg, filed at 3 hours 52 minutes in the afternoon. In the telegram, Wilhelm thanked for the election as a mediator; she clarified misunderstandings with Pourtales, who was instructed to draw the attention of the Russian government "to the danger and serious consequences that mobilization may entail"; the telegram said that in the mobilization of Russia against Austria, "acting as an intermediary" "would be more difficult, if not impossible." "The question of adopting this or that decision," the telegram ended thus, "now rests with all its weight solely on you, and you bear the responsibility for war or peace."

The end of the telegram gave a Formulation which was highly desirable both to Kappler and to Moltke.

But such a burden of responsibility no longer embarrassed the stubborn Nikolai, although, according to Zapisp, "at the same time, the sovereign still hoped to find a way to prevent the general mobilization from being an irrevocable pretext for war." "For this purpose, the sovereign, on the same day, in a telegram to Emperor Wilhelm regarding the decision made, solemnly gave his word that, despite the significant mobilization" ... (the phrase is not finished in the footer). This "word" consisted in a telegram sent to Berlin, however, on the next day, and not on July 50, in which, after gratitude that the mediation "gives hope for a peaceful outcome of the crisis", it read: "Under technical conditions, it is impossible to suspend our military preparations which were an inevitable consequence of Austria's mobilization. We are far from desiring war. Shock will continue negotiations with Austria on the Serbian question, my troops will not take any defiant action. I give you my word on this."

The last Romanov did not think of retreating before "Willy", the decision on general mobilization cut off further paths to this.

During the day, the German ambassador received from Berlin copies of Nikolai's telegrams, as well as two telegrams from the cannibal with the following statement: "our intermediary role continues, but the condition for us to preserve it is Russia's refraining from any kind of hostile actions at the present time."

"By evening I visited Sazonov," writes Pourtales, "in order to inform him of the contents of both telegrams." Sazonov promised not to open hostile

action against the Austrians. "However," the ambassador adds, "the day did not lead to any change in the point of view adopted by Mr. Sazonov." The Minister pointed to the mobilization of the German fleet, which the ambassador immediately refuted. During the night, Pourtales received a telegram from Yagov about the need to vigorously refute the information about the mobilization of the Fleet. The next important piece of news was a copy of a telegram from the German ambassador in Vienna, in which Berchtold reported that the Austrian ambassador in Petersburg was instructed to enter into negotiations with Sazonov. Sapari's instructions stated: "If the Russian government considers it necessary to discuss the mobilization of eight corps, as an event that militarily goes too far beyond the needs of a campaign against Serbia, then Sapari has an order to declare that if Sazonov, on his own

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For some reason, this question will touch upon that such a military contingent, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian military command, corresponds to the strength of the Serbian army, numbering four hundred thousand people in its ranks. Later, Berchtold's conversation with Shebeko was reported, to which the minister pointed out the above, and Austria's territorial disinterest in the conflict was also confirmed.

Sazonov informed the Russian ambassador at Burlip of the written condition handed over to Pourtales, according to which Russia agreed not to interfere in the conflict, and which you quoted above. By the end of the day, the ambassador reported that Jagow had found the conditions unacceptable to Austria.

Thus, Sazonov took a firm stand against Germany and Austria, deciding that war was unavoidable.

We know that already on the night of July 30, the French government was agitated by Sazonov's telegram, in which he pointed out the need for Russia "to take into account the probable inevitability of war."

On the morning of July 30, Izvolsky telegraphed to St. Petersburg: "The French government, henceforth not wanting to interfere in our military preparations, would consider it extremely undesirable, in view of ongoing negotiations with the aim of maintaining peace, so that these preparations would be as less open and provocative as possible. . For his part, the Minister of War, developing the same idea, expressed to Count Igpatiev that we could declare that in the highest interests of the world we agree to temporarily slow down mobilization measures, which would not prevent us from continuing and even getting ahead of military preparations, abstaining, according to opportunities, from mass troop movements."

These were the directives of the Union peak, but they were already too late - the order for general mobilization was being prepared for posting on the streets of St. Petersburg.

From now on, the war with Germany and Austria, which was considered inevitable in Russia, was put into practice as a Fact. This opinion was common both for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for the General Staff. "The tsarist general staff," writes Pokrovsky, "thus, was not alone in the summer of 1914. He had a reliable ally in the tsarist foreign ministry. All of them, of course, are not the "culprits", but simple tools of a mighty objective sect called imperialism. But sometimes it is useful to take a closer look at how and by what means this force operates.



In Bucharest that day, Sazonov again telegraphed that for the participation of Romania in the war against Austria, "we are ready to support the annexation of Transylvania to Romania."

Now let's move on to Berlin, where also the barometer showed more and more increasing pressure, ready to break out into a military storm.

As a conclusion for the day of July 29, it can be established that in Berlin it was decided not to offend Austria, giving her the opportunity of a military expedition to Serbia to satisfy the honor of the Danubian Empire and its army. As a last resort, Germany was ready to go to war with Francis and Russia, but England had to be kept from intervening. Thus, all previous statements by German diplomacy in St. Petersburg that Berlin would remain neutral, as long as there was no Russian

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orilililo 00006 of the general mobilization, have now been replaced by direct. with an order not to touch Austria, which is allowed to beat Serbia a little.

The English warning, as we know, drove Vplhelm into a frenzy. Reading Pourtales' report from St. Petersburg on July 30, the Kaiser expressed full approval, and Wilhelm wrote lengthy arguments to Sazonov's statement that "the cancellation of the mobilization order is no longer possible, and the Austrian mobilization is to blame for this."

He accused Nikolai Romanov of "not feeling strong enough to stop the mobilization." Frivolity and weakness, wrote Wilhelm, must plunge the world into the most terrible war, with the aim, in the final analysis, of the death of Germany. Of this I have no doubt at all in the present time. England, Russia and France "were talking, taking as a basis saziz (oedegz in a hurry to Austria to lead a war of extermination against us."

Giving an assessment of Gray's "pipichpy" statements that Apglia would come forward if Germany and Austria intervened in the war, Wilhelm wrote; "This means that we must either meanly betray our ally and leave him to the mercy of Russia and, thereby, split the tripartite alliance, or fall from the side of the tripartite agreement for our allied loyalty... we are building a trap. Thus, the notorious "encirclement" of Germany has become an undeniable fact, despite all the attempts of our politicians and diplomats... Against her, we turned out to be powerless, while she (England - B. Sh.) makes us fight in nets isolated, twists our allied allegiance to Austria into a rope for our political and economic strangulation.

Then pouring out bile against Apglia, the Kaiser comes to the conclusion: "Now all these intrigues must be ruthlessly exposed, the mask of Christian peacefulness must be publicly torn off, and the Charisaic pretense must be pilloried. Our consuls in Turkey and lpdia, agents, etc. must kindle the flame of revolt among the Mohammedan world against this hated, deceitful and shameless people of merchants. If we are to bleed to death, then England must at least lose India."

Kautsky believes that Wilhelm at this moment "considers the war already decided", that "all this tangled idle talk testifies

Likhnovsky's talks with Gray gave some hope of retaining England, and therefore at 9 o'clock in the evening Bethmann telegraphed to the German ambassador in Vienna: "If Vepa refuses any concessions, especially Gray's last offer, then it is unlikely that possible

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pnnnnnninnnninnninanininininininini we want to put the blame for the emerging European conflagration on Russia." Speaking of the fact that Wilhelm could not refuse Nikolai's requests for mediation, "not wanting to arouse clear suspicion that we want war", the chancellor reports that in St. Petersburg and Paris "the question was raised in a friendly manner" about the suspension of military activities, Gray was asked to "strongly influence in the mouth sense in St. Petersburg and Paris, and consent to this was received." Bethman sees the "new plan" in the warnings of France and Russia only "by means of an ultimatum, which would mean war." "If England's efforts are crowned with success, and Vienna continues to persist, then she will prove by this that she is achieving the war at all costs, in which we are already involved, while Russia remains free from guilt. This creates an absolutely impossible position for us in the eyes of our own nation." Offering to speak with Berchtold and "perhaps with Count Tisza", Bethmann "strongly recommends" that Austria accept Grey's offer. Telegram registered under number 200.

The telegram was not sent, but was replaced by another, in which the cancellation of the instructions was explained by the receipt of news from England. Kautsky considers the first telegram more frank. "Apparently, they were afraid," he writes, "to allow such an influence of the general headquarters on external medicine. In the person of the General Staff, a new Factor now appears, which is becoming decisive in the outbreak of war."

This "new factor" also provided an orientation for Vienna. By evening, Konrad received the following conclusion from Moltke from the German General Staff intelligence bureau, the Austrian officer Fleischmann: "Russian mobilization is not yet a pretext for mobilization (German — B. Sh.); it will be only during the war of the monarchy with Russia. In contrast to the usual Russian mobilizations and demobilizations

German mobilization will invariably lead to war. We should not declare war on Russia, but we should wait for her attacks.

The Chief of the German General Staff, apparently, clearly assimilated the views of the Chancellor and so far acted in the spirit of his instructions. The expression that the Russian mobilization will not yet lead the German one must be understood as a decision not to respond to the private, but not the general, mobilization of Russia. —

To the Berliners, the situation still seemed hopeless, for England made concessions and agreed to teach the advice of moderation in Petersburg.

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As we have just heard, it was Austria that gave great grief, not wanting to mediate, but finally agreeing to continue the negotiations: in St. a copy of the telegram from the German ambassador from Vienna.

Now let us turn to the consideration of what the "new Factor" experienced and how it reacted to the events - the German General Staff - the battle line. |

As is already known, at one o'clock in the afternoon newspapers appeared in the streets of Burlip with the announcement of general mobilization by Germany. True, these sheets. began to fall out of use, but they, of course, did their job: they started talking about mobilization more and more loudly. The origin of these premature leaflets is not known: whether the hand of the military department was involved in their appearance or not, this remains a mystery for the time being. But to Yagov they brought some unpleasant mishaps, forcing him to dissuade the Russian ambassador of the accuracy of the information reported by the newspapers.

In his book on Falkengeipe, Zweil writes that July 30 passed in "empty negotiations", and the Minister of War was of the mind that the ongoing negotiations were useless, and the Chancellor's advisers were vainly falling for a miracle. Falkevgain believed that Germany's steps depended on the decision of Russia, information about which, meanwhile, is very scarce. Austria, in his opinion, is positively unbearable. Both Falkenhain and Moltke came to the definite conclusion that at the latest, at the next mid-day, a decision should be made to declare a "state of danger for war." On that day Moltke was already resolutely fighting for the war, which Falkenhayn noted in his diary.

The history of the war in the State Archives gives us the following description: of this day. |  
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The chief of the general staff had in his hands a telegram from the military attache from St. Petersburg about the announcement of private mobilization in Russia and about his conversations with Yanushkevich, and he regarded all this as an attempt to mislead Berlin about true intentions.

The reports from France spoke of ongoing military preparations, and by the evening of July 30, information was received about the guarding of the borders and the bringing of the covering troops and cavalry into combat readiness, as we have discussed above. "For Germany," notes History, "the situation became extremely threatening," and the danger increased. be late in mobilization, in comparison with potential opponents. It was necessary, at the very least, to declare a "war-threatening situation" ..

BUT "the chief of the general staff did not consider it possible to come up with this proposal, since it was necessary to wait for the results of the diplomatic steps taken." History notes that, for the sole purpose of preserving peace, the German government postponed the most urgent military measures: measures dictated by defense.

Such is the peaceableness of the "new factor"—the General Staff—in the view of military historians, whose assertions run counter to Kautsky's conclusions. One way or another, the Chancellor's unsent telegram to Wepu was the result of information received by Moltke on the evening of July 30 about the military preparations of the Francois. "Hurry Decisions", vol. ©. announced--

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The "war-threatening situation" of which Bethmann speaks in the telegram was obviously offered to Moltke, for from now on he was decidedly in favor of the war. The Chief of the German General Staff "pastoly" demanded to find out specifically "Austrian decisions, in particular those concerning a military nature."

Vienna aroused Berlin's hesitation in the most decisive days, both on political and military lines. What's the matter? Let's hurry to Vienna.

On the morning of July 30 in Vienna, the office of the chief of the general headquarters began to be visited by various people. (After a while, the Italian military officer brought a "cordial" letter from the new chief of the Italian general staff Cadorna in response to Conrad's regrets about the death of Polpo. Then Berchtold's official Goyos appeared with the message that Koprak should be ready to go today to Franz Joseph, where the conversation will be about the announcement of a general mobilization. Goyos informed Konrad of news from St. Petersburg, where the partial mobilization, according to Azopov, was caused by the mobilization of eight corps by Austria, at the foot."

Reports of Russian mobilization led Conrad to reflections. He saw one thing in Sazonov's statements: Russia is only looking for a pretext to show its aggressiveness. It is difficult, of course, for a state to be able to look calmly at how its strong neighbor stands with a ready army - "with a gun at his feet." "Every moment," Konrad thought, "one must be prepared for the gun to be "on the shoulder" and an attack to take place. For Austro-Hungarian diplomacy, this should not be a secret.

Grabbing the paper, the chief of the general staff immediately sketched out, just in case, a draft note of Rosspp, which read:

"Austria-Hungary has mobilized exclusively against Serbia and will not allow itself to be deterred from moving against her."

"Austria-Hungary did not mobilize anything against Russia, which is evidenced by the non-mobilized 1st, Xth and XT Corps (they were on the Russian border - B.Sh.)."

"Since the Russian mobilization is openly directed against us, we declare that we are compelled to immediately expand our mobilization, regardless of whether Russia attacks or threatens, because we need to provide for a Russian attack, which, it seems, is the real Russian mobilization and directed.

With this document, the chief of the general staff went to Berchtold and handed it to the latter. The Minister spoke of Sazonov's complaints that Vienna did not want to negotiate, that Berlin advised to continue them, damn! not to take responsibility for the war, about the favorable position of England. To all this, the chief of staff replied in the same way: Berchtold can negotiate with Russia as long as he wants, but operations against Serbia must not be delayed. Berchtold had doubts. "Will we survive in Finance?" he asked. The Stürgk thinks, the minister continued, that in addition to the war with Serbia, there will be a war with Russia, and then we will go bankrupt. Konrad answered briskly that it was rather late to think about it with your mouth: the position of the monarchy is such that there is no other way out;

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Finally, it is still unknown what Russia will do - whether it will declare war or will wait in order to force the cleansing of Serbia later.

The chief of staff in his memoirs complains that he received the message from the Russian ambassador about the mobilization of four Russian districts only at 12:45 pm.

At 3:45 am Konrad again arrived at Berchtold's for a joint report with him at Frapts-Yosikh. The minister received a lengthy note from the German ambassador advising Vienna not to reject Gray's proposals for mediation and saying that the "humiliation" of Serbia would be achieved, that the prestige of the monarchy and the army would not be undermined by the occupation of Belgrade and other points, but at that time to avoid a world war. In a word, the note contained everything that we already know before.

Needless to say, the document was skeptically assessed by Konrad, who did not believe in all the promises of the "mortal" enemy, especially since, in his opinion, Negroes can be forced to make concessions, but not a state with a well-organized army.

Berchtold, taking with him a note, together with Conrad and the Minister of War, went to the old Habsburg.

The report began with a clarification of what Austria would require from Serbia if she declared her obedience.

The opinion was expressed that Serbia should fulfill the entire ultimatum, point by point, and then pay all the costs that were caused by the Austrian army's mobbery.

To this, the chief of the general staff added territorial concessions from the side of Serbia, at least strictly necessary for the military position of Austria - Belgrade and Šabac - with the construction of the necessary fortifications, the cost of which Serbia must pay.

"For this," Franz Josich remarked, "she will not go."

To Berchtold's remark that Tisez was also against annexations, Konrad replied that with the pastoral spirit of the army, this could not be dispensed with. Germany should be told: Russia is mobilizing, Austria should also be mobilized.  
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"It costs millions," Berchtold replied.

"The monarchy is in a difficult position," Koprad objected to him.

On the minister's instruction that mobilization in Galicia would lead to war © by Russia, the chief of the general staff replied that if the Russians did nothing, then everything would be calm on the Austrian side. The situation will not be bad if we manage to systematically carry out our mobilization, because then at the beginning of 2771 /, the Austrian divisions will be against 33 Russians.

As a result, it was decided: 1) to continue the war with Serbia; 2) kindly respond to an English sentence; 3) to announce the general mobilization on August 1 with the fact that the first day of mobilization is to be set on August 4, which, however, still needs to be discussed on the morning of July 31.

Returning to his room from the report, Koprad received from Fleishman the orientation we spoke about above.

The Chief of the Austrian General Staff immediately replied to her: "We will not declare war on Russia and we will not soil it."

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At about 7 pm, an orientation letter from the Austrian ambassador came from Berlip, who reassured her about Germany's position, saying that Pourtales had already announced in St. Petersburg that Russian mobilization would entail German mobilization.

Thus, Vienna, having firmly decided to fight with Serbia, on that day made no concessions to Berlin, but concessions that could not actually matter in the course of events, because, under any conditions, Serbia was obliged to fully comply with the ultimatum, but did not go for it Russia. Sazonov's disbelief that Austria would leave Serbia territorially inviolable was quite well founded, for the chief of the general staff of the monarchy did not at all think of getting out of the conflict without profits, and if his assumptions were not approved, then they were not rejected either. Chicks are counted in the fall, so they thought in Venice.

From the reports of the Russian Ambassador Izvolsky, we are partly familiar with the course of events that day in Paris.

In his book on the World War, Poincaré writes: "On this day, July 30, there was still a ray of hope. In the morning, the Council of Ministers met again at the Elysee Palace. The President of the Council and Messimy, Minister of War, have been informed that Germany has taken precautions a few hundred meters from our frontier along the entire line from Luxembourg to the Vosges, and that she even keeps her troops on alert.

After a meeting with General Joffr, who was to become commander-in-chief, Viviani and Messimy suggested that the council of ministers take appropriate military measures, but keep our troops 10 meters from the border, forbidding them to come closer. Viviani immediately asked Paul Cambon to inform the British government about this measure and added: "Our plan, which is defensive in nature, foresaw, however, that the combat disposition of our covering troops should. it would also be moved as close as possible to the border. Leaving, therefore, the line of the gravitsa without protection against a sudden attack from the enemy,

the government of the republic wants to show that Francia, no less than Russia, is not responsible for the attack." Subsequently, evidence followed that the Germans had warned the Franzuz in time in the development of military defense measures and it was reported that "twice German patrols had already penetrated our territory."

The French official history of the war lists in detail all the measures of a military nature, which were adopted by the government during the day of July 30, and says that the Council of Ministers, "in view of the deterioration in the general situation, is left to an important measure: partial mobilization, but introduces some limitations in the developed

plan."

We cannot enumerate all the measures, but they really spoke of a partial mobilization: the border corps, on alert, but without calling for spares, occupied positions chosen to cover the mobilization; their patrols were not to cross the 10 km zone established along the border; corps commanders took command of the troops in the sectors determined by the plan; fortresses began work on armament and engineering defense; allowed to buy horses

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infantry and artillery; given preliminary orders for the supply of a population of horses.

Nakopets, in the evening, a telegram was sent to Morocco about sending to the metropolis, without waiting for an order to mobilize, 10 infantry battalions and prepare to send the remaining 29 battalions, and it was indicated that, no matter how difficult the situation in Morocco became from this, it was important <to concentrate first only the maximum strength in the main theater.

Taking these measures, which corresponded to private mobilization, the government of the republic carried out nx secretly and advised that the same should be done, apparently at the insistence of Zhokhfr, the allied Russian army. War is unavoidable, it is necessary to prepare for it, but one should not use the word "mobilization" in all-successful terms. This explains the phrase in the telegram sent to London that "France, no less than Russia, is not responsible for the fall."

From what has been said above, we have seen that these secret measures across the Rhine were duly appreciated by Moltke in Berlin, who was already emphatically in favor of the war, but so far also did not want to bear responsibility for the attack.

As for Lopdon, he had not yet made definite decisions about the war and, on the contrary, agreed to the German ambassador to have a pacifying influence in St. Petersburg, an attempt to which, as we shall see below, he really did. Gray immediately warned the Austrian ambassador that Vienna was on the path of a European war, and advised him to be satisfied with the occupation of part of the regions of Serbia, in order to then negotiate with Russia. The latter will never agree to the destruction of Serbia, and Gray does not find it possible to mediate in St. Petersburg without certain guarantees. Finding that Vepa was vainly avoiding direct negotiations with St. Petersburg, Gray felt that Berlin was doing little in this direction. "Sazonov will never dare to play the role of Izvolsky in 1909." Tyrell confirmed that if France entered the war, then

the position of the British government will be very difficult.

This was indeed not easy, because within the cabinet itself there was no unity of views on the war. or peace. While the opposition part of the cabinet was striving for peace, Grey, Churchill and others were already on the path of war.

Itai, the day of July 50 was decisive in the course of events, which invariably rolled along the path of war, - at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on 6 Peterdura, a decision was made to declare a common mobilization with full consciousness that an armed clash in this case was inevitable.

If this decision had not yet reverberated on the same day in other states involved or being drawn into the conflict, then the ground for the adoption of immediate "hurried decisions", as the German Chancellor's telegram indicated, was prepared everywhere. All that was needed was the first flash of lightning in order for the retaliatory strikes of thunder to be heard in all the major states of Europe. From now on, everything depended on the people who posted the mobilization order on the streets of St. Petersburg—they must be recognized as "the perpetrators of the war!"

## CHAPTER V THE EUROPEAN WAR

July 54: Sazonov's intentions to mobilize "secretly" and refusal to do so. - Sazonov's explanations with Pourtales about mobilization. — Pourtales on "lightning strikes" and "hurricane storms". — Sazonov's concerns about the Balkans. — Purtales in Peterhof. - Purtales and Frederiks. - Sukhomlinov's refutation: "Whether war is needed or not is a purely diplomatic question." - Morning meeting of Yagov with the Russian ambassador. — Wilhelm's telegram: Russia must suspend military preparations. Purtales receives a telegram from Berlin with a proposal to warn Russia that, if the mobilization is not stopped within 12 hours, a German mobilization will follow. - Night conversation between Sazonov and Nurtales. — Pourtales about the determination of the Russian government to bring the matter to an end. — Berlin's diplomatic offensive. "Course lost." — Military circles insist on mobilization. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon a situation threatening war was announced in Berlin. - The second meeting of Yagov with the Russian ambassador: "the situation is hopeless." - At 11 pm telegrams were sent to St. Petersburg and Paris; their similarities and differences. — Belief in English neutrality. — Moltke's nervousness. — His telegram to Konrad about the calm position of Austria. — Moltke's conversation with an Austrian military agent: Moltke advises Vienna. restraint in declaring war, but at the same time mobilization against Russia. — Berchtold's telegram to Berlin about the general mobilization. - Second Tezegram Moltke: to Vienna: fears for the position of Vienna. — Wilhelm's telegram to Franz Josich: a proposal to concentrate the main forces against Russia. — Addendum to France's ultimatum on her neutrality. "Falkenhayn is rushing to mobilize in Vienna. - "Who. governs: Moltke or Bethmann? › - Decision to announce a general mobilization. - Italy refuses to fulfill allied obligations. - Konrad offers his services to Berchtold to negotiate with Cadorna. — An order on general mobilization was signed. — Conrad's reply to Moltke's second telegram asking if Germany wants to enter the war? —Konrad on Wilhelm's telegram. — The development of French military measures. - The Council of Ministers in Paris and a personal letter from Poincaré to the English king. - The first note from JoFffre about the need not to be late with the mobilization. - For each missed day -15 -20 I eat territories. — Second meeting of the Council of Ministers and expansion of military measures. - Partial mobilization. Shen delivers an ultimatum. — Third meeting of the Council of Ministers: decision to wage war. — Russian telegram



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July 50, the day of the announcement of the general Russian mobilization, can be considered the first day of the European war, since in the future the two opposing political groupings of European states had only to formalize the war by appropriate state acts. Russian mobilization was such a prominent event in international relations in the summer of 1914 that it not only obscured the Sarajevo assassination, but even, in the opinion of some researchers of our day, was almost the cause of the European, and then world war. The theory of automatic mobilizations appeared, that is, the successive entry of the states of Europe into the war only because one of them announced mobilization. We are far from such a superficial theory of the cause of the European war, but we must agree that the mobilization of one of the great European states was such a major factor not only

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military, but also political significance, by which the life of other states of Europe could not pass. Below we will talk about this in more detail, and now we will continue the calendar of events of the summer of 1914 of the year, the numbers of which more and more took on a bloody color.

31 JULY

The advice of Paris on secret preparations for war was taken into account in St. Petersburg. The Daily Record says: "The Minister of Foreign Affairs considered it desirable, in order to avoid exacerbation of relations with Germany, to proceed with general mobilization, if possible, secretly and without announcing it to the people. However, it turned out that this was technically impossible, and on the morning of July 18/31, notices appeared on all the streets on red paper calling for the banners."

We do not know whether Sazonov negotiated with the General Staff about the "secret" conduct of the general mobilization, or whether he independently admitted the "technical impossibility" of hiding the transition to war. It can be said with certainty that even if there were such negotiations, then from the haste of the General Staff a negative answer to the advice of Paris would certainly follow. If it was thought there that the measures being taken to prepare for war in France remained a mystery to Berlin, then it can be seen from the foregoing that this was a naive delusion.

The appearance of "announcements on red paper" "could not have caused unrest among the foreign representatives," continues Zapis, "and one of the first to come to the minister for clarification was the German ambassador."

"Sazonov," according to Zapis, "told him that the decision taken by the imperial government was only a precautionary measure, in

in view of the intractability found in Berlin and Vienna, but that nothing irreparable will be done on the part of Russia, and, despite the mobilization, peace can be preserved if Germany agrees, before it is too late, to moderately influence its ally.

"Grach Pourtales did not hide his fears about how 3 Berlin would react to the mentioned measure."

"Record" does not designate the date of time of the conversation, and therefore we turn to the testimonies of the German ambassador.

"Early in the morning, July 51st," writes Pourtales, "I was just getting ready to go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report there the contents of the telegrams received during the night, when Major Von-Eggelipg, the military attache, entered me and informed me that on the corners of the streets the order to mobilize all the forces of the Russian armies and Navy is being slandered. And if the telegram from Vienna again revived some hope in me, now it has become completely clear to me that the war has become more inevitable.

Having learned that Sazonov was in Peterhof, the ambassador went to see his comrade Neratov. After informing him of the telegrams received during the night, Pourtales declared: "The news of the mobilization of Russia, in my opinion, will give the impression of a lightning strike in Germany ... In Germany, the general mobilization of the Russian army can only be understood in the sense that

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Russia wants war at all costs, so the news of this mobilization will cause a "hurricane storm" in Germany.

In confirmation of his conversation, Pourtales, as it appears in the Record, handed over to Neratov a note in which the peaceful mediation of Germanip in the Austro-Russian conflict was proved. "The Russian government," the note concluded, "should not lose sight of the fact that Germany is interested in maintaining the prestige of Austria-Hungary as a great power, and that Germany cannot be required to influence Austria in a direction that runs counter to her own interests."

"Under these conditions, if Russia insists on its demands and refuses to recognize the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict as absolutely necessary in St. Petersburg of the European world, it must at the same time be aware that the situation is extremely dangerous.

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In the ambassador's opinion, Neratov was apparently embarrassed by his explanations: "He did not object to me, but only stated that he would let the Minister of Foreign Affairs know about my message."

The latter, apparently, was not as "embarrassed" as Neratov, but in a conversation with Pourtales on the telechon about his references to the "hurricane of the storm" and "lightning strikes", Sazonov "answered only a few unimportant remarks."

It was difficult to scare Sazonov. The minister had many other things to do. The English staff proposed to introduce changes more acceptable to Germapius into the Formula given to Pourtales by Sazonov. Had to agree, yeah

also to ask "to convey to Gray gratitude for the friendly and firm tone of England." We will not consider this Formula, since it did not have its reconciling effect.

Serbia was offered to enter into an agreement with Bulgaria, promising her "territorial compensation" for military assistance, provided that Serbia received the fx "in another place", Turkey was reassured about the military measures taken in the Caucasus, and Austria, this "treacherous" Av - The party, which again offered to negotiate, was told that it was desirable to conduct negotiations in Lopdop and on the condition that Austria ceased hostilities.

In a word, Sazonov was too busy to carry on useless negotiations with Pourtales. The latter understood it this way, having decided to apply for an audience in Peterhof itself, and in advance he already harbored little hope" that this "direct step of his in front of the monarch could have some success in the sense that his Majesty would decide to take over back the mobilization order.

In Peterhof, Pourtales was "very friendly" received, but for all the ideas that "mobilization means a threat and challenge to Germany", he remained unperturbed calm: "The Tsar listened to me calmly, not betraying with the slightest movement of a muscle what was happening in his soul." "I got the impression," Pourtales continues, "that my high interlocutor is either gifted with self-control to an unusual degree, or has not yet had time, despite my very serious statements, to comprehend the entire menacing situation that has arisen." On the ambassador's proposal to cancel

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The emperor objected to the general mobilization that, since Pourtales himself had scrambled about Fipper, he must understand that, "for technical reasons, orders already given cannot be delayed." Then Nikolai showed he was ready) to send a telegram to Berlin about the impossibility of delaying the mobilization. already known to us, which was sent at 2:55 am on July 31st.

Nikolai II spoke out about the need to put pressure on Austria, "at the same time the monarch made a characteristic movement with his hand"; "The boy," writes Pourtales, "did not find a single answer to my explanations, which, apparently, were not appreciated by him." Pourtales's attempt to frighten Romanov with the "dangers" that "this war threatens the monarchic principle" also proved unsuccessful.

'In a word, in Peterhof Pourtales met with a rebuff, which he probably did not expect. It was necessary to act in other ways, and here on the stage was the Minister of the Court, Frederiks, who asked the ambassador to come to him. Again long proofs of the peacefulness of Hermapius flew from the mouth of Pourtales, and behind them heavy threats of war fell. The old minister surrendered and made it clear to Pourtales that "the order for mobilization was carried out under pressure from Minister of War Sukhomlinov and Minister of the Interior Maklakov." "Of the NPH, the first one was under the fear of a surprise attack, and turning pale managed to convince Emperor Nicholas that the internal situation of Russia urgently required some way out."

What Maklakov thought about the war, Dobrovolsky says in his article.

As for the thoughts of the Minister of War, in his memoirs he sharply attacks the German ambassador for "fables". Avoiding the thought that such a "noble" person as Frederiks could say something like that, Sukhomlinov writes: "I declare categorically that this was not and could not be, firstly, is a purely diplomatic question, not a matter of military competence. minister, but the one who is in charge of foreign policy.

"Probably, Count Pourtales also knows, in addition, that trait of the character of Emperor Nicholas II that he organically did not tolerate the interference of ministers in the affairs of a foreign department."

Meanwhile, news was coming in from Burlip. The Russian ambassador Sverbeev reported that from 10 o'clock in the morning he was again negotiating with Jagov, which did not lead to any agreement. "Jagov repeated to me," Sverbeev telegraphs, "that negotiations are already difficult because of our mobilization against Austria." "In general, I found that Jagov is extremely gloomy."

At 11:30 a.m. in Berlin, a report was received from Pourtales and Helms about the announcement of a general mobilization in St. Petersburg, which Jagow told the Russian ambassador "with extreme exclamation" when he summoned him to his place. The minister pointed out that Germany was compelled to respond by declaring "a situation threatening war" and then "immediate mobilization."

Such were the telegrams of the Russian ambassador from Berlin.

But, in addition, immediately upon receipt of the news of the announcement in St. Petersburg of a general mobilization, at 2 hours 15 minutes in the afternoon in Berlin, Wilhelm's telegram was sent to Nikolai, received in Peterhoff at 5 hours 15 minutes in the afternoon.

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This telegram crossed paths with a telegram sent by Nicholas about the technical impossibility of canceling the previous order for general mobilization.

Wilhelm's document, beginning with indications that Berlin was trying to act as an intermediary, stated that at this time "reliable news was received of serious preparations for a war on the eastern frontier." "Responsibility for the security of my empire compels me to take preliminary measures of protection," wrote Wilhelm, adding: "In my efforts to preserve the peace of the world, I have reached the limits possible and the responsibility for the disaster that threatens the entire civilized world will not fall on me." Demonstrating that no one threatens the "power and honor of Russia", recalling the friendship bequeathed by "grandfather", Wilhelm ended the telegram with the following indication: "The European peace can still be saved by you, if only Russia agrees to suspend military preparations, threatening Germany and Austria-Wergria". |

"Shuol 31, at 11:10 pm," writes Purtakhes; - I received a telegram from the imperial chancellor" which said that the general Russian mobilization called Hermapiy "to proclaim for the security of the empire a co-stolion threatening the danger of war, which, however, still does not mean mobplizadia."

"However," continues the telegram; - mobilization should follow in the event that Russia does not suspend military preparations for 12 hours, pravleppy both against the pass and against the Austro-Venetian

'rii, and will not give us definite statements on this subject. |

Pourtales was instructed to promptly bring to Sazonov's svbdepiya this, if not an ultimatum, then a diplomatic document close to it. "This order to Mr. Sazonov," the ambassador writes, "I carried out at 12 o'clock at night from July 31 to August 1." The conversation of diplomats did not give cases to the peaceful outcome of the conflict. Sazonov repeated that technically the mobilization could not be stopped, that the mobilization was not yet at war, that Nikolai solemnly declared that the Russian troops would not undertake hostile actions while the negotiations were going on. The ambassador was not satisfied with what he had said and demanded a promise that military operations would not go wrong, even if the negotiations broke down. "Since Sazonov," writes Pourtales, "answered my question in the negative, I told him that in such a case it was also impossible to have a claim on our command of the armed forces if it refused to wait until Rosspya concentrated on pasha border with their miraculously huge military hordes.

Pourtales stated categorically: "If Russia does not suspend its mobilization and thereby force the population to mobilize in the same way, then we will find ourselves right at the very edge of the abyss of war."

"After a conversation that lasted a whole hour, I," writes the ambassador, "left the minister of all sorts of affairs, leaving a definite impression that the Russian government was determined to take things to the extreme."

Petersburg resolutely refused to make concessions, all the more so since France supported it completely, and the English proposal was not rejected by Sazonov, but was unacceptable to Germany.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that on this day Berlin passed the

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especially into a diplomatic offensive, backed up by military measures.

"The course has been lost and the avalanche has begun to move," was how Capillary Bethmann described the general situation in the Prussian Council of Ministers as early as July 30.

In the report of the French Ambassador dated July 30, we read: "According to the statement of Comrade Secretary of State (Zimmerman - B. Sh.), military circles are very insistent on issuing an order for mobilization, since any delay deprives Germany of the advantages known to her. However, so far it has been possible to resist the pressure of the General Staff, which sees war in mobilization."

Kautsky testifies that "more than Bethmann fought against the declaration of war": "Together with him, other leading figures from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also fought, who were well aware that under any unfavorable international conditions Germany would enter the war: they did not want to prematurely break the thin thread of peace, finally woven at the last minute.

What this "thread of the world" was, shows the conversation between Yagov and Sverbeev, which took place at 10 o'clock in the morning even before the news of the Russian general mobilization was received in Berlin. At the end of the conversation, the Russian ambassador considered "war inevitable" and reported to Sazonov that he "met stubborn resistance

on the part of the secretary of state," who gave him the same answer as the nakya-pune, an answer that convinced Sverbeev of the futility of any further negotiations.

Tirpitz notes: "Already on the morning of July 31, I was informed by the naval headquarters that the foreign department considered war inevitable and that Jagow had asked if we were ready to attack the English fleet. This contradiction became clear to me when, between 12 o'clock and 1 o'clock in the afternoon, I received the news that Russia had announced mobilization.

Indeed, at 11:40 a.m., a telegram from Pourtales was received in Berlin: "The general mobilization of the Army and Navy has been announced. The first day of mobilization is July 31."

About 1 o'clock, as the History of the State Archives puts it, Wilhelm declared Germany in "a situation threatening war." How this document was signed, the sources we used do not say, and we will not try to clarify this fact.

Tirpitz says: "At half past one I was summoned to his office by the chancellor, who already had the order from the Kaiser to declare a 'threat of war'. I drew the chancellor's attention to the unity that had been achieved between us and Lopdon. Tirpitz advised Bethmann that "it would be correct to point out once again in the ultimatum that unity has essentially been achieved and that mediation is being established." At the mouth, the chancellor, with rather strong emotion, objected to me that "this has already been said many times, and that Russian mobilization is precisely the answer." Tirpitz confesses that he "almost did not hope to stop the wheel of fate, which set the Russian mobilization in motion, but, in any case, he hoped to lay the responsibility for everything that followed more decisively on the enemies."

At 2 p.m., Yagov's second meeting took place with the Russian ambassador, who was summoned by the minister to report the received telegram.

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Pourtales about the general mobilization in St. Petersburg, which Sverbeev was still not aware of. The conversation, as before, was unsuccessful: "When we parted," writes Sverbeev, "Mr. Khon-Yagov repeated that after our mobilization the situation was hopeless.

At 3 o'clock Wilhelm solemnly entered Berlin, delivering the famous speech from the balcony, in which he declared that he was being forced to wage war.

"At 11 pm," writes Sverbeev, "they bring me a leaflet concluding the ultimatum presented to Russia, and the leaflets were handed out on the streets." The ultimatum is known to us from the words of Pourtales.

Before his solemn speech, "Willy" sent a telegram to "Niki" from the balcony, in which he suggested that Russia mark off the general mobilization.

It follows from Tirpitz's words that the chancellor had already been mulling over an ultimatum to Petersburg since noon, which was sent at 11 o'clock in the evening.

At the same time, the same note was sent to Paris, almost identical in content. The only difference was that the note addressed to St. Petersburg did not indicate the full significance of the mobilization of the German

army, while France was definitely told: Mobilization inevitably means war", her position "in the Russo-German war" was requested and 18 hours were given for an answer.

Noting the difference, Kautsky says: "In the text intended for Russia, this decisive proposal, which only made the message an ultimatum, was absent."

"How to explain it? Kautsky continues. - This omission can be explained by two completely different motives: firstly, the desire of the General Staff not to alarm Russia prematurely, to leave her still hopes that, despite mobilization, negotiations can still be continued and, consequently, prevented from forcing mobilization. But the pass could also follow from the desire of the civil kandher - not to burn all the ships behind him, despite the mobilization.

"Indeed," Kautsky concludes, "in Russia the message of the German government has not yet been regarded as an ultimatum."

"On the 31st," the crown prince writes in his memoirs, "I had dinner at the New Palace, which was attended by my uncle, Prince Heinrich."

"After dinner, His Majesty walked with me and with Prince Henry in the garden. The emperor was extremely serious and did not hide from himself the extraordinary and dangerous situation, but expressed the hope that a European war could be avoided. He himself sent long telegrams to the Russian Tsar and the King of England and hoped for success.

Speaking of a dispute with his uncle over the possible participation of England in the war, which the crown prince considered inevitable, he remarks: "I met here with the same optimism that dimmed the canpler's eyes: and he firmly believed in English neutrality until the last moment. As for His Majesty, he still hesitated in assessing the behavior of England in case of war.

Meanwhile, already on this day, July 31, the English staff asked Yagov on behalf of the government whether Germany would observe the neutrality of Belgium. Jagow answered that without the request of the chancellor and the kaiser, he could not speak out about this definitely. The symptoms of England's anxiety were evident.

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Vienna also caused concern for Wilhelm and the diplomats, which we will discuss a little later. |

So, on July 31, the dynastic and diplomatic lines finally decided on a war with Russia and Francia, experiencing, however, unpleasant moments from the realization that this matter could be made nerve-racking.

Above was a report by the Khranpuz ambassador from Berlin dated July 30 that the military party insisted on announcing a mobplization. We know from Falkenhain's memoirs that, indeed, on the evening of July 30, Moltke was already convinced that the war was penalized, but for the time being he would still be restrained.

However, reports from various border points that came in abroad spoke of Russian general mobilization and, as Zweiz says,



"pervoked" Moltke. This "pervnos" condition of the chief of the General Staff was revealed in a telegram addressed to Konrad and Polucheppa in Vienna at 7:45 am on the morning of 31 pu.

Moltke's telegram said: "Russian mobilization has been announced; Austria-Hungary must remain calm while mobilizing against Rossip. Germany is mobilizing. Italy is compelled by compensation to fulfill allied obligations.

At the same time, an Austrian military agent reported to Vienna: "Moltke said that the situation would become critical if the Austro-Hungarian moparchy did not immediately mobilize against Rossip. Russia's open announcement of mobilization allows Austria-Hungary to take the necessary measures against this, which are quite explicable for society. At the same time, this would also serve as a pretext for Germaipi to fulfill his allied obligations. It is preferable to negotiate with Italy by way of compensation, so that she remains an active member of the tripartite alliance, and at the same time not a single person could be left on the Italian border. The steps taken again by England to maintain peace are rejected. Endurance in the declaration of European war is the last resort for Austria-Hungary. Germany certainly goes hand in hand.

These two documents were read out by Konrad in his memoirs and, according to the "History" of the German State Archives, were not found in German files.

One way or another, but not being able to keep silent about the documents read out by Koprad, the History of the State Archives says that Moltke expected the announcement of the general Austrian mobilization at the same time as the Russian private one. But since Vienna also wanted to avoid a war with Russia and was not sure of the firm intentions of Germany to defend the monarchy, these circumstances prompted Moltke to send the above telegram.

It seems to us that such an explanation is not entirely correct, for Moltke did not particularly worry about private Russian mobilization, and until he received information from the border, not Austrian, but German, about the impending mobilization, he sounded the alarm, because the hands of Germany were still free. Since Germany was drawn into the war, the chief of the German General Staff was afraid that Austria would not be late with mobilization, and decided to draw her first into the general mobilization, explaining to the military agent that, they say,

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in this way it is possible both to justify this before public opinion and to push Hermapia into war. |

If earlier it was possible to talk about a "local" war only with Serbia, now the war with the main enemy, Russia, fell on the shoulders of Austria, and measures had to be taken so that Vienna would not be carried away by the Serbian theater, settling in a wait-and-see situation in Galatia.

If we recall, on the evening of July 30, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff sent a telegram to Moltke stating that Austria would not declare war on Russia and would not start it. This telegram diverged from Moltke's 30th telegram on the need for Austrian mobilization and

against Russia.

Similarly, prior to receiving this telegram in Vienna, Berchtold telegraphed to the Austrian ambassador in Berlin at about 3 am on July 31: "Konrad simultaneously telegrams in response to a request from the chief of the German General Staff: "According to the orders of the emperor, it was decided to continue the war against Serbia. The rest of the army is mobilized and concentrated in Galicia. The first day of mobilization is August 4th. Order of mobilization will be announced today on July 31st. Please let me know the expected first day of mobilization in Berlin."

"These considerations were incomprehensible to Berlin," writes History of the State Archives.

The chief of the general staff on the banks of Eshree was really nervous: on the one hand, at 11:40 a.m., Russian general mobilization was no longer in doubt, as a fact, and on the other, Konrad was not going to declare war on Russia and start it, but Berchtold spoke about the decision to wage war against Serbia, mentioning only the concentration of part of the mobilized army in Galicia against Russia.

After the announcement of a situation threatening war, when the war had been decided in principle, Moltke asked Konrad after dinner by telegram: "Does Austria want to leave Germany under the yoke?" The telegram was received in Vienna at 7:15 pm.

However, in Berlin the situation in Vienna was considered rather serious, and at about 4 pm, after a speech from the balcony, Wilhelm sent the following telegram to Franz Josef:

"Today, I have announced preliminary mobilization measures for my army and my Fleet, which will be followed in the shortest possible time after. general mobilization is blowing. I propose to make August 2 the first day of mobilization and am ready, in fulfillment of my allied obligations, to start a war with Russia. The most important thing in this difficult struggle is that Austria should concentrate her main forces against Russia, and not disperse them with an offensive against Serbia. This is all the more important since most of my armies will be bound by France. In a company of fighting not to the stomach, but to the death, which we are entering shoulder to shoulder, Serbia plays a completely secondary role, which requires the adoption of strictly necessary defensive measures against it. The success of the war and, at the same time, the integrity of our monarchies will be achieved only when both of us, with full exertion of strength, come out against powerful new opponents. Then I urge you to do everything to encourage Italy to come together

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niyu. Everything else must recede into the background before the desire to achieve a joint action in the war of the tripartite alliance.

Such directives along the military and dynastic lines went from Berlin to the "unbearable" Vienna, in which there was no certainty even at the "twelfth hour", as German writers like to put it.

From the documents cited, the "nervous" state of the chief of the German General Staff is evident.

More calm was the military minister Falkenhayn, who sought one thing - the speedy announcement of mobilization, for which, according to the law, he was

responsible.

We said above that on the evening of July 31, a kind of ultimatum was also sent to Paris: a request for the neutrality of France in the Russo-German war. Of course, such neutrality had to be guaranteed by the Republic of Germany. If we remember, then the head of the German. of the General Staff resolved this question of guaranties from France long ago. In a letter to Conrad in 1911, he wrote about the need to demand from France the transfer of the fortresses of Verdun and Toul before the end of the war. Now, when this question was passing from the realm of conjectures into the realm of reality, Moltke made these demands. The letter sent to Paris on the evening of July 31 with an 18-hour ultimatum was immediately followed by the addition: "If the French government. declared its readiness to remain neutral - which cannot be assumed - kindly, Your Excellency, declare to the French government that we must demand, as a pledge of neutrality, the provision of the fortresses of Toul and Verdun, which we will occupy and give up after the end of the war with Russia. The answer to the last question should arrive here no later than tomorrow (August 1 - B. Fri.), 4 o'clock in the afternoon. Fop-Bethman-Hollweg.

True, this document was not shown to the French government, for the chancellor rightly himself pointed out that "it is impossible to assume" the neutrality of France, but, in any case, the document was written and sent, characterizing the assumptions of the German general headquarters.

Assessing this "addition", Kautsky writes: "It is clear as one can see that no French government, even if it were Jaurès's most peaceful government, could fulfill these demands. Consequently, the question of neutrality had the pelev "not to limit. fire in the east", but on the contrary, immediately force France into war.

How Moltke himself looked at the neutrality of France, we will see below.

For Falkenhain it was also "clear as in the palm of your hand" that France would enter the war, and therefore, on the evening of July 31, in a conversation with the Chancellor, he again pointed out the danger of being late with mobilization.

After the war, France used the plans of the former Chief of the German General Staff and retaliated in kind, demanding the transfer of a number of German fortresses in order to preserve Germany's "long" neutrality. Verdun, as you know, was a "minor" not only for the French, but also for the German army.

So, by the evening of July 31, Berlin was ready to turn into an armed one:

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camp, not suspecting that such a state of affairs would last for quite a long time, eventually leading to Versailles.

Now let's see what happened in Vienna, which caused Moltke's "firstness".

On the morning of July 31, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had already informed the Chief of the Austrian General Staff that Germany wanted to present an ultimatum to Russia. Thus, Berlin's decision on the ultimatum was taken

them even before they received Pourtales' telegram announcing the general mobilization in Russia. |

At 7:45 a.m. Conrad received the first telegram from Moltke and a report from a military agent from Berlin. With these documents, the chief of staff went to the Minister of War and, taking him with him, appeared to Berchtold. Both ministers of the president (Tissa and Shturgk) and Buryan were already there.

When Koprade announced the received telegrams, Berchtold exclaimed: "Good luck! Who rules: Moltke or Bethmap?!" and immediately, in turn, read Wilhelm's telegram to Franz Josef. It said. that the Kaiser could not refuse Nikolai's request for mediation and asked to confirm the statements of Austrian diplomats that after the occupation of Belgrade or another area, Vienna would stop the offensive.

If this telegram spoke of Wilhelm's desire to avoid war, then his chief of staff considered it inevitable and recommended that a general mobilization be announced in Austria as soon as possible in order to put Germany in this way. before the need to fulfill allied obligations.

Even now Berchtold was still afraid that Hermannia might get away with it, but one way or another it was necessary to think of drastic measures, and it was considered necessary to immediately declare a general mobility as a measure of protection against Russia's falladepia. However, do not declare wars on Russia and start it yourself. In this spirit, the diplomatic representatives of the monarchy abroad and the press should have been shaped.

The Minister of War went with the prepared order to the office of Rappa Joseph for signing.

At that time two notes were received from Rome. The first of them, from Prime Minister S. Giuliano, read: "Since the tripartite alliance has a purely defensive character, and since the Vienna Cabinet, by its violent action against Serbia, provokes European equilibrium, without first entering into negotiations about this, with the Roman government, Italy does not consider itself obliged to take part in the war.

We will not cite Coprade's anger at the "Machiavellian soPHISMS" of Italian politics, which has now thrown off its mask. However, Italpi's refusal to form an alliance and Berlin's instructions about relations with Rome had an effect on the Viennese diplomats: Berchtold spoke of the need to enter into negotiations with Italy about compensation for her participation in the war. The chief of staff believed that if Italy acted actively, then she could be promised compensation and even donate Valona. As we can see, Conrad sharply changed his tone and suggested that Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff, try to negotiate on the military line, suggesting that, in the spirit of the negotiations that had been going on until now, to involve Italian

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PONY AS PIANO

Yang troops to active operations. In his opinion, Germany should come up with the same proposal. If Italy evades this time as well, then any maritime convention of the tripartite alliance ends. We think that, in sending the above telegram, the Roman government in general did not highly value the tripartite alliance as a whole, and not only

maritime convention.

The ministers sat down to sit down to discuss questions of English mediation and concessions to Italy, and the chief of the general staff went home.

— At 12:23 p.m., a signature was received at the military ministry  
ny order for general mobilization, which was immediately published.

At 0445 hours, a German military agent informed Konrad of the announcement in Berlin of a situation threatening war.

At 7:45 p.m. Koprade received from Moltke a telegram already known to me, asking him whether Austria was thinking of exposing Germany to a blow?

The Chief of the Austrian General Staff immediately dictated a telephonic reply to Moltke in the operational bureau.

"By general mobilization and concentration in Galatia," Konrad wrote, "Austria-Hungary has documented its will to war. The last telegram (of Konrad - B. Sh.) meant to wait for the declaration of war. By the time the telegram was sent, when there was no news about Germanip's assumptions about mobilization, but, on the contrary, from Germanip's negotiations with England, it could be seen that it was in the interests of Germany to smoke up the conflict by the world. We were forced to go to war with Serbia, while Russia mobilized. To this day, we are still not firmly convinced that Russia does not intend to confine itself to threats alone, and therefore we can not refuse an offensive against Serbip. A completely different situation would not develop if Germany told us that she wanted to enter the war at the same time. I ask for clarification on this matter."

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Thus, even after Hermapia was on the verge of mobilization, and, consequently, war, which VKonrad was also explained by Moltke, Vienna was still not sure of Germany's desire to fight and believed that at the last moment "brave cowards will give up their positions.

After 2 hours, Conrad read Wilhelm's telegram, which we quoted above. In his memoirs, the former chief of the General Staff speaks of this document with bitterness. Transportation to the Serbian front was already in full swing, and there was no need to bring chaos. Conrad thinks that instead of rather "lame advice and teachings" it would be better if Germanpi's decision on the war with Russia followed earlier, when the main forces of the Austro-Hungarian army were immediately sent to Galidia. The "advice" about a friendly course in politics with Italy was also belated, especially since Ptalía's refusal to participate in the war was the result of the erroneous policy of Berlin itself.

As regards Rumania, Conrad was inclined to reckon only with her neutrality. Bulgaria and Türkiye will probably take the side of Germany. The positions of England and Gresai were not clear.

France continued to develop swap military measures on the eastern frontier.

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By the morning of July 31, reports were continuously coming to Paris about the spread of military measures on the frontier; interrupted the telegram and railway

road communication.

The French General Staff in the morning issued further orders for measures of combat readiness in relation to communications, protection of military and important civilian facilities and, finally, as the official history of the war writes, "in the form of an exceptional measure, by order of the government, following the assassination of Zhores, the 2nd Kprasir brigade, which was supposed to come out, receives an order at night until further notice to remain in Paris.

As we know, the Russian mobilization made the French government have a bad night. The assembled council of ministers approved a telegram sent to Palaiologos in St. Petersburg about Francia's complete solidarity with Russia.

At 3 o'clock in the morning in Paris a telegram was received from Ambassador Burlip: "The indecisive position of the African government can cause very serious consequences, because here (in Berlin) they hope for success in the struggle against France and Russia, if they are alone. Only the possibility of interference from Upglip worries the emperor, his government confuses all calculations.

"Having inquired about this telegram," writes Poincaré, "I proposed to the Council of Ministers, which accepted my proposal, to hastily send a personal letter to King George in order to inform him of the importance of an immediate and open statement from Apglia." ,4

The letter was laced with evidence that Germany was threatening France with the development of military measures and that the latter was taking military measures in the form of "precautions". The salvation of the world, according to Poipcare, lies in the simultaneous action of the entire Entente. Recalling the terms of the agreement between Phrapdia and Apglia, which pointed to the need to start an exchange of peace, Poincaré wrote that France, like England, was doing everything to preserve peace. "I have a deep conviction that at this hour the more England, France and Russia give an example of unity in their diplomatic efforts, the more it will be possible to count on the preservation of world peace."

The letter went to Lopdon, and in Paris a message was received from the ambassador from Vepa announcing the mobilization in Austria and, finally, at 1330 hours, as the official French history of the war writes, "there is news that Germany has sent an ultimatum to Rosspi", apparently, was just preparing for shipment.

Whether this was reported to the Chief of the Frapduz General Staff, we do not know, but at 3:30 pm on July 31, Joffre submits a note to the government, in the copy of which, listing the military measures taken by Germany, indicates: "If such a tense situation continues, If the men, under the guise of diplomatic negotiations, continue to carry out their mobilization plan, which they are now doing, avoiding calling things swappmenamp, then the government needs to know that, starting tonight, a 24-hour delay in the call for reserves and sending by telegram an order to mobilize the expression

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EOP 1100000606066 3 lies in the delay in the fulfillment of our mobilization plan and will force us to immediately resort to abandoning a part of our territory, 15-20 rubles for each missed depot.

The Commander-in-Chief cannot bear such responsibility." Thus ending Joffre his note, forcing the French government to think seriously.

At the same time, information was received from Berlin about the announcement in Germany of a situation threatening war.

At 5 p.m., the council of ministers met again and, according to Izvolsky's report to Sazonov, "decided to take the fastest preparatory measures in five frontier corps, which, however, did not have the character of mobilization." "Informing me of the above," writes Izvolsky, "Margerie added that France would immediately respond to the mobilization of the German army by mobilizing its military forces."

"History" says: "The Council of Ministers, meeting at 17 o'clock, having become acquainted with this communication (a note by Zhofkhfr - B. Sh.), supported by Viviani, decides to send a telegram about private mobilization," and ironclad roads are alerted to prepare for mass transportation. At 5:40 p.m., a telegram is sent to all army corps on the northeastern border: "Start dispatching forward units. Beginning at 21:00. The telegram had in mind the transportation by rail, since the advancement of the advanced units on foot was indicated on July 30th.

Speaking about this at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, Poincaré adds that: "by agreement with the Minister of War and the General Staff, the government, wishing to maintain an impeccable position, has not yet given the mobilization request."

Apparently, Zhofhfr made some concessions in his demands.

At 7 pm, the German ambassador Shen appeared at Viviani's and informed the already well-known memory with an 18-hour deadline, declaring that he would come for an answer tomorrow, Saturday, at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. In short, he writes. Poincaré - it seemed that he was announcing his departure to us.

"The President of the Council of Ministers," continues Poincaré, "with whom I was in constant contact, hastened to inform me of his interview. We came to an agreement with him that on Saturday, when Shen reappears, Viviani will simply declare that France will act in accordance with its own interests.

An "emergency" council of ministers immediately convened to discuss Shen's statements.

On the results of this council, Izvolsky reported to Sazonov a telegram from the war minister to the war minister: "One in the morning. The Minister of War announced to me (to the military agent - B.Sh.) in an upbeat cordial tone about the firm decision of the government to go to war, asked me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our efforts would be directed against Germany and that Austria would be recognized as fiat be peoPseae "(secondary - B. Sh.).

The reader, probably without us, will compare this telegram with the earlier telegram of Wilhelm to Francp-Josich, and if he puts instead of Austria

Rosspyu and Serbia, then essentially recognizes them as identical. The "blacks" were both in a tripartite alliance and in tripartite agreement...

tingents".

So, in Paris "firmly" decided on the war.

It was about Londop. Having suffered the last failure in its attempts to be an angel of peace, British diplomacy had to find a tangible pretext for entering the war. Neither Serbia, nor Russia, nor even France could bring public opinion to the realization of the need for war. Belgium is another matter, and now we know that already on July 31 the British ambassador in Berlin was trying to find ground around this question. Without a doubt, even in London they "firmly" decided to go to war - all that was needed was a pretext, and such could be a violation by Germany of the neutrality of Belgium and a threat to the English coast. The diplomacy of the islands had only to bide its time, which it did.

We have already said above that on October 30, 1912, an exchange of letters took place between France and England. They said: "If one of the governments has sufficient reason to fear a direct attack by a third power: or to assume that the world is under threat, it should assess, together with the other government, whether it is necessary for both to act in order to prevent an attack or secure the world, and in this case jointly determine what measures need to be taken. If they are sent to hostilities, then the plans of the general staffs must immediately be reviewed, and both governments must decide how far they should be carried out.

On July 30, 1914, Camban, on the basis of existing letters, asked Gray what England would do if Germany attacked France on the pretext that France was taking military measures, or demanded a commitment from France to remain neutral in the event of wars Germanip with Russia. "Neither one nor the other," the ambassador said, "France cannot go."

The answer was given by Gray only on July 34, after the meeting of the Cabinet, in the spirit that England at the present moment could not assume any obligations. The financial question plays a big role, just as public opinion will not agree to any obligations of England.

We find an explanation for this answer in the words of Gray's assistant, who pointed out that the British government should not now give France and Russia reason to think that it has decided on war. As soon as it is established, however, that France and Russia cannot avoid war and have entered into it, then, in accordance with British interests, it should be declared that England is taking their side.

On July 28, Nicholson wrote to Buchanan that, despite the fact that England had not yet taken the side of the dual alliance, he should have seen it come to pass.

In his memoirs, Churchill speaks of disagreements in the cabinet over decisive steps; July 31, through negotiations with the opposition



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Often the Minister of the Navy of the Cabinet received the consent to support the cabinet if Germany affected the neutrality of Belgpi.

Since a presentation about this had already been made in Berlin, it was only necessary to wait for an answer, which, it could be said in advance, should be negative.

On the same day, Nicholson proposed to announce the mobilization of the army. because otherwise you might be late. Gray seemed to think this was quite fair.

AUGUST 1

Description of the day On August 1, we will start from Berlin, from where the "actual" and "legal" declaration of war followed.

In his book on the Second World War, Kautsky writes that "already at 1 o'clock in the morning, without giving orders for mobilization, they were sent to Petersburg. declaration of war."

Pourtales points out that telegram 0b of the declaration of war, with the addition of the need to hand it in on August 1 "at 5 o'clock in the afternoon" (Central European time), was received by pm "about 5 hours 45 minutes in the evening", and its decryption was smoky "at '7 pm Russian time" or at 6 pm Central European.

From this it follows that the telegram traveled from Burliv to St. Petersburg for 16 hours and 45 minutes, which, of course, is obviously false. Kautsky himself then refuted what he said above, stating that "in reality" the telegram announcing the declaration of war was sent "at 1 o'clock in the afternoon" on August 1st. True, it was sent before the announcement of mobilization, but, in any case, after the expiration of the 12-hour period established by the ultimatum. Historical justice compels us to note this Fact.

Events escalated. There hasn't been a retreat yet... Voeppy minister. Falkenhayn entered the 1st of August in his diary: "I suggested to Mpe Moltke the pttp, together with the pam to Jagow, in order to prevent Rossini's senseless premature declaration of war—I would answer: too late."

Further, Falkenhain continues: "Since no answer came from Russia, the term of the ultimatum to which expired at 12 pm, until 4 pm, I went to the chancellor to get him to go with me to the Kaiser and ask for consent to the announcement of the order about mobilization. After a long resistance, we agreed, and we telephoned Moltke and Tirpitz. At that time, the emperor himself called and ordered to come to him with an order for mobilization.

"About E o'clock in the afternoon, the order was signed by His Majesty on a table with inlays of wood - Nelson's Victory. I said at the same time: "God bless your majesty and your weapons, God will protect your beloved fatherland." Then the Kaiser shook my hand for a long time, there were tears in the eyes of both of us: The chancellor, Moltke, Tirivi, Lipker (chief of the cabinet - B. PT.), Plessen (general adjutant of Wilhelm - B. Sh.) were also present. .

So, in high spirits, with purely German sentimentality, an order to mobilize was signed, i.e., in other words, an order to declare war.

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After signing the order, all those present went home, at least the military. But no sooner had they reached their quarters than they were immediately demanded to the palace to Wilhelm.

The reason for this secondary gathering of all was the telegram received by Yagov from the German ambassador in London. According to him, oops appeared. "to confine oneself to the war only in the east, to give it the character of only a struggle of Slavism against Germanism and to prevent the outbreak of a world conflagration."

"I immediately," writes Yagov, "I went with a telegram to the palace, where, as I knew, the Kaiser was meeting with the Kanpler, the chief of the general staff and the military minister about the possibility of announcing mobilization after dinner." Accordingly, Jagow appeared in the palace after about 3 p.m.

Lpkhnovsky reported that in the morning he talked on the telehop © Gray, who asked the German ambassador whether he considered it possible that in the event of a Russo-German war, Germany would not attack France, which would remain neutral. Likhovovsky replied that in such a situation it would be possible to assume an obligation.

It is needless to say that Gray's proposal was more suited to the Berlin diplomats: to crush Russia alone—it was better to wish for.

In our subsequent presentation, we will present in detail the testimonies of the participants in this second meeting in the yard, starting from the chief of the general staff.

"I was walking," writes Moltke in his memoirs, "on the way back from the palace to the general staff, when I received the order immediately. return to the palace, where very important news arrived. I returned immediately. In the palace, besides His Majesty, I worked as a chancellor, a military man. Minister and several other officials.

The Chancellor, who saw the basis of his policy in maintaining good relations with England, and, remarkably, still thought to this day that in a general war, at least, it would be possible to avoid the participation of England, was very pleased. the content of the telegram of the German ate in London, Prince Likhnovsky. The Kaiser was in the same state. The telegram said that Secretary of State Gray had informed the Ambassador of England's intentions to undertake that France would not declare war on us if Germany, for her part, undertook not to take any hostile action against France. In addition, I must note that France on the same day, like us, announced mobilization, which we knew. As mentioned above, a joyful mood prevailed.

We had to wage war only with Russia; The Kaiser said to the MPE: "So, we are advancing with all the armies in the east!" I objected to his majesty that it would be impossible. The strategic deployment of millions of armies cannot be provisioned, it is the result of hard, many years of work and, once established, does not change. If it

majesty insists on sending all the armies to the east, then they would not be ready for battle, but would be a chaotic crowd of

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low-level armed people without supplies. The Kaiser kept on his own and was very excited, saying to me, among other things: "Your uncle (Moltke <senior - 5. Sh.) would give me a good answer!"  
- It was very painful for me. I have never claimed to be like a Field Marshal. That a catastrophe would come for us if we launched an offensive against Rossip with all the armies, having a mobilized France in the rear, there was no doubt about this for anyone. How could England guarantee Germany that France would not attack from the rear? My objection; that France had already mobilized, and it was impossible that the two mobilized states should remain for a long time without clashes, it was wrong. The mood was upbeat, and I turned out to be completely alone.

In the end, I managed to convince His Majesty that our concentration, conceived as a strike with the main forces against France and a small defense against Rossip, should be systematically carried out so that an irreparable disaster does not happen. I told the Kaiser that at the end of the concentration it was possible to transfer any strong part of the army to the east, but nothing could be changed in the very plan of concentration, otherwise I would relieve myself of all responsibility.

The reply telegram to Lopdon was drafted in the spirit that Germany was willing to accept the British proposal, but that the plan for the concentration of forces on the French border, for technical reasons, should be carried out from the very beginning. We will not fall on France if she, under the control of England, remains completely calm. I could not achieve more. The nonsense of this whole English sentence was perfectly clear to me. Already in previous years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked me about the possibility of such a situation in the war between Germany and Russia, when France remained neutral. Even then I declared that if Russia declared war on us, we must, if the position of France was doubtful, declare war on her immediately. Now, as a guarantee against an attack by France, I demanded the temporary transfer to us of the fortresses of Verdun and Toul. This proposal, as a sign of no confidence in England, was rejected.

During this whole scene I was in complete despair; I saw from these actions of diplomats, who could hinder the course of our mobilization, that in the coming war we were in danger of great misfortune. It is necessary to explain here that our mobilization plan provided for the occupation of Luxembourg by the 16th division already on the first day of the mobilization. We had to immediately secure the Luxembourg railways from French attacks, as they were intended for our concentration. It was all the more difficult for me when the chancellor declared that the occupation of Luxembourg could not be carried out under any pretext, because it would be a direct threat to France and would nullify the proposals made by England. While I insisted on my own, the Kaiser, without asking me, turned to the duty adjutant wing and ordered him to immediately send a telegraph order to Trier of the 16th division so that she "did not enter Luxembourg. I felt like I was about to have my heart broken. For the second time the danger arose that our concentration would

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crumpled. This, of course, could only be understood by someone who as a whole and down to the smallest detail studied the work of strategic concentration, where each train is calculated to the minute and where each change could have the most serious consequences. In vain did I try to persuade his majesty that we should use and provide for the railways in Luxembourg, I was stopped by the remark that instead of these roads I could use others. The order remains in effect."

"With that I left," writes Moltke. In order not to interrupt his story, we will listen to him already before the contest.

"It is impossible to describe the state," continues the chief of the general staff, "in which I returned home. I felt morally broken and wept with grief. When they brought me the telegram of the 16th division for signature, as confirmation of the order transmitted by telephone, I threw the pen on the table and declared that I would not sign it. I could not give my signature on the order, which was the first one after the announcement of mobilization orders and which introduced changes in what was systematically prepared and which the troops might consider an indication of uncertainty. "Do what you like with the telegram," I told Lieutenant Colonel Tappen. "I won't sign it." In a dejected state, I sat idle in my office when at 11 pm I was again called to His Majesty at the palace. The Kaiser received me in the bedroom. Op was already in bed, but then he got up and threw his coat over himself. He handed me a telegram from the English king, in which he stated that he knew nothing about the statements of England, which would stop France from interfering in the war. Likhnovsky's telegram is wrong, or he misunderstood something. The Kaiser was very excited and told me, "Well, you can do whatever you want." I immediately returned home and telegraphed to the 16th division that the occupation of Luxembourg should be carried out. In order to motivate this new order at least a little, I added: "Since it has now become known that mobilization has been announced in France."

"That was my first experience during this war," Moltke says candidly. "I am convinced," continues the op, "that if Likhnovsky's telegram had been received half an hour earlier, the Kaiser would not have signed the mobilization order. I could not eradicate this experience from myself; something broke inside me, which could no longer be corrected; confidence and trust were undermined."

We listened in detail to the testimony of the Chief of the German General Staff about the "English incident", heard how he defended the inviolability of the strategic deployment plan worked out over the years, when the diplomatic and dynastic lines thought that this plan could be changed at the last minute. The sufferings of Moltke passed before us, which shocked him so much that from August 1 he began to follow the path of defeat until he reached the Marne. One can, of course, challenge such a conclusion, but that the incident of August 1 was the beginning of the end of the German commander is beyond any doubt.

His future deputy, Minister of War Falkenhayn, describes what happened as follows: "When the order for mobilization had already been announced," writes Falkenhayn in his diary, "I was again summoned by telephon to His Majesty ... I found another lively exchange of opinions between camp-

12 Army brain. Neither. 3.177

Lehr and Moltke about the response telegram compiled by Yagov on the orders of the Kaiser. Moltke telephoned to Trier that the 16th Division should not go immediately to Luxembourg. He argued that all was lost, since the emperor's decision showed that he still and now hopes for peace. I comforted Moltke. I shared his conclusion about Wilhelm's decision, but there could be nothing irremediable for Moltke in this if Wilhelm's orders had been delayed in time; the emperor at this time preferred humanity. Of course, I did not for a single moment allow the thought that the telegram would change anything in the horrific drama that began at 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

Speaking further about the receipt of the second and third telegrams from London, which destroyed all the hopes of Berlin diplomacy, and that the Kaiser allowed Moltke to occupy Luxembourg, Falkenhayn notes: "The Crown Prince visited me and asked if negotiations with London could affect the order about mobilization. I answered: to be sure, then no, just as, unfortunately, as far as the human mind makes it possible to predict, they could not influence the war either, and "unfortunately" answered the thoughts of His Majesty and humanity in general.

Thus Falkenhayn, who did not for a moment doubt the futility of negotiations with London, considered that the strategic deployment of the German army would not be thwarted if there were a delay in the occupation of Luxembourg. The political advantages of the Minister of War's negotiations took precedence over the military interests of Moltke.

We will not dwell on those telegrams from London that caused open clashes between the military line and the diplomatic and dynastic lines. Jagow in his memoirs rather modestly states that the Kaiser's "peacefulness" went so far that he postponed military operations for two "precious" days, just to clarify the situation. Berlin at all costs tried to keep London out of the war.

The "History" of the State Archives, speaking of Moltke's nervousness on August 1, finds that the Chief of Staff was "facing a decision that could have the most grave consequences."

Of course, it cannot be denied that Berlin diplomacy was going through a lot that day: the time was approaching when, in the absence of answers to the ultimatums sent by Russia and France, it was necessary to make a formal declaration of war. As for Russia, at 1 p.m. on August 1, even before the whole history of negotiations with London, a declaration of war was sent to her. So far no such document has been sent to Paris. But on the other hand, Shen had an "addition" in his pocket: in the event of Francia's neutrality, the

To send the German army of Verdun and Tul. Thus, on the one hand!, Bethmann sent the "addition" to Chariz, and on the other hand, according to Moltke, German diplomacy did not want to reveal it to England, so as not to disrupt negotiations with it. The usual diplomatic trick was being prepared, designed by no means for honesty.

To finally establish the balance of power on August 1 in Berlin, let's listen to Tirpitz, who was not a fan of either the General Staff or diplomacy.

And

The admiral does not say anything about the collision between the Kaiser and Moltke.

"August 1," writes Tirpitz, "at a meeting of the Allied Council, I learned that, following the ultimatum, we sent a declaration of war to Russia. I found this very disadvantageous for Germanus. Pointing out that Italy and Romania, for formal reasons, could evade participation in the war, the admiral continues: "I got the impression that in this direction, too, our actions developed completely thoughtlessly and without any guidance, and my feeling was indignant by the fact that we, essentially the defending side, by the grace of the jurists and the foreign authorities, had to bear the brunt of the attack, although we could not entertain the intention of invading Russia. Therefore, leaving the meeting, I asked the captain why it was necessary that the declaration of war coincided with our mobilization?"

"The chancellor replied that it was necessary, because the Armenian wanted it. immediately move troops across the border. The answer surprised me, since it could have been a matter of patrols at the most. However, all these days Bethmann was so agitated and irritated that it was impossible to talk to him. I can still hear how he declared several times with raised hands the absolute necessity of declaring war, thus interrupting further discussion of the issue.

Moltke, whom I later asked whether the declaration of war had necessitated crossing the frontier, objected to the idea that there was an intention to immediately move the troops across the border. Moreover, he told me that from his point of view he did not consider the declaration of war to be of any value to us.

Thus the riddle of why we were the first to declare war remains unresolved for me. In all likelihood, this was done out of formal legal conscientiousness. The Russians started a war without declaring it, but we considered it impossible to defend ourselves without declaring war. Outside Hermapia, such a train of thought would be completely incomprehensible.

The night did not bring peace. It is true that Wilhelm, having given freedom of action to his bedchamber of headquarters, went back to bed, but... "On the night of August 1-2," as Tirpitz writes, "the chancellor repeated the argument about our declaration of war, this time about France. Kapiler believed that we should immediately declare war on France, since we intended to go through Belgium. The admiral considered it necessary to declare war when the army entered the territory of France, and "raised the question of whether the army could not refuse to march through Belgium. Moltke declared that there was no other way." Pointing out that in such a case one must reckon with "the immediate declaration of war by Applia," Tirpitz proposed "to send a message to Belgium as late as possible." "It was agreed with me that we should wait until the second day of mobilization, however, this was not done," and already on August 9, Bethmann informed everyone about the possibility of developing operations through

Belgium.

"The impression," writes the admiral, "that our political leaders had lost their heads, became more and more disturbing ... From the moment the Russian mobilization was announced, the candler gave the impression of drowning

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of our ... Leaving the meeting, the military spoke with horror to me about the state of our political leadership."

"When the Kaiser became convinced of the failure of his efforts to save the world, he was deeply shocked. One person who had long been close to him, who met him in the first days of August, said that he had never seen such a tragic and agitated leader as the Kaiser had these days.

We understand quite well the state of the "brave coward" that Wilhelm was when he was driven against the wall and when he saw that peace alone could not be achieved, but action had to be taken.

So, by the morning of August 2, only Russia was finished, and unity had not yet been reached on the question of declaring war on France.

"After the deciphering, carried out at 7 pm Russian time," Pourtales reported from St. Petersburg at 8 pm, "I asked Mr. stop hostilities against you and Austria. After answering the question three times in the negative, I handed over the note I had received.

The German ambassador had a lot of trouble. According to his recollections, on the morning of August 1, that is, after the delivery of the ultimatum, he began to send his people to Frederiks and Vrivoshein, "who, as I knew, stood for peace." He wrote to Frederiks that if the ultimatum was not carried out, then war was inevitable, and it "would be a terrible danger to all monarchies." An embassy official sent to Krivoshein "got the impression from this brief conversation with the minister that he was opposed to the war." "Subsequently, I heard that at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, which was of decisive importance, Mr. Krivoshein spoke in precisely this direction." If we recall the Daily Record, which noted all the efforts of Krivoshein for the war, we can say that the ambassador attacked the wrong person.

Pourtales himself was sitting at his place: "It seemed to me inconvenient," he writes, "to be away from the embassy for a more or less long time, "every minute I could expect to be taken out by telephon from Mr. Sazonov or from Count Frederiks."

Indeed, at about 2 p.m., Frederiks reported on a telegram sent to Berlin by Nikolai, which was received there at 2:47 p.m., i.e. after sending to St. Petersburg the declaration of war. "I understand that you must mobilize your troops," Nikolai said, "but I want you to have the same guarantees that I gave you, that is, that these military preparations do not mean war, and that we will should negotiate for the sake of the well-being of our states and world peace, dear to all of us. The telegram in Berlin had no effect, contrary to Fredericks' alleged hopes.

Pourtales characterizes the situation in St. Petersburg as quite calm: "there was absolutely no general military enthusiasm."

"It was noon on the 1st of August. This hour was met in St. Petersburg in a calm mind, - plows the former quartermaster general Danilov, -

that everything consistent with the dignity and greatness of Russia was done in order to save the world from attempts on it by the German emperor and his government.

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Pourtales did not wait for a telephone call from Sazonov either, and at "five o'clock, Mr. Pourtales," as the Daily Record notes, "calling barop Schilling by telephone, said that he needed to see the minister without delay. Baron Schilling replied that S. D. Sazonov was at the present moment in the council of ministers on Elagin Island, and promised to notify the ambassador at once as soon as the minister returned. This was done at the beginning of the seventh hour, and Count Pourtales soon arrived at the ministry. Warned about this, SD Sazonov did not flatter himself with any hopes and said to Baron Schilling: "Ov will probably bring me a declaration of war."

Indeed, at 5:45 p.m., Pourtales received a telegram with the text of a declaration of war, which he was to deliver at 5:00 p.m. CET. "The deciphering of the telegram was already over at three-quarters of seven... At about 7 o'clock in the evening I was at Mr. Sazonov," writes Pourtales.

We will not dwell in detail on the very scene of the declaration of war and on the fact that Pourtales in a hurry handed over the note with a double edition, since he did not want to transmit it, but only read it out, and left at the request of Sazonov as an aide-mémoire, and not a document. According to Russian sources, Pourtales was voluptuous, "handled" the note with trembling hands, "cried" when it left. and Sazonov was the embodiment of complete calmness and firmness. According to the memoirs of Pourtales, at the request, Sazonov, "deeply touched, threw himself on my neck", "bitterly complained about the German ambassador in Vienna, as the culprit of the war", and in conclusion he declared: "What could I do as Minister of Foreign Affairs, when the Minister of War announced to the Emperor that mobilization was necessary? "During this last conversation with him, Mr. Sazonov made an impression on me. complete helplessness: this strengthened my view that during the last phase of the crisis, he completely surrendered to the will of the current and turned into a limp tool of military harassment.

Sukhomlinov strongly protests against such statements by the German ambassador, and, indeed, not without reason. Sazonov was a "weak-willed instrument" not only of "military" but also of his own diplomatic "harassment", following the lead of his irresponsible chipovniks, like Basilia and the so-called. individuals who sought to "make politics", and most of all, "their career".

In a word, both diplomats, having cried into the waistcoat, said goodbye, and we do not know if they ever met again.  
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"Having summoned immediately A. A. Neratov and Baron Schilling," says Podepnaya zapiska, "the minister reported on the conversation that had just taken place and instructed to immediately notify who should be informed of this, while he himself telehoped reported everything to the emperor.

"Baron Schilling, for his part, hurried to telephon to the chairman of the council of ministers, the military and naval ministers, the minister of finance, as well as the Khranpuz and British ambassadors. At the same time, appropriate telegrams were sent to our representatives abroad.



with notification of the subsequent declaration of war against us by Germany.

How did the military line react to the declaration of war?

Sukhomlinov in his memoirs did not say a word about the TV

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FONPOM phoned Schilling about this and, on the contrary, indicating that his report scheduled for August 1 was postponed, says that until August 2, he, the Minister of War, was in complete isolation from decisions on war or the MPR. To what extent such statements do not correspond to reality, we have already said above.

Yanushkevich took with him to the grave his experiences at the time of the declaration of war.

His assistant Dunploff writes in his memoirs: "I vividly remember this day on August 1st. It was a wonderful summer day. It was already evening when the first news was received at the main department of the General Staff that Germany had declared war on us. Having completed all the necessary orders, I, at the request of the Minister of War, had to see our Minister of Foreign Affairs, SD Sazonov, in order to orient him in the measures taken. I was told that he was at a dinner with the British ambassador, on account of which I arrived at an old stately house that stood on the embankment near the Trinity Bridge and was occupied by the said embassy. I distinctly remember the calm confidence and satisfaction that breathed on the face of our minister, who came out to me in a separate room. The mood of S. D. Sazonov was for me a vivid proof of that atmosphere, friendly to us, which soared in the mouth of the house ... I left there much calmed  
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"WITH. D. Sazonov, Danilov continues, who personally knew me, asked me how I look at the future of the unfolding events. I replied that the struggle would be stubborn, for the concentration of all our forces on the theater of war alone would require several months; The result of the war will be for us in direct proportion to how our internal situation develops during its course. We must not: forget the past Japanese war and 1905 ... "

"I must, however, conscientiously make a reservation," adds Danilov, "that, speaking of the duration of the war, I still did not mean its four-year duration; I only warned against the frivolous optimism that has gripped many."

As for Austria, Petersburg continued to "remain in relations" with it, as Sazonov's telegram to Vienna dated August 1 stated, but on the same day the Russian ambassador to the Austrian court was told: "In the event that relations break down also between the Pami and Austria, you will have to leave here with the entire composition of the embassy, asking your Spanish colleague to take over the protection of our interests in Austria-Hungary."

Simultaneously with the telegram announcing the war from Berlin, a telegram was sent to Petersburg from London to Buchanan with a proposal to immediately receive a reception at Peterhof and convey "a personal message from King George."

"About a quarter past seven," writes Buchanan, "Sazonov, having given me a reception at Peterhof at 10 o'clock, telephoned me that Count Pourtales had just informed him that Germany considers herself at war with Russia." By 8 o'clock he came to dine with me and brought with him a draft reply to the king's telegram, which he asked me to convey to the tsar.

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The personal message of the King of England again called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict and the offer of services in mediation. At Buchanan's suggestion, a reply letter was drawn up in Petergokh, which "at this solemn hour" assured of a sincere desire to prevent war. "Now that it has been imposed on me, I fall down that your country will not refuse to support France and Russia."

"Only after 1 o'clock in the morning did I return to the embassy," continues Buchanan, "surrounded by an excited crowd, eager to find out if Russia can count on the support of England." Apparently influenced by all the experiences of the evening of August 1, Buchanan "dared to say to the British government: 'If we stand aside, we will lose all our friends in Europe; even apart from the question of our own security, we cannot allow Germany to crush France; sooner or later we will be forced to intervene in the war, and the longer we delay intervention, the more expensively we will have to pay with foam."

The ambassador immediately adds that "this telegram arrived in a distorted form, interrupted in the middle of a phrase." Byuokenen's position was not pleasant.

With Buchanan's departure from Petergokh, Wilhelm's last telegram was received there, sent from Berlin at 10:55 am and received at Peterhof at 1:15 am between August 1 and 2. The telegram again offered to give a "clear and precise answer" from the Russian government, which was seen as "the only way to avoid innumerable disasters." Until this answer, Wilhelm refused to discuss Nakolai's proposals and "asked" "to give an order to the troops not to cross the German border in any case."

Petergokh was perplexed. "Sazonov asks how to explain such a request after last night I delivered a well-known note," Pourtales reported. "I replied," he continues, "that, in my opinion, the only explanation could be that my emperor's telegram was probably sent the day before yesterday, at 10:45 pm."

Kautsky considers the sending of this telegram: "undoubtedly one of the strangest episodes in the terrible comedy of errors on August 1..." "The only correct explanation, of course, did not occur to the German ambassador, but even if he I wouldn't dare to tell him. The explanation was that his "most merciful sir", together with his advisers, completely lost their heads."

Kautsky further refutes all the Germanic data about parachuting by the Russian frontier troops. The author of this work had to start a war 12 versts from the border, and the telegram declaring war was received at the headquarters of the border cavalry division only at 12 o'clock in the morning from 1 to 2 August. Until that time, not a single Russian siding had crossed

frontier line separating the hostile sides, and around 1:00 am on August 9, Russian patrols were on German territory.

We believe that the conclusion disseminated by Germany: "Russia has started a war against us" may be correct in general, but erroneous in the factual part. "In reality, things were different. Germany

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and I started a war against Russia. The German government's portrayal of the beginning of the war puts the question upside down," Kautsky rightly mutters.

"However, this was done then consciously by Berlin, because it was necessary to put the responsibility for the war on the shoulders of Russia. After the war, the need arose again to justify oneself at the beginning of the war, and again it was necessary, and so far it is necessary, to "put the question upside down."

While on August 1 in Berlin "they completely lost their heads", in Vienna this day passed more or less calmly, for the Austro-Hungarian diplomats had reached a state of headlessness much earlier.

The Austrian ambassador from Berlin reported that Wilhelm was making every effort to create such an environment for Austria so that she could throw as many forces as possible against Russia, and asked Vienna about it.

The plans of the Kaiser were to win Bulgaria over to the side of Austria; Greece remains neutral or opposes Russia; An offer is also made to Turkey to go to war with Russia; Sweden is active; Italy is required to take military action in fulfillment of her allied obligations.

It was also known that Germany had already sent an ultimatum on 31 July.

If we recall, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff offered his services to force Italy to fulfill its allied obligations and actively enter the war. On August 1, Conrad writes a letter to the head of the Italian general staff, Cadorna.

"The unexpectedly serious situation that has come upon me compels me," says Conrad, "to ask Your Excellency to continue those verbal negotiations that I conducted in strict secret with the late General Pollio. They consist in the fact that Italy, in addition to the forces assigned for the direct support of Germany under the agreement that has already taken place, will put up more forces for the allied war, appointing them for the direct support of Austria-Hungary.

"I ask you to inform me what the size of these forces would be!, when and where they would be concentrated, and then, by joint agreement of both general staffs, to establish the provisions that are necessary for the transport of these forces, similar to that as it is done with the troops sent to the aid of Germany.

At the end of the letter, Conrad "requested that a representative be sent to Vienna with the full powers necessary for this."

From 11 to 12 o'clock in the afternoon, the chief of staff with the future commander-in-chief was at the report of Franz Joseph on purely military issues.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was compiling an answer to Wilhelm's telegram, which was already known to me. Conrad sent the following to the Foreign Office as material for his reply.

"From the moment," the hand of the chief of staff wrote, "as it became known that Germany had decided to start a big war, here (in Vienna - B.Sh.) a firm decision was also made to concentrate the main forces against Russia, despite great technical difficulties. who are standing up thanks to the transports against Serbia that have already begun, which could have been changed two days earlier. Negotiations have been started with Italy by my general staff with a view to attracting Italian troops to the side of the tripartite

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alliance, and a persistent indication in this sense from the German side would be highly desirable.

"Germany can be sure that military tension will be displayed to the extreme in order to bring the greatest struggle to a victorious conpa, with the consciousness that the outbreak of wars: with the concentration of the main forces in Galipia, it will serve primarily as a cover for the rear of Germany."

At about 5:45 p.m., a reply telegram from Franz Josef was sent to the Austrian ambassador in Berlin.

Beginning with gratitude for support during difficult hours and a prayer to God for granting victories to the allied armies in their struggle for a just cause, the telegram read:

"As soon as my general staff learned that you decided to immediately launch a war against Russia and carry it out with full exertion of strength, a firm decision was also made here to concentrate the main forces against Russia. Negotiations have been started with Italy by my general staff with a view to bringing Italian troops to the side of the triple alliance, and persistent influence in this direction on your part would be very desirable.

You can rest assured that my army will exert tension to the extreme in order to bring the greatest struggle to a victorious end. My military attaché in Berlin informed me of your reception yesterday. I am very pleased with your comprehensive efforts to reinforce our fighting forces with new allies.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, my ambassador in Rome was instructed to tell the Italian government that we are ready to comply with the decision of the OP, paragraph of the treaty, if Italy now fulfills its allied obligations in full. I telegraphed and the king of Italy that we, after thirty years of peaceful work!, count on the fact that the allies will jointly throw their armed forces into this decisive struggle.

As we can see, Berchtold almost completely included the wishes of the chief of the general staff, releasing an essential, though only part, an indication of the importance for Germany of the actions of the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia. For the time being, it was not necessary to anger a stronger ally, while the "prestige" of Vienna had to be hidden.

At about 6:30 p.m., a telephone call came from Berlin, and in)

o'clock in the evening, a telegraph message was received. "His Majesty has announced mobilization against Russia," the message said. "August 2 is the first day of mobilization for the army and the Navy. Moltke".

From Conrad's side came a telegram: "Is Germany mobilizing only against Russia or also against France?"

"It is systematically mobilizing against France and Russia," Berlin answered at 10 o'clock in the evening.

This compelled the Chief of Staff at once to inquire of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the position of France. Berchtold's office replied that, according to the ambassador, France had given an evasive answer: "In the event of a Russo-German war, France will act as its interests require."

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On the same day, information was received that mobilization would also be announced in Switzerland, with August 3 being the first day. Montenegro is mobilizing, and, as a result of Russian mobilization, there is high spirits. Mobilization will take place in Belgium and Holland; Norway will remain neutral, and Sweden will not be on the side of the tripartite agreement and, possibly, will oppose Russia.

These were the results of the day of August 1 in Vienna, but they would be incomplete if we did not mention the letter that Conrad sent to Moltke at 7 pm, that is, already knowing about the mobilization of Germany, dated it on August 2.

"At this decisive hour," wrote the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, "I consider it necessary to address you directly in order to ascertain those wishes that I have always set as my goal.

In this sense, I find it necessary to briefly outline the development of our relations.

The threat of our South Slavic regions being torn away and propaganda working with unworthy means forced us to war.

We considered this war to be carried out without further complications.

The desire of all powers to localize the war reinforced our conviction.

Naturally, for this war we put on combat readiness such forces that, by their numbers, ensured success.

When Russia, by mobilizing her southern districts, created a threat to our empire, we turned to Germany with a request to declare that this mobilization of Russia threatens both us and Germany.

At the same time, the mobilization of the remaining parts of the army and their concentration in Galicia were envisaged.

In this situation, we had to declare, just as Germany wanted it, that our military measures were directed only against Serbia and further mobilization would only be a defense against the Russian threat.

attack.

It was hoped that these measures, supported by vigorous diplomatic pressure from other powers, especially Germany, would deter Russia from hostile actions against the monarchy, giving the latter the opportunity to wage war with Serbia.

In such a situation, we could and should have firmly adhered to the idea of an offensive against Serbia, especially since the case of a simple threat to Russia was not ruled out, without an actual declaration of war on us.

While the powers, and Germany among them, intervened only diplomatically, Russia not only stopped its mobilization, but expanded it into a general one.

Meanwhile, our shipments to the south, which had begun, were in full swing.

From the diplomatic negotiations taking place at that time, we concluded that Germany, in the event of an attack on us by Rossini, would fulfill her allied obligations, but that it would be desirable to avoid a European war.

"Remaining at our decision to continue operations against Serbia, defense against Russia, with which we

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could not lead, it was decided to entrust the forces concentrated in Galicia, as well as, in addition, the threat of Hermapia against Russia and the intervention of other powers should have served.

It was only on July 31 that Germany unexpectedly announced that she herself wanted to enter into a big war with Russia and France.

This created a completely new situation.

In accordance with it, it was immediately decided to concentrate the main forces in the north, and I ask, Your Excellency, to be sure that this will be carried out, despite the great difficulties with the already ending transports on the line.

I fail to overcome all the difficulties that arise from the modern provisions.

I will inform Your Excellency of all the dates as soon as the situation is clarified in detail, and I ask you to keep me informed about the same.

We think that this letter from the Chief of the General Staff to Moltke is only a neat fixation, characteristic of the bureaucratic way of thinking and habits of Koprak, of what was known to Moltke a long time ago, and is now also known to our reader. If we hindered the reader's attention by reading this document, it was solely with the desire to show what the chief of the general staff on the banks of the Danube was doing during "these decisive hours", as he himself writes about it. Friends - friends, according to the documents Conrad needed. True, the receipt and presence of these documents on German territory is now denied by such a high institution as the State Archives, but we are inclined to believe in the truth.